NATO STABILITY POLICING CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

STABILITY POLICING

Edited by
Dr. Joanna Siekiera



PAST PRESENT FUTURE

MISSIONS' CHART

1. 1946/1949 US Constabulary - Germany
2. 1995 NATO Mission - Kosovo
3. 1999/2003 UN Mission - Kosovo
4. 1999 UN Mission - East Timor
5. 2002 NATO Mission - Iraq
6. 2005 UN Mission - Sudan
7. 2006 NATO Mission - Iraq
8. 2008 UN Mission - Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia
9. 2008 NATO Mission - Kosovo
10. 2010/2011 NATO ISAF Mission - Afghanistan
11. 2017 Humanitarian Relieve Mission - St. Martin
12. 2018/2022 EU Mission - SAHEL
13. 2021 NATO Resolute Support Mission - Afghanistan


2
9
3
13
10
5
7
6
4

NATO Stability Policing

Beneficial tool in filling the security gap
and establishing the rule of law, and a safe and secure environment

Edited by
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Vicenza 2024

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHORS AND MISSION

Authors & Missions

General James Everard, (ret)
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INTRODUCTION

Dr. Joanna Siekiera
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PREFACE

Lieutenant Colonel Marti Grashof
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PREFACE

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1. Foreword

In the last few years, the Alliance has faced a dramatic evolution of the security environment, whose old and new threats have drastically broadened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security challenges well beyond traditional military bounds. In this framework, marked by an endemic complexity driven by the multi-region, multi-dimensional, and multi-domain operating environment, Stability Policing, traditionally a "bridging factor" among worlds, is emerging, once again, as a booster for innovation for many forms of interaction between traditionally incontiguous cognitive worlds, such as the "Internal Security" world and the "Collective Defence" world.

Under this perspective, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) is ready to take on its role of driver of this process of constant innovation: while confirming the incredible benefits of the "blue lens" applied to stabilization operations – an approach rooted in the 90s of last century – an evolved Stability Policing doctrine will face the new scenarios with the confidence allowed by an uncontested base of lessons learned and expertise, meticulously gathered in many theatres of operation by the Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, that will always be ready to provide the Alliance the best and most up-to-date doctrinal, educational and research products.

This book is a tribute to the roots of Stability Policing, on whose solid bases NATO SP COE is building the future of this peculiar doctrine, that remains – and this is its real value – a "bridging factor" among worlds.

But this is not a collection of lessons learned. To collect, analyse and exploit lessons learned there's a very specific cycle, that leads to very well-defined doctrinal products. And this is not the case, nor the intent.

This book – the first of a unique and precious trilogy – is a collection of "cognitive experiences", I want to emphasise, the feelings and personal perspectives of Stability Policing operators who navigated the difficult seas of a crisis, whatever it was, trying to make a sense of their expertise in a stranger country, with stranger people, with unusual, often unexpected threats to face.

These perceptions, these emotions, these experiences constitute the solid base that is the very reason of existence of Stability Policing doctrine – and as a consequence, of the existence of NATO SP COE – across the years, the missions, the debates, the doubts, the confrontations, the failures, and the success. These exceptional observers accomplished their tasks, overcoming the challenges they had to face, with their ingenuity, their improvisation skills, their passion, and ultimately with their sacrifice.

This is the humus in which Stability Policing nowadays still finds strength to face its new challenges.

Moreover, between the lines of these vivid testimonies, there's the breath of the thousands of lives that could be protected, helped, and supported, through their path towards a new future, by Stability Policing operators.

For these reasons, for the significance of having such a density of emotions gathered in a single literary work, I praise the authors and the editor and all who collaborated to produce this book, and who will produce the next two books of the trilogy. I am impressed and admired, first of all, because I served too as a Stability Policing operator in more theatres of operations, and for having lost friends and colleagues in the Stability Policing endeavour. Reading these contents, I could revive feelings and experiences buried deep in my conscience, and I think this is the best guarantee of the effectiveness and the candour of these pages.

I recommend this reading, not only to Stability Policing enthusiasts, or to those veterans who served abroad for a stabilization mission: this is a reading for our fellow citizens, of all extractions and education. This book leads the reader across drama and tragedy, it makes them feel the dust, the smoke, the smell, the sweat… but also shows them hope, the strength

and resilience of the human congregation against barbarism, misery, and death. A sort of new humanism that puts ahead human beings and their right to freedom, welfare, stability, and happiness.

At the end of the day, this is Stability Policing: the human being at the centre. To be served and protected.

General Sir James Rupert Everard
(ret), KCB, CBE British Army

2. Introduction

Clio, the muse of history – always with a book in her hand – offers us the gift of historical awareness. But one has to read books to get to know her and benefit from her gifts.

"To Fight Against this Age – On Fascism and Humanism", Rob Riemen 2018.

If you want to lead, then you need to read. No matter how good we think we are, we can always be better. Reading helps us visualise the true nature of the challenge. It allows us to learn from the hard-won experiences of others. We can also build knowledge (what works, and what does not work), so reducing 'trial and error learning' (MSG José Lorenzo ESP) on the ground.

Reading also opens the minds to opportunity and gives us the courage to be creative. And so, we become better and stronger. I will return to opportunity.

This book contains the wisdom of decades of operational experience from experts in Stability Policing. It is about how best to fill the security gap in ungoverned, under-governed and ungovernable parts of the world. It is about bringing order to chaos, about establishing the rule of law – and the importance and difficulties in doing so. It is about engaging with warring factions, many of whom see advantage in disorder, and some who wish us harm. It is about what happens when law and order evaporate ('frenzied anarchism' (Captain Bakker NLD)) and the role of Stability Policing in re-establishing the rule of law and developing a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) for an often-traumatised civilian population.

I wish this book (the first in a trilogy) on Stability Policing had been available to me earlier in my career. I wish I had visited the Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (COE) while I was serving. Both changed my understanding of the policing / stability gap, and my mind on the benefit of Stability Policing – as opposed to Security Force Assistance (SFA).

History tells us (Michiel J. de Weger NLD) that we should be able to call on very large numbers of Stability Policing specialists. NATO frames Stability Policing within Military Police. I can understand, because only six members of the NATO Alliance have dedicated Gendarmerie-type forces (best described as police force with military status and organisation, delivering law enforcement capabilities). I guess that few Allies would wish to invent or invest in a capability they do not have – or deliver an output they assess can be delivered by Military Police. And Stability Policing can be delivered by Military Police. Just (a hard truth) not as well.

I say this from the benefit of my own experience. Stability Police (and many of us have seen Multinational Specialised Units (MSU) in action) offers 'a policeman's mind in the body of a soldier' (General Sir Mike Jackson speaking a Commander of the Kosovo Force, COMKFOR). They are the experts in Stability Policing and are expected to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police. Military Police have a much wider remit in support of the Joint Force. Yes, they can turn their hand to stability policing, but it is not their primary focus, and this comes at a cost to other tasks.

There are some common themes and many valuable lessons in these essays. To highlight just a few:

The number of challenging stability policing operations is likely to increase.

Stability Policing requires thorough training, targeted training, and experience in the field.

- You never get a second chance to make a first impression and establishing security is critical from the start of an operation. Do it well – seizing the initiative in the Golden Hour in order to close the security gap – and you greatly improve the odds of mission success.

- The clock is ticking, and the same people who at first welcomed you as saviours will soon see you as intruders. Stability Police help to foster

legitimacy and resilience and to win the battle of narratives; it can extend public support and the window of consent.

- Interoperability between Stability Policing actors can be challenging.

- Progress is often uneven, and Stability Policing requires good intelligence, understanding – and patience.

Returning to opportunity: Stability Policing is a capability in its own right. We understand its role out of area in filling the security gap and establishing the rule of law. This skill set must be sustained and enhanced. We should also look to exploit Stability Policing in enhancing resilience, in countering hybrid warfare, and in countering terrorism across Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)'s Area of Responsibility (AOR). We have barely scratched the surface here, and I hope that the Stability Policing COE will be at the forefront of this planning effort as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) develop and refine SACEUR's AOR-Wide Strategic Plan.

Finally, I suggest this book is consumed slowly, one essay at a time, over time. It is never good to rush a good thing!

London, May 2023

General Sir James Rupert Everard

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Editor of the Book, Krulak Center, Marine Corps University, USA

Lieutenant Colonel Marti Grashof,
Chief of Staff NATO SP CoE Royal Marechaussee, The Netherlands

3. Preface

We are thrilled to hand over to you the effect of our international, multidisciplinary, and fascinating journey on how Stability Policing is viewed, understood, effectively used, or unsuccessfully unemployed across the Alliance Member States. This book is the first in the trilogy as over the course of time, during hours spent on lively discussions, meeting various experts in person and online, we decided the substance is still unknown or misunderstood by many, far too many in the NATO family, while the mission of the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence is to bring the most comprehensive, cohesive, and practical usage of this tool.

The Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP-3.22 from July 2016) introduced Stability Policing as the new capability of Military Police who are the most suited for building civil police capabilities and the capacity in maintaining security and control. Military Police Units and Gendarmerie-Type-Forces are the ones who have and will undertake a range of stabilizing activities. Yet, even among those forces the very notion of Stability Policing

is unclear and thus not fully implemented to the benefit of its own mission, the Host Nation's troops/police/law enforcement bodies, and the protected civilian population. Additionally, military colleagues, police forces, and civilian advisors at each level of decision-making, including training those who will be deployed, as well as those already being trained by the NATO contingents, are left with numerous formal and merit dilemmas. When we add to that so-called the green mindset in contradiction to the blue mindset, various national preferences, and military history, we might end up with unnecessary tensions among staff, prolongation of the harsh situation in the area of operation, and last but not least, a severe detriment to the persons in need, vulnerable groups seeking for the rule of law, safe and secure environment.

As there is no common understanding of Stability Policing within the international community, while the concept of police deployment to a theater of operation is not NATO exclusive, we have to underline that this term is only legally codified and used within the NATO official terminology. Undeniably, Stability Policing came as a novel element within the set of codified norms and unwritten customs represented by the Allies. From this very fact, it must be presented to the broader audience, both civilian and military, both theoreticians and practitioners, decision-makers and advice-givers, academia, politicians, and journalists. The role of Stability Policing has to be distinctly comprehended and then properly used by Gendarmes, Military Police, and Military across the whole spectrum of NATO activities, in Land, Sea, Air, Space, and Cyber.

The aim of the project is ambitious, as such a project, ever since the establishment of the Stability Policing Doctrine in 2016, has not been analyzed on such a broad scale. We believe that through engaging international specialists, especially among the Sponsoring Nations of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, it will be possible to develop an effective SP tool for NATO. The Stability Policing Trilogy presents the broad spectrum of benefits stemming from police related activities. The Book you are carrying now documents the historical usage ("The Past" – 1st book in the series) of Stability Policing during NATO missions and operations, but also other deployments where this tool had become highly utilized in order to maximize deployed soldiers' capabilities, as well as to provide Host Nation's indigenous public services and populace's improvements for rapid and long-lasting progress. Ultimately, we must not forget that Stability Policing empowers the Host Nation in the eyes of its own populace, because using policing capabilities limits collateral damage

derived from the use of combat force and helps to establish independent and efficiently functioning democratic institutions.

The fundamental role and huge potential of Stability Policing cannot exhaust the subject in one book. Therefore, after "The Past" (beginnings, purposes, and motives of Stability Policing), The Present (current usage, obstacles, and potentials), and The Future (constantly changing international relations, disruptive technologies, and foreseen geopolitical harms) will all bring unique and valuable knowledge edited in an accessible in order to read, understand, and practice Stability Policing to the fullest potential.
Enjoy reading the authentic stories of our 13 authors representing France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Türkiye, the United States; civilians and military; academics and practitioners deployed in various places on Earth. That it may inspire your imagination and help you understand the added value of Stability Policing.

Vicenza, October 2023

Dr. Joanna Siekiera & LtCol Marti Grashof

BIO:

Doctor Joanna Siekiera *is an international lawyer, legal advisor and academic from Poland. She has been cooperating with the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence since 2021. Dr. Siekiera works as a consultant, lecturer, and Subject Matter Expert in various military institutions (i.a. Finland, New Zealand, Poland, Türkiye, USA), as well as a fellow at the United States Marine Corps University Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare. She did her postdoctoral research at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen, Norway, and Ph.D. studies in New Zealand, at the Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. She is the author of over 100 scientific publications in several languages, 40 legal opinions for the Polish Ministry of Justice, the book "Regional Policy in the South Pacific", and the editor of 7 monographs on international law, international relations, and security. Her areas of expertise are the Law of Armed Conflict (lawfare, legal culture in armed conflict, NATO legal framework) and the Indo-Pacific region, Pacific law, Maritime Security.*

Lieutenant Colonel Marti Grashof *is an officer at the Royal Marechaussee in the Netherlands. Over the course of his service, he assumed several positions in command and staff positions at operational, tactical, and strategic level. Lt Col Grashof served*

twice in Afghanistan (2006 and 2010) and one tour in Kosovo from 2015 to 2016. From 2017 until 2020 he worked within the NLD national police as head of the NLD Police and Marechaussee attachés at NLD embassies. He is an experienced military and police officer, his subject matter expertise lies in the field of border control, public order management and (stability) policing. Since 2020 LtCol Grashof holds the position of Chief of Staff at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence.

Dr. Michiel J. de Weger
The Hague University of Applied Sciences and Leiden University
The Netherlands[1]

4. Nothing New: Stability Policing from A Historical Perspective

1. Introduction

"Stability policing" is nothing new but history has proven that this particular kind of security enhancing operations are rather difficult, often achieve only partial success and in too many cases fail. Because stability policing operations are rare for western military as well as police organisations, the forces that have to perform these operations are in many cases ill prepared. This is often not caused by a lack of expertise on how to conduct stability policing, but because the number of military or police personnel skilled and experienced to successfully work in the challenging conditions in which stability policing is the (only) solution is too small. Stability policing to fill the "security gap" is plagued by the classic challenge of having insufficient numbers of specialised forces at the place and time they are needed. Because in "the West" itself security conditions that require stability policing are rare, states do not have sufficient numbers of specialised personnel needed for it.[2]

Pacifying any region or country after armed conflict or preventing it to descend into real war takes large numbers of stability police officers,

1 The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the organisations he is employed by in any way.

2 M. de Weger (2010).

now even more than previously, decades or centuries back, as a result of population growth in many parts of the world. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what constitutes stability policing, how to plan and execute it, and gather, connect and train as many military and/or police personnel as possible for this kind of work in advance of starting an operation. Because stability policing operations are rare, preserving and updating the expertise needed is a challenge, too. Operations in similar conditions, with similar goals and challenges, performed by "peers" can be decades apart. Studying the history of western, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Member States and their military and police forces providing stability policing is therefore essential. This chapter is a contribution to fill the gap in researching the beginnings of stability policing.

The aim of this chapter is to provide examples of past stability policing operations by forces from current NATO Member States. Reading these will demonstrate that stability policing is not new, has been done many times before, although often called differently. Reading these examples might motivate and help some readers to dive even deeper into these operations in particular or more broad overviews in literature on the experiences of western military forces in this specific field. Studying these and other operations can help develop policy frameworks, strategic thinking, operation designs and tactical guidelines. It might help to collect cases that could be copied to be skilfully applied to be used in future operations. The war in Ukraine started in 2022, might make a series of (NATO) stability policing operations in that or surrounding countries necessary in the upcoming years.

Without going into many details, stability policing is different from other kinds of military operations in that the aims are to reduce levels of non-military threats like large scale or politically motivated crime and public unrest. After military conflicts the levels of these can be so high that basic order and lawfulness are threatened or absent. Real military conflicts can erupt (or caused, provoked) in conditions of large-scale public unrest or general lawlessness. Challenging conditions like these have become rare over the last century in many (long-time) NATO Member States. They have become rare in most of the developed nations throughout the world but did occur temporarily or more or less structurally in (parts of) the territories governed by western powers in the past. Stability policing operations have been provided by "Western" forces domestically, in colonies as well as in wars or peacekeeping abroad. Where-ever needed, stability policing operations are aimed to counter security phenomena like insurgencies,

crime waves, terrorist campaigns, recurrent rioting, large-scale violent protests, armed gangs, no-go areas, political assassinations, etc. As examples from the past demonstrate, stability policing operations can be provided by regular infantry and cavalry units, military police, gendarmerie type forces, national guard volunteers, often in conjunction with local and national civilian, regular law enforcement organisations. In operations in colonies and abroad mixed forces of "expat" and local nationals were used and, in many cases, newly created for the occasion. From a historical point of view, what in NATO is now called "stability policing" can be performed by a whole range of military and civilian organisations, also coast guards and air forces, even private security companies, but this chapter is limited to stability policing on land by public organisations. As the cases described below make clear, often the mix of forces providing stability policing changes over time and is often – at least at the start – more determined by availability than being best for the job.

To provide some historical overview of what in NATO is currently called "stability policing", a number of cases are described below. These have been selected to provide a broad historical overview, the nationality of forces involved as well as countries and conditions operated in. The first case is a little known, but probably for many readers an easy-to-understand example of the United States (US) military in post-World War II, occupied Germany. Going back to the time in European history where large parts of current NATO Member States' own territories were still very unruly, the 19th century, in the third paragraph the challenges and tasks for the back then new gendarmerie forces are described in some detail. Demonstrating the different approach, the US military had to take, the fourth paragraph focuses on Texas in the 1820's and the decades after that, and also briefly describes US military stability policing efforts in Cuba, Nicaragua and Haiti. In the fifth paragraph the British army experience in colonial India is the topic, in the sixth the US in the Philippines. To make the point that over the centuries the challenges and efforts to provide stability policing have not changed (much), it is followed by a paragraph on the Dutch operations in southern Iraq (Al-Muthana) in the 2003-2005 period.

2. US Constabulary in Germany (1946-1952)

As Rauer (1998) describes, modelled on the example of the US State Police-forces, with a force sized on a ratio of 1 officer for each 450 citizens 'it served' (the first calculations were 38.000 men needed), the US military started planning a police force that would maintain basic order in

Germany (and Austria) after the Second World War ended. This United States Constabulary would work in addition to the regular US (Army) Military Police and local German police. While planners decided that the US mechanised cavalry would be the best choice to provide the majority of troops for the Constabulary, the desired size of the force was also calculated on the basis of 'their mobility and speed. A cavalry reconnaissance troop of 140 men could patrol a rural area of 225 square miles. Since the American zone consisted of 43,000 square miles, 192 troops of cavalry would be required.' At that time (West-)Germany was faced with 'challenges ranging from coping with millions of displaced persons to controlling hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, hunting for suspected war criminals, halting rampant black-market activity, and, most important, preventing any possible uprising against the occupation government of the Allies'. Mid-1946 some 28,000 soldier-police officers started their work. These 'constabulary troopers' were to conduct routine motorised patrols, operate roadblocks, participate in large-scale raids, cooperate with the German police, support minor reprisal actions, provide border security, execute search and seizure operations, protect U.S. military government offices, maintaining a mobile reserve, and perform military police functions when regular Military Police units were not available. The Constabulary were a mixture of armoured infantry, artillery, tank, and cavalry units, now also providing counterintelligence and criminal investigations. While using jeeps, trucks and armoured personnel carriers, the United States Constabulary were denied patrolling boats. 'Since there were no existing manuals, standard operating procedures, or handbooks for the new troopers, the Constabulary issued a "Trooper's Guide" to provide the necessary policy guidelines and operational procedures for their law enforcement work.' This stated as 'five principal duties' to preserve the peace, enforce the law, prevent and detect crime, protect life and property and arrest violators of the law, prescribing it clearly as a police organisation. More of a political nature was its tasks to forestall and suppress any riot or rebellion against the occupation (forces). The first operation of the United States Constabulary was a clear manifestation of its role in establishing basic order, stability, in extraordinary conditions. In an operation named "Grab-Bag", in May 1946, 4,000 troopers sealed of the Danube River to stop the flow of former Nazi SS members out of occupied Germany as well as the smuggling of illegal goods. The Constabulary quickly learned how to improve 'the efficiency of its activities': in-debt border patrolling would provide more effect than operating fixed or static positions, while raids required so many personnel that these should only be planned 'when there was strong indication of illegal activity.' Starting already in 1944,

the US military started training Germans to establish a new civilian police force. This grew in size over the years and 'gradually assumed a greater responsibility for civilian law enforcement.' In mid-1948, the Constabulary relinquished its police and border duties to the rehabilitated German civilian police forces, while becoming more of a regular military combat organisation itself by starting training and preparing 'for any kind of hostilities' that might occur in the changing security situation. Mostly transformed and transferred back to the cavalry, by the end of 1952 the last Constabulary units were inactivated. As Rauer concludes, the Constabulary 'helped maintain the peace and order that were vital for the successful development of post-war Germany.'[3] In other words, the US Constabulary was a very useful security instrument and provides a good example for how stability policing forces should operate.

Perito (2013) also describes the success as well as the challenges of the United States Constabulary in (West-)Germany. By the end of 1945 it was planned to consist of 32,750 personnel. To train the new force a constabulary school was established at Sonthofen, in southern Germany, at the foot of the Alps, at a former Nazi youth training academy – which in itself is not so relevant here. 'Its curriculum included courses in German geography, history, and politics, plus basic police skills such as criminal investigation, report writing, arrest procedures, self-defence, patrolling, and the role, mission and authority of the constabulary.' The school 'received professional guidance' from Colonel J.H. Harwood, a former state police commissioner of Rhode Island, including writing the constabulary troopers' handbook. As a result of redeployments and demobilisation of US Army units, the total Constabulary force that was prepared to start in Summer 1946 was reduced to 20,000 trained and ready personnel. This had to cover a territory of over 40,000 square miles, 'nearly the size of Pennsylvania', and 1,400 miles of international and Soviet-occupied zone internal German borders. This was inhabited by 16 million Germans and over half a million refugees from many (other) countries, including living in many large cities that were heavily damaged by the war. In the first 2 months of its operation the Constabulary lost 14,000 men, over 43% of its size, 'by a sudden speed-up in demobilisation'. 'The task of finding and training replacements for those who had just graduated from the constabulary school was staggering. There was also a serious shortage of NCO's and junior officers.' 'Operating in a country where black-markets provided the majority of economic activity, personnel also needed strength

3 Rauer (1998), p. 22-32.

of character, discipline, and dedication to duty. Constabulary members were subjected to a broad variety of temptations offered by people in desperate circumstances.' As Perito puts it in what is probably an understatement: 'there was no shortage of challenging assignments for the new force.' In the vast area of responsibility, it performed a number of large and widely publicised operations. In its first 6 months the Constabulary conducted 168,000 patrols. 'Over time, an analysis of crime statistics resulted in more patrols in high-crime areas.' While there were few civil disturbances involving German citizens, at times food shortages became so serious that farms were attacked, and US Army facilities robbed 'to obtain something to eat'. In response, the Constabulary had to add another task, with an anti-pilfering and protection program.[4] Despite limited personnel numbers and high demand for its attention and action, the US Constabulary clearly contributed significantly to the security in the US occupation zone in post-war Germany.

3. Gendarmerie in 19th century

Emsley (1999) is probably the most profound book on the emergence and nature of gendarmerie forces, one of the options available to some NATO Member States to deploy for stability policing operations. This particular type of military police organisation broke through internationally with the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte in the early 1800's, but was a new, improved, renovated version of a much older French force, dating back to – some argue – the time of the crusades in the early Middle Ages: the Maréchaussee set up in 1190. Bonaparte reorganised the force, becoming 'the body of men to whom Napoleon owed the restoration of order in France' and 'the most efficient way to maintain the tranquillity of a country' being an organisation 'half civil, half military spread across the whole territory'. At the time, France was 'a country wracked by a mixture of civil strife and brigandage', where the state needed a force for 'surveillance and regulatory control to maintain public order rather than... the deployment of coercive force to restore it.' In March 1800 Bonaparte ordered the set-up of a gendarmerie, to start operating 'of more use on foot' in the four major French cities of Paris, Bordeaux, Lyon and Marseilles, which 'had witnessed serious disorder during the revolutionary decade' before.[5]

4 Perito (2013), p. 44-49.

5 Emsley (1999), p. 56-58.

By 1806 the Gendarmerie had received a new, additional task: enforcing conscription legislation, and the pursuit of deserters and refractory conscripts. The Gendarmerie proved to be so useful to Napoleon and the French state that between 1789 and 1815 it was increased in size more than fourfold, judged being 'one of the surest guarantees of order' by then operating all over the country. After the reign of Napoleon, the new regime kept the gendarmerie and its military nature but subjugated it to civilian control too. By 1820 'the ministry of war was responsible for its organisation and administration, for its barracks, its discipline, and its equipment. … The corps was, however, to report to the ministry of the interior on matters relating to public order, and to forward to the minister accounts of its regular patrols. Any matters of *police judiciaire* were to be conducted under the authority of the ministry of justice.[6]

By the 1870's the Gendarmerie had 6,100 men stationed in Paris, and 20,000 in the provinces, performing the 'daily tasks they had accrued over the previous century' alongside the then growing number of local, civil policemen. By the 1880's the French gendarmerie was 'commonly called out to supervise public order in cases of workers' demonstrations and strikes. Agents of the local police were often regarded as too few or insufficiently disciplined and organised for such a task, and there was a reluctance to use the conscript army'. Gendarmes were considered 'to be experienced professionals who believed in the strict application of the law' and less likely to revert to 'disastrous shooting of demonstrators' as happened when calling on the regular military. Nevertheless, 'the problem was that the Gendarmerie was thin on the ground, even in the most populous industrial districts. Men had to be detached from distant posts for service in emergencies, and as the incidence of strikes grew and their duration became longer, so rural districts could be left for lengthy periods with skeleton brigades. When it appeared that the gendarmes were insufficient, there was no other recourse but the deployment of troops.[7]

Napoleon brought the gendarmerie to the countries and territories he conquered, while just like the new French elite kept it after Napoleon Bonaparte was ousted, so did many governments in countries and regions liberated from occupation. This included nowadays Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy (still existing: Carabinieri), Spain (Guardia Civil) and The Netherlands (Marechaussee), to perform

6 Emsley (1999), p. 70, 81 and 90.

7 Emsley (1999), p. 141-142.

similar tasks like it had in France itself: 'to enforce and preserve the state's perception of order and tranquillity, to be the eyes and ears of the government in the countryside, and to bring in the conscripts and sometimes also the taxes', at times unpopular with local authorities and populations. As 'it appeared to work effectively', gendarmerie forces undertook a multiplicity of tasks, like pursuing 'vagrants and malefactors', bringing in conscripts as well as deserters, protecting frontiers, showing 'the flag to peasants of uncertain loyalty, and provided both information on what people thought and a first line of defence against popular disorder'. Many countries' authorities used gendarmerie forces 'to centralise and rationalise their systems of government and justice' 'for the greater happiness of the state'. Moreover, the French gendarmerie proved such a successful instrument to maintain basic order, some staunch enemies of Napoleon 'copied' it, like tsarist Russia (Corps of Gendarmes) and the United Kingdom (Royal Irish Constabulary).[8]

To complete this overview, it must be noted that many of these countries introduced gendarmerie forces to maintain basic order in their colonies, where most continued their tasks after decolonization for their new central state authorities. In this lineage also the large gendarmerie forces in Brazil and Mexico should be mentioned. Interestingly, the tsarist Russian gendarmerie lived on a spread into the Soviet-Union's OMON or "interior troops", which in many cases survived the break-up into many post-communist states in Eurasia and was probably also copied by the Chinese government to form what is currently the largest gendarmerie in the world: the People's Armed Police, also very active in Xinyang and Tibet. Currently, about a third of the world's countries has a gendarmerie-like "stability police force" operating to maintain basic order as an addition to regular law enforcement and regular army.[9]

Emsley (1999) ends his seminal book on the generally successful "stability policing" efforts by gendarmerie forces in 19th century (continental) Europe with a paradox, illustrating the schism between the Anglo-Saxon and Napoleonic inheritances in the composition of national security complexes, that still causes NATO to call upon different kinds of member states' forces to contribute to stability policing operations. 'Paradoxically, almost at the moment when gendarmeries were becoming established across continental Europe an alternative model of police was created.

8 Emsley (1999), p. 155, 173, 236, 239 and 247.

9 De Weger (2009), p. 79-83.

Partly because of a hostility to things French and a dislike of deploying the military internally, the British government insisted that police should be civilian', like the new London Metropolitan Police.[10]

4. Early US experiences (1823-1934)

In his search for what he labels a US "stability force", Perito (2013) describes historical examples of US security forces and their tasks, both domestic, colonial and in deployed post-conflict conditions abroad. Although the point he makes with his whole book is that the US currently has no such force, he discusses the Texas Rangers, the US military in Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Germany, Japan and Korea. According to Perito, contemporary US "stability forces" are the National Guards and Army Military Police. In separate chapters he describes US and other nations' efforts to stabilise Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the 1990's and 2000's. He ends his forcefully written book with a model for a US "stability force" consisting of 'robust military forces … civilian police constabulary forces … civil police … judicial teams … and correction officers'.[11]

The Texas Rangers was a volunteer frontier defence force, a military unit within the Confederate army during the US Civil War, and after that a Texas State "constabulary" with responsibilities for border control, frontier defence, and law enforcement – a classical mix of stabilisation activities where states fear trouble. In the original American colonies 'ranger' local militias protected the frontiers of Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia. In Texas this kind of organisation was started when the state was still under Spanish rule, in the 1820's, when 'English-speaking settlers from the southern United States requested permission from the Spanish authorities to form militias to preserve local order. The Spanish governor … responded by organising a volunteer force based on the Spanish militia system that had been transplanted to Mexico.' From 1823 the primary role of the Texas Rangers was to protect settlers against attacks by native tribes. During the Texas war of independence (1835-1836) the Rangers were also aimed against the Mexican army. By 1835 there were a total of 168 Rangers, a third of which died at the Alamo. In 1846 the Texas Ranger companies were incorporated into the US Army, served as scouts, and protected

10 Emsley (1999), p. 267.

11 Perito (2013), p. 33-60 and 224. See Serafino (2004) for an earlier discussion of the US (lack of) capabilities for 'stability policing'.

frontier settlements against Mexican bandits. After the Civil War the Rangers were replaced with a Texas State Police Force, but recreated in 1874 as a 'permanent, professional, state-wide gendarmerie', ending the era of the 'citizen ranger', with the new force in addition to protection - fighting - against tribes and patrolling the Mexican border also held civil police powers. The Rangers spent much of the early 1870's fighting Apache on the western border of Texas, 'very close to being a soldier', but in their role as 'detective and policeman' Rangers had to confront 'outlaws, train robbers, and highwaymen'. After the Civil War the Rangers had to deal with 'revenge killings, blood feuds, and range wars, which were fought between rival bands and resulted in hundreds of casualties'. In 1916 the Rangers were 'drawn into the U.S. campaign' against the notorious Mexican revolutionary Francisco "Pancho" Villa, patrolling along the Rio Grande to deter and in necessary fight of any Mexican raids across the river into Texas and the U.S. After the end of border disturbances (1917) the Ranger force became more concerned with routine law enforcement, having contributed much to pacifying the unruly border and rural areas[12] – classical tasks of stability policing forces.

Perito (2013) also describes US experiences with 'constabulary forces abroad'; establishing new security organisations to 'enforce internal stability' during foreign interventions from 1898–1916. In 1898 a Cuban 'rural constabulary' force was created to restore public order in the chaotic Santiago Province, which had been the principal battlefield of the US war with Spain. The U.S. Army occupied the island with 45,000 soldiers, which 'was inadequate to both conduct military patrols and handle local law enforcement. Maintaining internal stability in Cuba was particularly challenging given the breakdown in public order, environmental and health threats to U.S. soldiers, and demands from Congress and the public to bring troops home after the U.S. victory.' In addition, the risk of an uprising by the nearly 30,000 former members of the Cuban Liberation Army 'was too great to ignore'. The new stability policing force was modelled on the Spanish Guardia Civil, numbered 1,600 'constables' and was led by US officers, with duties ranging from suppressing banditry, executing court orders, and investigating crimes. Another stability policing force was created in Panama, after that country became independent from Colombia, with the help of the U.S. Navy and Marines. In the de facto US protectorate of Panama, a 'Corps of National Police' was created to replace the small army, at the request of the American embassy. The new force consisted of

12 Perito (2013), p. 33-36.

seven hundred Panamanian policemen, led by Americans. This force was the only armed organisation in the country, grew in size to about 1,000, received extensive U.S. material assistance and training. It existed until 1953, after which it was transformed into a military force and renamed into National Guard. Succeeded by the Panama Defence Force in 1983, it – ironically, was targeted in the US invasion of Panama in 1988. Having the 'monopoly of armed force in the country made it an ideal vehicle for a commander with political ambitions and a disregard for democratic principles.' From 1948 on the force commander wielded 'authoritarian and totalitarian power' in the country.[13] This series of transformations is another example of how stability forces adapt and change according to developments in security conditions, needs and perceptions.

In similar fashion the US Marines in Nicaragua, occupying the country from 1912 to 1933, at first tried to maintain stability with a 100 members Marine Guard. In 1925 this was replaced after public complaints on their handling of internal order by a newly established Guardia Nacional consisting of 1,136 Nicaraguan personnel but led by 93 US Marines officers. After the descent into civil war this force more than doubled in personnel numbers, and performed police functions, controlled the movement of arms, disarmed rival factions, and secured presidential and congressional elections. In the early 1930's the force fought a growing "Sandinista" insurgency and rebellion, together with the US Marines. By 1932 there was 'almost continuous fighting in all parts of the country'. The Marines and Guardia were unable to defeat the Sandinista national liberation movement. After the US withdrawal in 1933 the Guardia as an organization remained but descended until 1979 into what Perito calls a 'Mafia in uniform', involved in prostitution, gambling, smuggling, protection rackets, bribing and kickbacks – 'and thoroughly hated by all Nicaraguans'.[14]

At about the same time, the US had another experience of what can be labelled "stability policing." After a force of US Marines intervened when mobs had taken over in Port-au-Prince on the other side of the island, Haiti, in 1915, a group of US officers led a constabulary force called Garde d'Haiti, 'which repeatedly crushed internal dissent.' The US occupation was faced with growing rebellion, guerrilla, and insurrection. Between 1922 and 1928 the Garde became both a military and a police force, both in the city and to maintain order in rural areas. It also 'forced peasants to

13 Perito (2013), p. 37-39.

14 Perito (2013), p. 39-41.

report to work sites and donate their labour' in road construction. This forced labour road-building program 'led to a dramatic increase in anti-Americanism and generated a guerrilla resistance movement that engaged in periodic insurrections.' When the US left Haiti in 1934, Haitian military officers 'continued their governance over civil authorities' and the Garde evolved into the army of Haiti – to be met once more by the US military as it led the multinational intervention on that part of the island in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy).[15]

5. British colonial India (1880-1947)

Chandavarkar (1998) is a beautifully written and well-researched book on British colonial India, including a chapter on use of the police and the military in the capital Bombay (1880-1947). Although the maintenance of public order was the duty of the police, troops were frequently summoned to deal with local disturbances. Besides to resist invasion, the function of the army was to 'suppress rebellion'. It was 'primarily the army and not the police which provided the muscle to move the coercive apparatus of the colonial state. To a large extent, public order policing in India was conducted by the army.' Troops were alerted and mobilised even more frequently during the 'nationalist agitations' of the early 1920's and early 1930's. No clear demarcation of function between the army and the police had been affected, and as a result 'far too frequently' 'regular troops were used for purely police purpose', India being an exception in the British Empire. The police itself had military origins and in its 'understanding of its own role, and its perception of crime and the social order, was coloured by its military antecedents'. In maintaining internal order, providing stability for colonial rule, both army and police realised they were highly outnumbered to the local population. Both were deployed selectively and had to resort to (lethal) force quickly. When called out, the army 'generally refused to adopt 'police methods', as these could leave them exposed to the mob and vulnerable to attacks. Also, to protect itself, the police was controlling crowds in an 'often crude' fashion, using bullets or batons, and 'often appeared to have no intermediate options available'. The police always had to realise it could be outnumbered by the local population and mobs and resorted to lethal force on many occasions. 'When the police opened fire, they frequently justified their action by the claim that they were on the point of being overwhelmed. … Their numerical and organisational weakness meant that police pickets often found themselves

15 Perito (2013), p. 43-44.

surrounded, outnumbered, and attacked.' 'The constraints under which the police functioned meant that they were only likely to be effective if they marginalised and concentrated upon selected targets.' The colonial army also adapted to being highly outnumbered in the country. 'The armed force the colonial state could command was formidable and when it perceived a serious threat to its security, it unleashed it with a ruthless, sometimes murderous brutality.' Nevertheless, the army did not try to fully control public order in the vast and highly populous country, or as Chandavarkar puts it: 'the British in India did not, they could not, constitute an army of occupation. Had they tempted to so style themselves, the armed force at their disposal would have seemed woefully inadequate.' The composition of the army reflected the reality of its critical role for colonial rule, as well as its fragile position and need not to become too much involved in local disputes and political movements. The ratio of British versus Indian soldiers was even higher in 'troops allotted for internal security' than the average of 1:2.5, either because they were considered less biased or being more 're-assuring to colonial officials'.[16]

6. Philippine Constabulary (1901-1936)

Hurley (1985) is a vivid description of the work of the Philippine Constabulary (first called Insular Constabulary). Nearing its end, the force consisted of about 6,000 men. It had only 25 American officers, but manned 162 garrison stations, fighting outlaws and insurgents in the archipelago. This Constabulary was a police unit, heavily armed with revolvers and rifles, but often having to apply hand-to-hand combat deep in the jungle. 'They eliminated organised banditry'. Created in 1901 after the end of the American-Spanish war, the Constabulary operated separately from the regular US Army, until it was transferred to the new National Army of the Philippines in 1936. It took from the Army 'the tiresome and thankless detail of policing the Islands and pacified the jungle by armed infiltration'. Interestingly, Hurley puts the Constabulary in line with the French Foreign Legion, the Texas Rangers, the International Column of Spain, and the Royal Northwest Mounted Police in Canada. Differing from other early US "stability policing" cases, it was officered by Americans, Englishmen, Germans, Spaniards, and a few Filipinos. The Constabulary was tasked to 'put down active insurrection and murder and arson', to 'preserve public order' - with an intensity bringing it close to a purer military, infantry tasking, which nowadays might also be allotted to military special forces.

16 Chandavarkar (1998), p. 182-183, 214, 219-223 and 228.

Hurley himself labels the force 'a sub rosa body of unofficial American soldiery', tasked 'to put down armed disturbances that should have been put down by the army' and aimed at establishing or maintaining 'very serious public order'. Nevertheless, in essence it was a police force, as it was 'restrained in battle' with the 'duty to hold their fire and to maintain their position by diplomacy. The first shot went to the adversary'. Choosing to establish a new, largely native police force was also motivated by lower costs and political-legal considerations, as tasking the regular army required declaring martial law. In just its first 6 years of existence the Constabulary lost 1,026 men. In gruesome jungle warfare, i.e. many sentries of their encampments had their throats slit. For a large part the men occupied isolated stations in small numbers and 'made long marches into the mountainous jungle.' The men were badly paid, lived of the jungle 'on a diet of python and rat and fruit', in a 'splendid efficiency of … military orphans', performing 'a service that no massed troop movement of the regular army could possibly have contributed'. Constabulary patrolmen often served for decades, not years like in the regular Army. Although being numerical superior to the Constabulary and having strongholds, 'citadels' 'deep in the jungle mountains', one of their standard tactics was to have one man hide, wait until a Constabulary patrol had past, and then attack the last man from the back with a dagger. While 'under the direction of the capable white officers', this mainly native force fought 'against terrific odds … with every physical and topographical advantage favouring their enemy.' They operated 'in the centre of hostile territory. In garrison, they were under constant attack, and they suffered from a shortage of munitions and supplies.' 'With regularity' the Constabulary had to 'engage vastly superior numbers' of adversaries often outnumbering them twenty to one or more, having time for 'two or three shots before the action was man to man' with knives, clubs, teeth and fists.[17]

7. The Dutch in Iraq (2003-2005)

A more recent cases I did research on myself will further illustrate the classic "time-place-quality-quantity" challenge of stability policing by western security forces.[18] Between July 2003 and April 2005, the Netherlands provided military forces to the international Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR), in the southern province of Al-Muthanna. This large

17 Hurley (1985), p. 11-14, 43-49, 364 and 377.

18 Published partially in 2009 after a formal Freedom of Information Act request: Ruimte voor de realiteit, Crowd and riot control door de Nederlandse krijgsmacht, Breda, 2007. Https://w-o-o.nl/wob/archive/documentcloud/dc-2113977.pdf, visited July 4th, 2022.

province, mainly consisting of desert, with a small population of about 600.000 inhabitants, is situated just to the north of the border of Saudi-Arabia and west of Kuwait. The Dutch were present with 5 rotations of each 6 months, ranging between 1.085 and 16.090 military and civilian personnel. The core of this force was provided by the Royal Netherlands Marines (SFIR 1-2: 650 marines) and Royal Netherlands Army (SFIR 3: Mechanised Brigade, SFIR 4-5: Air Mobile Brigade). The Dutch based company sized forces in the main towns of Ar Rumaytah, As Samawah and Al Khidr, with helicopter support from Tallil Airbase, and logistics and command centres at Shaibah Airbase. Through Al Muthanna ran one of the main highways and logistical routes in the country, Route Jackson, connecting Bagdad with Basra and Kuwait, with many (US) military convoys passing over it, causing many incidents and tense situations for the Dutch to manage. At first, the Dutch military were tasked to provide force protection, maintain security, stability and public order, allow humanitarian organisations to work in the province, allow the restoration of public utilities, local government and economic recovery, as well as protection of local law enforcement, financial and cultural facilities. After June 2004, when the Iraqi government formally regained sovereignty, this was reduced to suppressing violence against the Iraqi government, rebuilding Iraqi security forces, as well as supporting humanitarian aid, civilian public services and (economic) recovery efforts.

In Al-Muthanna province SFIR was facing a number of security challenges. While the first rotation was relatively calm, SFIR- 2 was increasingly confronted with a local population becoming frustrated by the lack of economic recovery. The situation worsened, as basic public facilities were not restored, fuel shortages occurred more often, cross-border smuggling and black-market activities increased, and serious security incidents kept happening on Route Jackson. As to the latter, every week some (US military) trucks broke down, caused damage or injuries to locals, or got stuck in traffic jams. Often the Dutch had to dispatch Quick Reaction Alert (QRA-)units of about a dozen marines to stop pillaging, manage traffic, control protests or end skirmishes. Many times, fights broke out when large numbers of cars and trucks queued at gas stations. Local leaders and their followers staged protests at Iraqi local government buildings, calling on the Dutch military to send (additional) protection units. During SFIR 3 and 4 this unrest grew into small-scale insurgency activity, although not on the scale like the UK were faced with in nearby Basra or the US in Baghdad. Nevertheless, the Dutch were faced with political violence and were attacked themselves on a number of occasions.

SFIR did its best to counter the unrest and later the insurgency but was ill-prepared to do that. Basically, there were no or at least far too few specialist forces present in the area operations. The Royal Marechaussee ("gendarmerie") took part in SFIR with about a handful of officers, mainly for military police tasks. Unlike in the Italian SFIR-zone, where the Carabinieri provided the vast majority of personnel for the whole operation, Dutch marines and later army infantry had to maintain public order, but these were largely not trained and equipped (no baton and shield) for stability policing. Some marines were trained for Crowd and Riot Control (CRC) for previous deployments, but these lacked the necessary gear. Only SFIR-2 had an earmarked, trained, and equipped CRC-platoon, consisting of 37 marines. The problem was this group was stationed in one town, Ar Rumaytah, needed too much time to gather and reach the place of an incident, except for pre-planned situations, constituting a small minority of all incidents. The vast majority of public order incidents thus had to be managed by "regular" marine/infantry patrols or platoons, sometimes causing serious risks and lethal incidents. In addition to maintaining public order, Marines and army also improvised counter-crime and counter-smuggling units, mostly from intelligence and special forces. Here too no specialised capability was (made) available, despite local SFIR-commanders requests for precisely that to their staff and the ministry back in The Netherlands. At the time the Dutch left the province the insurgency had more or less ended, mainly as it was countered effectively by SFIR in more important parts of the country, like Basra and Baghdad, and/or the main instigator of the insurgency, Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, was incorporated, co-opted into the Iraqi government and parliamentary structures.[19]

8. Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to describe some cases of current NATO Member States' forces providing stability policing operations. This was done by MP, gendarmerie, police, cavalry, marines, and army infantry many times in the past, both domestic, abroad and in colonies, and with varying degrees of success. Just like other kinds of (military) operations, stability policing is a specialisation, which can be prepared for, to fill a security gap or cover a part of the security threats spectre between war and full law obedience. As the cases illustrate, successful stability policing requires having the right

19 For detailed information (in Dutch) see the final evaluation of the SFIR operation as reported to the Dutch Parliament: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29521-17-b1.pdf, visited September 28th, 2022.

specialised (wo)men, in sufficient numbers, at the time and place they are needed. This was not always possible. The cases discussed in this chapter make clear what can be challenges in stability policing, like insurgencies, crime waves, large-scale violent protests and armed gangs threatening the population in some areas. In many of the cases it took decades to pacify the area of operations.

While the cases do provide an overview of the kinds of activities (NATO) stability policing units should be able to perform to have a chance of success, like patrolling, raiding, arresting, investigating, educating, fighting and protecting themselves, this chapter did not investigate and establish whether Member States' forces or NATO itself have the doctrines, at different levels (strategy, operations, tactics, procedures), that can guide in doing it in future operations. As police, MP, gendarmerie, and regular military units could be necessary in future (NATO) stability policing operations, all should be well-trained and equipped for stability policing. The cases discussed above demonstrate that the biggest challenge is to have sufficient numbers of qualified personnel in the area of operations, so the necessary numbers can be used where and when needed. Having the least experience, but able to provide the largest numbers, it is especially important that (some) regular military units, most of all infantry and marines, receive policing training and equipment.

Having (very) large numbers of stability policing specialists available is a serious and acute task for NATO and its Member States. The war in Ukraine and all changes in European (and global) security it has resulted in might very well make a number of challenging stability policing operations necessary in the years just ahead.

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BIO:

Michiel Johan de Weger *studied Political Sciences, International Relations at Leiden University (1995) in The Netherlands. He served as a Royal Netherlands Navy officer between 1995-1997. As a business consultant at Capgemini (Ernst&Young) he worked for many customers (1998-2006), including police, military, foreign affairs, intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations. In 2006 he received a doctorate at Tilburg University (NL) on the subject of the domestic role of the Dutch military. Between 2006–2011 Michiel was a lecturer and researcher on policing by the military at the Netherlands Defence Academy (Breda). He then worked as a researcher, and security and risk consultant, among others in critical infrastructure protection. Currently, Michiel is lecturer Integral Security at The Hague University of Applied Sciences and Fellow at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs, Team Policing Studies, at Leiden University (NL).*

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5. Being a Police Actor in Military Operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo

1. Introduction

Let me begin by stating that Stability Policing (SP) is a cornerstone for any community or state, regardless of whether it is stable or needs to be rebuilt. It is, in fact, one of the pillars of the Rule of Law and, as such, it requires that its agents have an in-depth and global understanding of how it works and of the environment in which they will need to implement it. Whereas the goal may seem simple, it is not: it requires thorough training and experience in the field.

2. Targeted Training

As a rule, on average, within the boundaries of their own State Stability Forces have a good understanding of the environment in which they are called to operate. Abroad, it is of the utmost importance that they gather as much information as possible if they want their action to be truly efficient. This means, in essence, that the effects should be long lasting and allow Local Authorities to take over in full at the end of the day.
The upshot is that, before deployment, forces need to be provided with targeted training. It is not a matter of training them about policing techniques –it is a given that they should already master them– but rather a thorough understanding of the politics, economy, history, social interaction, religion of the area in which they will be operating. We could define it as preventive training –at least for the SP leaders– on all the risks that may be lurking ahead.

It is equally important that the military, who will typically be the first to be deployed, also receive proper training in SP and how to implement it in both stable or unstable theatres. The same applies, whether preventively or later, as training on the job, for the Local Institutions –especially the military– as this will provide the means for a gradual path from the military phase to the civilian one. It is in fact extremely important to provide military commanders with a clear perception of how to properly use SP and the effects it can generate. These training and operational needs must be planned and inserted from day one in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operations Plan (OPLAN). Whereas it is obvious that all of the above requires time for proper consolidation, it still will facilitate immediate and mid- to long-term results. Kosovo, where I was the Commander of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) Regiment is the example that is closest to how an international intervention in a crisis area should evolve, providing a gradual transferral of responsibilities to Local Authorities. The gradual intervention carried out by the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) mission and Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the wake of poor results by the Local Authorities, and the subsequent support provided to those same authorities at a later stage, has been proven valid in the long run and was successfully inserted within the governmental structures and throughout the population. And though the fragility of geopolitics in the country prevents us from defining the intervention as conclusive, the twenty-year experience gathered so far, living amid the country's people, makes us believe that the local transplant has yielded most of its promises.

3. Experience in the Field

In order to stress how important it is to acquaint the Commanders of the Military Missions with the SP instrument, which is key for the gradual move from military to civilian (the passage cannot be abrupt at the end of the military mission, that is the point), I would like to recall two personal experiences. The first concerns the NATO Articled 5 exercise for the NATO Response Force (NRF) certification of the Joint Force (JF) South Europe Command, in Estonia. The second, in Afghanistan, towards the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission, where I was Director of the ComIsaf Police Advisory Cell (CPAC), and the beginning of Resolute Support.

In the first episode – Article 5 context – the Mission Commander was asked to take a quick decision on immediate intervention concerning an isolated theatre where there was alleged terrorist activity. In that context,

as Special Staff Police Advisor, it took me the better part of thirty minutes to convince the Commander that we had to inform the Estonian National authorities, reassuring them that they had the best efforts of the allied forces at their disposal and that, at the same time, we were securing the area to give them the necessary to make decisions whilst preventing any of the terrorists from escaping. The Commander's initial idea was to intervene immediately with military means, without even considering priority responsibilities that the Estonian Government might have had.

In Afghanistan, when it was proposed to slowly migrate from the ISAF context to the one foreseen for Resolute Support in order to assist local institutions to implement Rule of Law, the flat reply was that this objective was not foreseen in the operational planning and that what had indeed been planned had been achieved: mission accomplished. A perfect example of how military and civilian planning went astray.

My experience in Kosovo as Commander of the MSU Regiment has provided me with ample proof that the police component of the NATO KFOR mission has been the ideal interface between the third NATO Response Team and the EULEX Second Response Team. Last but not least, it has also been a key link with the Kosovo Police Forces, who are the of local authorities' primary responders.

Police intelligence provided by the Carabinieri has provided the KFOR Commander with full analysis capabilities to assess the internal dynamics in Kosovo and facilitated relations with the country's authorities and other International Organisations present in the territory.

The Carabinieri patrols, alongside all other members of the MSU called to operate abroad, have become fully enmeshed in Kosovo's social tissue, regardless of the different ethnic groups present, to the extent that their absence would feel unnatural.

4. Conclusion

Whereas the "Safety" and "Security" of staff deployed in missions are paramount when considering transferring responsibilities from the military to the civilian domain, unless careful assessment is made of how the transition from one domain to the other takes place, as was done in Kosovo, the risk is total failure of efforts made, including the loss of human lives. Stability Policing is the interface that can prevent this rift. Its essence is precisely the connect and transition between military and civilian action.

BIO:

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Provost Marshal, Police Adviser to the NATO JFC Commander, Coordination Officer for the NATO Training Mission Iraq,

Head of Carabinieri Mission and Adviser to the Carabinieri International Operations Division Head,

MSU Carabinieri Regiment Commander within NATO Mission KFOR in Kosovo.

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6. StabilityPolicing:ImpactonOfficersServinginConflictedArea

1. Introduction

The Kosovo conflict (1998–1999), conflict in which ethnic Albanians opposed ethnic Serbs and the government of Yugoslavia, achieved extensive international attention, and led to the intervention of NATO forces plus the establishment of an Interim Administration of the United Nations through the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
An understanding about the origins of the conflict takes us to 1989, when the leaders of the ethnics Albanians in Kosovo (province of Serbia), started a policy of protests (initially non-violent actions) when Slobodan Milošević,, President of the Serbian Republic, withdrew the province's constitutional autonomy. Kosovo, sacred area for the Serbs as seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church and symbol of the Serbian victory over the Turks in 1912, was in demographic control by the Albanians; fact that had been long objected by Milošević and members of the Serbian minority of Kosovo. Tensions increased between the two ethnic groups and the most radical parties in conflict argued that their demands could not be achieved through peaceful means. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UCK) appeared in 1996 and took sporadic actions, mainly attacks on Serbian police and some politicians. The situation escalated during the two following years and by 1998 the KLA's actions could be qualified as a substantial armed uprising.

1 This article is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, and its contents does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NATO SP COE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.

Serbian special police and armed forces tried to regain control over the region and, during these operations, atrocities were allegedly committed by the police, paramilitary groups and the army; this caused a wave of refugees to flee the area, causing the situation to become well publicized through the international media.

A cease-fire agreement was demanded by a group of countries, as well as the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo to allow the return of refugees and unlimited access for international monitors. As Milošević failed to implement these demands, the KLA regrouped and rearmed during the cease-fire, renewed its attacks triggering a ruthless counteroffensive and engaging in a program of ethnic cleansing. The United Nations (UN) Security Council condemned this excessive use of force and after unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations held in France in February 1999, in March NATO began air strikes against Serbian military targets. Serbian forces intended to drive out all of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, displacing thousands of people initially into Albania, Macedonia[2], and Montenegro. A large amount of people, previously displaced, continued their way into some EU member states. The NATO bombing campaign lasted eleven weeks and expanded to Belgrade causing considerable damage to the Serbian infrastructure. In June, a peace accord was signed establishing troops withdrawal and the return of nearly one million ethnic Albanians, as well as another half a million displaced within the province. Most Serbs left the region, and reprisals against those who remained took place. The UN peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kosovo, which came under the UN Interim Administration according to the 1244 UN Resolution.

2. First contact with Stability Policing

The author was deployed in Kosovo, along with a group of 40 other police officers (civilian police and gendarmerie type forces) and conducted duties as the United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) from August 1999 to August 2000 in his first mission in the international environment and later for a second tour from August 2002 until August 2003.
I will hereby offer an overview of the situation based on personal experience during the first tour acting as Pristina Station#1 patrol officer and serious crimes investigator and, as member of the War Crimes Investigation Team within the Central Criminal Investigation Unit during the entire second tour. In a post-conflict area, tasks performed faced many difficulties and

2 Since 2019, the official name of the country is the Republic of North Macedonia – editor's note.

a brief description intends to give the reader a slight overview of the situation faced during the deployment within UNMIK.

Pic 1. Destruction in downtown. Local administration building bombed. Pristina – Kosovo (1999). © Israel Lazaro

The first Spanish UN CIVPOL contingent landed in Skopje (Former Macedonia) in August the 17th 1999, shortly after the NATO bombing campaign ended. When driven by bus to the UN premises in Pristina, first thing we noticed was the total absence of people in what appeared to be a completely deserted "ghost city". Destroyed buildings, craters and huge impacts on the constructions were the general landscape we could see through the windows while a shocking silence took over the whole bus.

After two weeks within the UN Induction Training Centre (ITC) being given of general awareness about the theatre of operations and after going through language, shooting, and driving tests; we were deployed to different units throughout the whole area of operations. During these two weeks, the city experienced a demographic explosion growing from 400 thousand people before the conflict to nearly 1.5 million. Many people whose villages and towns had suffered armed clashes (some of them destroyed and in ruins) were returning back to the capital of the region trying to settle and find a way how to make a living.

At that time, the UN seemed to me like a big Tower of Babel in which hundreds of nationalities were supposed to find a mutual understanding and protocols of action. Sometimes it was exceedingly difficult due to high difference in police or cultural standards. We need to keep in mind how

complicated it is to set up a patrol with one officer from Sweden and another one from Nepal. We were given police vehicles, radio handsets and printed maps so to navigate throughout the city using grid references, in a theatre where it was nearly impossible to find a spot using a certain address. In my first duty, I found myself driving a car through a completely unknown sector of a town, accompanied by a partner whose revolver from 1947 was well kept in his backpack (he said his country was peaceful and they were "not used" to carry guns and he did not want to lose his weapon). He seemed not to be worried at all with the situation (a city in which shootings were heard several times a day and where three or four helicopters were constantly patrolling the air. My partner's attitude definitely did not help me feel reasonably safe. However, Pristina was divided in four sectors (police stations) and luckily when patrols were dispatched to a situation, we could always count on our compatriots that were on duty in the other three stations. It became a non-said rule to always assist your country man (easy identifiable on the radio due to our special accent) no matter where the incident was taking place. This fact gave us some confidence to keep going in a scenario in which nearly half of the vehicles stopped for identification were carrying weapons (all sort of them), where absolutely nobody had ID cards, nor the vehicles had license plates.

Earlier information before arriving to Kosovo, mainly from the news, was that the Serbian paramilitary was indiscriminately killing Kosovo-Albanians wherever they were found. Thousands of Kosovo-Albanians had fled into neighbouring countries. These were the facts and news that triggered an international state of emergency, and which then led to a NATO intervention. It was also the reason we were there, trying to stabilize the region and promote a safe and secure environment.

In this scenario, we executed many joint patrols with KFOR (NATO operation on the ground), mainly foot patrols to check destroyed/abandoned spots where usually dead bodies were found. The military structure and training of the gendarmerie type forces, just like in my case, made very easy the integration with the military in joint duties. As the soldiers mentioned on many occasions, before the presence of UNMIK Police, they were also patrolling but not exactly knowing police protocols as they were soldiers – not police officers. The police presence, in turn, within the patrol was happily received as in case of any incident, while the military response was at once given by the army and then the group, as a whole, having police capabilities was acting under the police point of view. After a month searching and recovering dead bodies, responding, and verifying reported mass graves, on-going homicides, assaults, rapes, and more, one could say that the information on the situation I had beforehand

was not really exact. The armed conflict seemed to have let off the leash the human capability to commit atrocities in all manners, coming from and directed to all ethnicities, not only from Serbians to Kosovo-Albanian, as I thought it was going to be with the news I had received before arriving. Civilian population had very easy access to weapons, such as pistols, machine guns, shotguns, hand grenades. They all were found in almost every check point we executed. After the many cases I faced, I understood that in these conflicts, what defines who is a victim and who is a persecutor is simply the fact of who is carrying the weapon.
One of the very first calls, my patrol was dispatched to a case of a 94-year-old lady who was beaten up to death by four individuals. There are no words to describe the scene and the obvious fatal result after being immediately evacuated to the hospital. Clearly the intention of these individuals was not to rob her or anything similar but simply the fact of being "the enemy", obvious revenge. I could not stop wondering on matters such as: if the so-called "civilian" conflict started (being generous) 20 years before, the lady at that time would have already been 74. What harm could this 74 years old lady had done to anyone? This case triggered in my brain, that need of a deeper analysis of the capability of carrying atrocities by both parties, taken into consideration that I used to witness such atrocities as pure retaliation on a daily basis. At that stage, with a situation that was more or less stabilized with KFOR troops and UN police on the ground, I could not think on any reason to commit these sorts of assaults or atrocities. I could witness that the feeling of impunity was largely extended and made individuals who were previously restrained by rules and policies to set loose and carried on with whatever they wanted. Total disorder and lack of judicial system was the ground in which this situation grew leaving specially the weakest population completely unprotected.
Since August 1999 and for the next four-five months, police had practically the role of policing, prosecuting and sometimes deciding on the faith of criminals. The absence (or extremely slow function) of a judicial system – no lawyer for detainees' rights, no prosecutors to control cases, no judges to take decisions – they all really hit my brain in a situation in which many arrests were conducted daily in the whole region within a nearly collapsed system. However, we tried to do our best, following as much as possible European standards of the rule of law, transparency and democracy in a way to contain the situation until the system could be normalized.
There were cases that might illustrate disorder and the role police officers had to take. A young girl was raped by an 18-year-old individual. Some neighbours heard the victim's screams for help and alerted the police. At the time we reached the scene, the boy (he was a male with the face of a boy)

carried an AK-47 and tried to manipulate so to use it against the officer's present at the crime scene. Luckily, the boy was not well trained and was not able to load the magazine, thus he was taken under custody without using any force. The victim pointed him out as the individual who had just raped her. She was taken to the hospital for examination straight away and the suspect was taken under custody to the police station.

"Why not?". After receiving such a shocking answer given by the suspect as a reason to have committed a crime, there was no need for further immediate investigation so initial police report was finalised to be submitted for prosecution. Something what we would describe as "unreal" came immediately after. When the suspect was taken to the detention centre, the police officer in charge of logging suspects in and out told us that we had to look for some other solution as the detention centre was absolutely overloaded. He then gave us a second choice of releasing him after full identification pending on a future summon. Any police officer reading this would come up with the same thoughts: "what?". A suspect who raped a young girl some hours ago is not accepted in a detention centre due to overpopulation. The officer explained the situation showing log-files and we had to admit it was real; there was literally no room for one more detainee.

A quick look over the log files showed suspects were in detention for all sort of alleged criminal actions. Some of them were in for two or three months, waiting to be taken in front of the prosecutor for further decision. Among others, there were four suspects that had been put under custody approximately two months before for burglary in a shopping centre.

It was difficult to assume that four people arrested for burglary were two or three months in detention but there was no place where to put the suspect that allegedly had just raped a girl. "Unless you release some other of those you have arrested, it is just not possible to place him in". "What?"! Is it possible to do that? For a regular European police officer, doing such a thing is out of discussion, but in an exceptional situation like that one, it seemed the most suitable option. Releasing those for, so to say, "minor crimes", therefore being able to keep one for a very serious crime sounded even logical. The officer in charge of the detention centre's answer was that, as far as he was concerned, the officers who arrested the suspects had the capability to release them after full identification for future summon, so apparently there was no problem. Once the system is fully functional, all cases will be prosecuted. Final result: three free places in detention centre after releasing four for an "old" burglary and putting one in for a recent rape.

This is an example of what a territory without a clear legal system to obey or without a functional legal system becomes. We necessarily need to bear in mind that we are referring the first months after the entry of KFOR, UN CIVPOL and the UN civilian structure was building the Security Sector Reform mission. Stability Police forces need to be flexible and adaptable to be able to model to each scenario and try to make the proper decisions to problems that arise in territories in which sometimes logic or preconceived ideas do not apply.

1999 was a year in which I personally came to learn to appreciate simple ordinary facts as turning the water tap on or switching the light on. Our first six months were exceedingly difficult due to a variety of situations that for an experienced writer would take a full book. The end of mission and the way back home made me reflect on the entire year, the help we provided, and more particularly the help we were not able to give, loss of friends and colleagues, death and destruction surrounding us and above all, what human beings are able to achieve in both directions good and evil under given circumstances.

It is undeniable that acting as civilian police in post conflict area implies risks. These risks may easier be confronted when equipped with adequate military gear and training. During one regular patrol in October 1999, we became under fire from a building. In these cases, the logical reaction was to call the military (British area of responsibility) that responded immediately, however their mandate clearly stated that their mission was to repel the aggression. I am convinced that my partner and I both with a military background, would have easily integrated with the military units as a police component and could have dealt with the incident from a policing perspective. That is locating and arresting the shooters and seizing the weapons used. This is something that on the ground was agreed, as it was thought that having a gendarmerie type police integrated within the military force could have been positive. It would have meant adding a police perspective.

3. War Crimes Investigations Team (WCIT)

As previously mentioned, I was assigned to go back to Kosovo within UNMIK CIVPOL in August 2002 for a second one-year period. After the mandatory induction-training period, and due to previous experience and profile, I was directly posted in the Central Criminal Investigation Unit (CCIU), specifically in the War Crimes Investigations Team (WCIT), in charge of investigating cases that would eventually end up in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for an

eventual prosecution of suspects to have committed violation against international humanitarian law. It was a team of about 30 police officers from 25 different countries commanded at that time by a Norwegian Officer. The deployment in such high-level unit seemed to me to be a thrilling challenge and a way for me to offer a personal contribution in bringing justice to so many people who suffered the consequences of war. During the Kosovo conflict, army, police and some paramilitary groups used excessive force resulting in property damage, displacement of the population and deaths or non-combatant civilians. As a variety of ICTY judicial sentences stated[3], Kosovo-Albanians populated villages were attacked and civilians were abused, robbed and in many cases killed, ordering those who survived to go to Albania, Montenegro or elsewhere. Houses were burned and properties destroyed, entire villages were brought down to ashes. Duties within the WCIT gave me afterwards the opportunity to closely witness full destruction of settlements and the landscape of total desolation and ruins in some villages in which no house remained undamaged and became real "ghost villages".

Pic 2. Destruction of villages. Kosovo 2002. © Israel Lazaro

In many cases there were places where cultural and religious monuments were destroyed. It was a clear example of violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Almost half of the mosques were vandalized, severely

3 ICTY PRESS REALEASE, Five senior Serb officials convicted of Kosovo Crimes, one acquitted. (26/02/2009): https://www.icty.org/en/press/five-senior-serb-officials-convicted-kosovo-crimes-one-acquitted. (06/07/2022)

damaged, or completely destroyed. All that was another component of the ethnic cleansing. There were also many Serbian Churches destroyed as retaliation mainly after the withdrawal of Serbian forces. Another fact systematically observed was the identity cleansing, consisting in confiscation of personal identification, passports, and other vital documents to make difficult or impossible for those expelled out to return. This last modus operandi was noticed in almost all the cases in which any UN CIVPOL officer interacted despite of the nature of the case. As mentioned from the experience during the first mission, it was extremely rare to find people with ID documents.

Pic. 3. Destroyed Orthodox Church in Kosovo. © Israel Lazaro

Still nowadays, after 24 years, the courts of justice both in Pristina and Belgrade continue their job in which indictments point out suspects from both ethnicities for crimes during the armed conflict or immediately after. The ICTY addressed a list of cases[4], however, as previously said, there are some recent developments in some other cases heard and tried locally[5].

4 ICTY Interactive Map of cases under investigation. (2009): https://www.icty.org/en/cases/interactive-map (10/07/2022)

5 RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, War Crimes Court sentences Kosovo veterans to Prison for Witness intimidation. (18/05/2022): https://www.rferl.org/a/kosovo-war-crimes-tampering/31856340.html (15/08/2022)

When it comes to writing about my own experience within the war crimes investigations (what I have been able to refer in very few occasions and exclusively with fellow partners that went through similar experiences), it necessarily implies mentioning the hard psychological impact the different cases and its details, directly has on the investigator involved. More specifically rawness and cruelty on the atrocities described within the statements taken from victims or eyewitnesses often drove to a situation in which the only person in the room not in tears (or hardly fighting them) was the victim, who most likely ran out of them long time before. Details or data about specific cases will be avoided for obvious reasons.

It is difficult for any human being to stand cold in front of somebody who is explaining in detail how was raped just in front of his/her family or how relatives were repeatedly beaten up, killed, or raped in front of his/her eyes. From the professional point of view, it takes time to be able to put these facts into words in a written statement, how to find the right words to put in a piece of paper. On many occasions, when words were found and apparently, the worst had passed, the statement continued into the final result, in some cases, putting the whole family inside a house under the look of those whose lives were spared (usually young girls after being just sexually assaulted); and once all confined within four walls, several hand grenades were thrown in.

Many statements had to be paused and continued hours of days later, as previously mentioned, due to the difficulty for assuming that human beings are able to commit such atrocities. It was definitely exceedingly difficult to cope with. It is unavoidable to experience the recurrent feeling of despair and absence of hope and humanity in this society. Many years have already passed and many of those statements, that most likely would really impress the reader, may be found with a simple basic search on the internet.[6-7]

One case that recurrently comes back to my mind is about six members of a family: four males aged from nearly 16 to 80 years old and two females on the thirties/forties who were executed in their farm with 5.56 calibre shots in their hearts. When NATO forced the Serbian troops north, many innocent families remained in their houses or farms just waiting for a conflict end. Being found by some, in some cases, KLA fighters, retaliation was taken just immediately, and entire families massacred just for

6 KOSOVO 2.0, Echoes that remain (07/10/2019): https://kosovotwopointzero.com/en/echoes-that-remain/ (15/07/2022)

7 PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE FRONTLINE, Three Albanian victims of Serbian ethnic cleasing and atrocities (2012): https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/victims.html (16/07/2022)

belonging to the particular ethnic group; and in other cases, being found by the withdrawing forces committing atrocities in their way leaving the region. Still nowadays I try to imagine what could have passed through the murderers' minds in order to find acceptable the killing of an entire family, from 16 years old kids, going through middle aged women and to and old grandfather, all this, despite of the ethnicity.

One of the first things that called my attention when I first started to investigate war crimes cases was the ethnicity of the victims. Even having the experience of the first mission, my mind was set over the fact that the cases under investigation were the ones committed by Serbians against Kosovo-Albanians[8] but on the contrary, there were also many cases about Kosovo-Albanians having killed Serbians[9] especially during the end of the conflict when Kosovo-Albanians took over and most of the Serbian population fled out of Kosovo. It was sometimes difficult to separate real war crimes from those committed for other reasons, regular criminality, organized crime, or any other motivation in which the suspects and the victims were of the same ethnicity.

The reader needs to bear in mind the extreme difficulty that these investigations imply. Some cases started with a four lines report written by a KFOR soldier who during his patrol three years before found several dead bodies that were taken to the hospital. The log files in the hospital drove the investigator to the person who had claimed / identified the body and the place of burial if it was ever identified. Facing these challenges always brought to my mind the words of those platoon leaders from the British army saying they should have counted on the help of the police with military structure (he meant gendarmerie, though) that could easily interoperate with them and work along bearing in mind future investigations. The deceased had to be exhumed three years after, so to say, "being buried" and X-ray examinations were conducted to find projectiles within the remains trying with the coroner and forensic medical examiner team to determine the legal cause/origin of death as basic evidence to keep documenting cases that eventually will end up in prosecution/trial.

8 ACADEMIC DICTIONARIES&ENCYCLOPEDIAS, List of massacres in the Kosovo War (2010): https://en-academic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/11708380 (18/07/2022)

9 BBCNEWS, Massacre victims laid to rest (28/07/1999): http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/405692.stm (22/07/2022)



Pic. 4. X-ray examination conducted on remains. Kosovo 2003. © Israel Lazaro

Another challenge to overcome was the extreme difficulty to find relatives and/or witnesses in some cases. In many other cases, corpses were unidentified and transferred to the Missing Persons Unit to obtain an identification of the dead victim and therefore to have the possibility to conduct further investigative enquiries.

4. Conclusions

I have hereby tried to make the reader understand how complicated is to cope, as a member of Stability Police contingent, with a post-conflict reality (not anymore a scenario, sadly) in which, acting as a police officer, there are many situations that make stagger your own balance and sometimes lose any hope in mankind. Specifically, those incidents with a special personal impact, in which anybody would feel like it is not worth to keep fighting when seeing so much human horror.

Stability Policing is needed in post-conflict territories, as it was Kosovo, with a full substitution of the police at the beginning and later, as in early 2000 the local Kosovo Police Service (KPS) started to be trained and as

it became structured and independently operative after some years, the mission became strengthening and support mission.

The training and experience earned as a gendarmerie typed police force officer has been for me an added value when cooperating with the military component from different countries as well as it has helped me to cope as a member of a group with stress and undesirable situations we had to face along the way. During my two years in Kosovo, I have cooperated with many police corps (civilian and military / gendarmes) and military armed forces (army) achieving a high level of understanding and mutual collaboration. The military structure of a gendarmerie type force, as well as the expertise in all civilian police roles gives a wide spectrum of settings for cooperation with all kinds of forces moreover it eases the integration within military units in certain cases of crisis, increasing confidence and security. During the planning of any military operation of this nature, authorities in charge need to bear in mind the need of integrating police units within the military forces so to facilitate a future development when it comes the proper time for the transition from the military to the civilian control. Gendarmerie type forces are fully interoperable and flexible to work along the military in critical scenarios and keeping always in mind, as primary aim, the future that is desirable to come related to achieve a safe and secure environment.

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BIO:

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EU external border management. Degree in Police Studies and several specialization courses in criminal investigations (homicides, abuses, human trafficking, drugs, and terrorism) and intelligence (analysis). HEAT / HEST (Hostile Environment) trainings as well as several participations in the European Union Police Services Training Programme.

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7. The "Security Gap": International Policing in Timor-Leste

1. Introduction

This chapter will present a personal account what has often been referred to as the "security gap" and that has been described "as the grey area between the end of major combat operations and the Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the Host Nation Police Force, capable and willing to enforce the law."[2] Through a combination of literature review and a narration of first hand personal experiences, the chapter will describe the state of lawlessness which Timor-Leste faced in the aftermath of the Indonesian withdraw from the territory following the popular consultation in 1999 and how the presence of an international policing capability to restore and preserve a safe and secure environment was required.

The added value of having experts conducting this international policing activity will be highlighted as also the need for a gradual transfer of authority to the host nation. It will argue the need for the international community to have a stability policing (SP) capability ready to deploy to a theatre of operations and fill the so called "security gap."

1 This article is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence, and its contents does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NATO SP COE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.

2 NATO SP COE, "Joint Analysis Report on Stability Policing," 2018, pg. 26.

Timor-Leste is a former Portuguese colony, declared its independence 28th of November 1975, only to be invaded by Indonesia ten days later, who declared its annexation in July of the following year. The United Nations however did not recognise this and continued to consider Timor-Leste as a non–self-governing territory under Chapter XI of the UN Charter. The abuses conducted by the Indonesian Government in Timor-Leste through its military were widely documented, but the international community looked to the other side most probably due to the influence of the then President Suharto in the region. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and widespread corruption derived into massive protest and led to the resignation of Suharto in 1998.

His successor, President BJ Habibie agreed for a consultation to take place under the UN supervision to determine whether Timor-Leste populace accepted a special autonomy within Indonesia or sought independence. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) from June - October 1999 was mandated to conduct this process. The UNAMET mandate established that the security for the process was to be guaranteed by the Indonesian police and military.

The referendum was held on the 30th of August 1999 with a turnout of 98% of the population voting, the immense majority had voted against the autonomy and were in favour of independence. The results were known on the 4th of September 1999 and Indonesian Military and Pro-Indonesian Militias unleashed a scorched-earth policy leaving hundreds dead, hundreds of thousands internally displaced and a vast majority of the official buildings were left in ashes. Such was the barbarity that the UN mandated the deployment of the Australian led International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to intervene and establish order, arriving in Timor-Leste on the 21st of September 1999. Indonesia surrendered control of the territory on the 27th of September 1999.

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established on the 25th of October 1999 to administer the territory, exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and support capacity-building for self-government. This inter alia would include providing executive policing functions and setting up a national police force from scratch, as there were no security forces left behind. INTERFET officially handed over to UNTAET on the 23rd of March 2000.

The author was posted in Timor-Leste as a UN Civilian Police Officer (UNCIVPOL) from April 2000 until April 2001, and later returned as a UN Staff member from February 2002 to March 2003 where he worked within the General Prosecutor's Office investigating serious crimes occurred from January 1999 until October 1999.

2. The Deployment

It was an early spring morning in the year 2000, when, accompanied by another seventeen young Spanish Guardia Civil officers, we departed from our headquarters in Madrid on board a bus bound to Barajas International Airport, where we would initiate a journey that would take us to the opposite side of the world. We were a diverse group composed of experts from different fields such as criminal investigations, intelligence, maritime policing, environmental protection, close protection, border/customs control, crowd and riot control, road traffic and community policing.

We were heading to Timor-Leste to serve as UNCIVPOL officers. For many, it was our first international experience, amongst the "rookies" a few were considered "veterans" because they had already served a one-year tour of duty in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What was awaiting ahead was a total mystery for us all, as we had parted for a minimum of three months and not knowing for how long our tour of duty was going to be nor what conditions we would find upon our arrival.

After a twenty plus hour flight, passing through several international airports sorting visa and excess luggage issues, we finally arrived at the Australia's northern city of Darwin. We were to stay there at special facilities that had been set up for the purpose of receiving a one-week induction training period. We received daily briefings on the security situation in the theatre of operations. We were briefed on the mission mandate, rules and regulations, human rights awareness training, driving skills, and a long etc… However, what was repeated once and again, that this was different than other UN policing missions, we were not going to be monitors, mentors nor advisors, and we were not going to sit in the back seat. We would be the actual police, the only police in place. We were to take the lead. The message sunk in.

Then one morning we packed our gear (and enough provisions to last us a month) and were escorted to the airport and put on a plane, we looked

back to see our instructor's waving goodbye and wishing us luck. Many of them, I learnt later, had been evacuated from the mission months back in September 1999 when the violence escalated, and the Indonesian scorched earth withdrawal took place.

I still remember as if yesterday the slap of warm air which fit my face and the smell of humidity that almost knocked me over when I stepped out the airplane's front door and started to make my way down the steps to the tarmac of Dili's Airport. At the bottom of the stairs awaited a UNCIVPOL officer, "welcome to paradise" was his greeting. He was not wrong, if it were not for the evident signs of destruction all around us, that place would have been paradise.

We were escorted to the remains of building which served as the UN Police Headquarters in the centre of Timor-Leste capital, Dili. At the place was known popularly as the Dili "Markas" (which was the Indonesian word for headquarters), a large room which at some moment may have been an events hall was allocated as our accommodation for the next days until each of us were assigned to a different location and spread through the territory.

We set up our mosquito tents, and made the place as cosy as we could, placing our national flag covering a few missing panels of glass from a large window that offered views to a devastated landscape. This aided in identifying us to others as the recently arrived Spanish contingent as there were several new incoming contingents also in the same barracks. It also helped in keeping up the moral and very importantly it kept the malaria and dengue carrying mosquitos away. Sleeping was going to prove a nightmare, not only because of the snoring colleagues but also the constant noise from the generators which ran continuously as there was no more than two - three hours daily of electricity in the city.
The following days were followed by meetings, bureaucracy, logistics coordination and travels. Luckily on our third or fourth day on the island a rainstorm started during mid-afternoon. Since running water was also scarce and maintaining a correct hygiene a challenge, it meant it was shower time. Without second thoughts we all ran to the yard, each carrying a bar of soap and towel. It was the first real shower in days. God, it felt great. It was also then that I decided to get a buzz cut, to minimize the chances of getting unwanted visitors living in my hair.

By then, we had become used to the tropical weather, and our eyesight had become accustomed to the view of the torn roads and burnt buildings.

These displayed a mixture on the few walls that were still left standing of pro-Indonesian militia graffiti and hand painted portraits of Xanana Gusmao[3], leader of the resistance and symbol of the "freedom fighters." It was by no way street art, rather markings of territories by opposing groups in times of violence.

The chaotic traffic was something else. There was a jumble of spanking new UN vehicles going back in forth mixed in with broken down local vehicles covered with make-shift repairs, all circulating randomly and accompanied by the constant sound of their claxons. People travelling on the roofs of cars or hanging out the open door of mini-vans and circulating about was often seen, this was something that took some time getting used to, but eventually it just became white noise and soon no longer noticed anymore. Yet, what struck me most was the look in the people's eyes, a blend of sadness, desperation, and hope. They had been through a lot, no doubt.

After getting acquainted in Dili with the UN CIVPOL structure and receiving our postings and instructions we all parted to our newly assigned locations. Managing transportation and logistics was not an easy task, yet we all succeeded in arriving sooner or later to our duty stations. In my case, I travelled along with two other colleagues to the high mountains located in the inlands, our travel had been arranged by air, as the roads were in terrible conditions at the end of the rainy season. When our helicopter arrived to Same (capital of the Manufahi District) we jumped off, grabbed our gear, and went straight to the UN Police Station to report. Finally, we were ready to start.

3 José Alexandre Gusmão a.k.a. "Xanana Gusmão," born on the 20th of June 1946 in Manatulo Timor-Leste. Timorese independence leader and politician who served as the first president (2002–07) and fourth prime minister (2007–15) of Timor-Leste.

Pic 1. Arrival at Manufahi District. Same, Timor-Leste (2000) © Jose A. Lorenzo

The police station had the basic equipment one could expect such as satellite telephone, radio transmitters, vehicles, basic crowd and riot control gear, a computer and printer. Maps hung on the wall marking the primary routes and villages. We were greeted by the station commander, and introduced to our new colleagues, and were offered a beautiful smelling and tasty coffee, after all Same was home to some of the best coffee in the world.

With a second serving of freshly brewed coffee filling our mugs, we were once again briefed. We again were told repeatedly that there were no other police in the territory other than ourselves that we had been granted full executive powers by the UN mandate, which meant that we were to ensure the safety and security of the population in the district in which we were posted. This included the right of detention and arrest, as well as the authorisation to the use of the minimum use of force necessary to fulfil our duties.

What was unclear was which law was to be enforced and what procedural rules were to be followed. As a basic rule however it was clear that our actions must respect and comply with human rights law. Easier said than

done, when one examined the mix of troop contributing nations that had to work side by side, not all were on the same human rights standards. That is why the UN threw in a UN Civilian Police Handbook[4] in our kit, which contained a copy of the Universal Declaration Human Rights and Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police, just as a kind and polite reminder.

To fill in the reader it is important to highlight that around the same time but far from where we were standing, the United Nations Secretary General had already appointed the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations to assess the shortcomings of the then existing peace operations system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change. Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi chaired the panel and delivered in later that same year in August 2000 the "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations"[5], more often referred to as the "Brahimi report", which supposed a turning point in the concept of peacekeeping operations.

The cited report called for renewed political commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change, and increased financial support; and noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible, and achievable mandates. In terms of the use of Civilian Police (CIVPOL) it called for a "doctrinal shift" in their use in UN Peace Operations, to focus on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to the traditional advisory, training, and mentoring tasks. This would require a higher level of well trained and specialised police experts.

In this regard the Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999 issued prior to the publication of the report had already taken these issues into consideration, and mandated the UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; to establish an effective administration; to assist in the development of civil and social services; to ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance; to support capacity-building for self-government; to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.

4 Jørgen Breinstrup, Karl-Georg Andersson, Harry Broer, Paolo Coletta, Jose A Diaz de Tuesta y Diez "United Nations Civilian Police Handbook" UNDPKO, 1995.

5 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) A/55/305 - S/2000/809" 21.08.2000

We were living these changes of UN policy on the ground. A lot of trial-and-error learning was to expect us in the months ahead.

My two Spanish colleagues and I were split and assigned to different teams, forming mixed patrols with other civilian police officers from various nations. We were to police patrol the district. At this stage, mid-late April 2000, Indonesian Security Forces were long gone, and much of the pro-Indonesian militia had also fled with them, however the flow of the internally displaced people (IDP) was constant, as many of those that had fled to the mountains or that were forcibly taken to West Timor on trucks, were slowly making their way back to their homes or to what was left of them.

This flow of IDPs presented not only the inherent risks that accompany mass migrations of people but also the added risk of former militia members mixed amongst the crowds returning to their home villages. This was an extraordinarily complex matter, as many of the lower-level militia members had been coerced into joining the militia, or into conducting atrocities under the threat of being killed themselves. Some attempted returning to their hometowns yet they were only put under a spotlight themselves and were then in danger of being the victim of revenge killings by their past neighbours, most of which had lost a loved one or suffered some other type of abuse themselves.

It had also been reported that small groups of militias remained in some of the more remote areas of the district and had engaged in contact with the UN Peacekeeping Forces (PKF), the military element of the UN mission. Although a significant threat, the risk of encountering these elements was low due to the high presence of PKF troops on the ground which would conduct operations in the highlands every once and again. Nevertheless, all precautions were to be taken.

The aftermath of the Indonesian pull-out of Timor-Leste left a scenario which was devastating, buildings and infrastructure had been pulled down or torn apart, crops burnt to ashes, hundreds of people had been slaughtered, and thousands of hundreds displaced, a trail of orphans and victims of rape were left behind, and hundreds of people had been reported as to be disappeared. Many widowed women and young girls whose families had been either murdered or displaced, constituted a vast and vulnerable community which were left exposed to rape or sexual abuse.

Pic 2. Aerial view of destruction. Manufahi district, Timor-Leste (2000) © Jose A. Lorenzo

Physical scars were also visible on the bare backs of young men that walked around town shirtless. As I was told, many of those scars were caused by machetes, as they were the weapon of choice as they were readily available, as they were working tools and almost everyone always carried one around. The fact that machetes were a cultural matter made patrolling a complicated issue for us as well, one was never too sure of the intentions of the carrier of the blade and had to always keep an eye open. Efforts were made to prohibit the carrying of these weapons through the issuing of a zero tolerance for machetes and sticks policy, yet it was hard to argue because machetes were also tools which locals did use for farming, harvesting, or cutting themselves a path through the jungle areas.

The lack of drinkable water and the shortage of food was another problem, and although agencies such as the World Food Programme and NGOs were able to deliver food, there was still a need to secure the delivery and avoid crowd control issues during the distribution. Strangely enough, although food and water were scarce, it was possible to buy liquor, beer, and tobacco at almost any makeshift shop under a palm tree in any given village. This was an indicator that the contraband routes were operating freely and

could be used not only to smuggle these goods but also weapons, drugs, counterfeits, or even human beings.

With no Indigenous police force in place, the security gap seemed noticeably clear to those of us with boots on the ground. It was clear that there was a need for a policing capability to restore stability and ensure its long lastingness.

As UNCIVPOL we were called to fill this void, the tasks and activities were vast and of a varied array. The patrols that were conducted during the first months in mission area where I had been assigned to were wide-ranging and went beyond the specific remit of policing as the term is understood in western countries.

For example, on a day's patrol one may be tasked to verify the state of the roads or bridges that crossed the rivers, to explore alternative routes and/or to liaise with the local authorities and identify the community's needs (e.g. medical, vaccinations, food, educational, etc…), to carry out a reconnaissance in search for emplacements to open a sub-police station, a school or a medical clinic, to liaise with the village leaders and establish contacts, to escort food convoys, ensure public security during market days, and attend returning IDPs, assist NGO personnel, regulate traffic, rescue victims of traffic accidents, seize weapons, attend local celebrations, or visit schools to identify their needs, that to mention just few duties which were regularly assigned. In many cases, we were the only point of contact for remote villages with the UN Transitional Administration, and the only ones that could convey their message and call for help in their name. The UNCIVPOL was a multi-purpose tool available to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Timor-Leste to accomplish the mission mandate.

The early days of the mission the job in this area was very community oriented. The strengthening of these ties with the community allowed the UN mission to better understand the environment and through the confidence built over time by the operators on the ground, it was able not only to gain valuable intelligence regarding the movements of various returned militias and what was happening on the other side of the border concerning Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias, but just as important, to highlight countless small issues within the community that could be easily addressed before they escalated into larger problems.
Many times, all that was needed was to serve in situ as liaison between

two different parties and finding a compromise solution for their disputes. In summary, it was prevention through community policing.

Nevertheless, although upfront it may have seemed straight forward it was not always so. The UNCIVPOL mission was a no rank mission, which in lay terms meant that one's national rank was not considered in the mission, rather it was the position and the role within the mission that one was assigned to that mattered for command purposes. This in practicality meant that in some cases junior officers would be leading teams composed of senior officers. Personal egos were on occasions a draw back. Another issue was the mixture of different policing backgrounds, professional training, different thresholds considered for the use of force, work ethics, knowledge of human rights, interoperability, and a long etc… on occasions these differences would provide enhanced views on how to sort a problem, but the reality is that most often they posed significant draw backs, disputes, and loss of precious time.

After spending a few months in the high hills, I was summoned back to the headquarters to assume a position temporarily at the operations room, this gave me the opportunity to see what was happening in the rest of the mission area.

Soon, I noticed things were different in the city. There was a high unemployment amongst young adult males, and these spent their time sitting around, chewing betel nut, talking, or gambling. Women on the other hand were busy keeping the house, taking care of the children and elder, and/or attending makeshift stalls on the roadside selling scarce products to anyone that would purchase them. It came as no surprise that there were a higher number of crimes being committed in the city area. Most of these were property crimes, such as burglaries or petit thefts that targeted international staff members. Gang violence was emerging as well, and different neighbourhoods were controlled by distinct groups, UNCIVPOL had to increase patrols in certain roads and areas to ensure security. Sexual crimes targeting foreign women was also worrisome, as the power cuts and deficient street lighting created many dark angles that were ideal hiding places not only for sexual stalkers but also for muggers. Information campaigns and uniformed patrols and were also increased in the areas that were frequented by international staff as an effort to reduce these serious crimes.

The UNCIVPOL had established various specialised patrolling teams which worked in close coordination with an investigation division also staffed from the international police headquarters and these carried out numerous operations, not only focusing on crime by locals but also by expatriates that had come to the island seeking business opportunities which at times were murky and illegal. Raids and detentions were conducted and handed to the newly established courts. These specialised patrols were also double hatted as crowd and riot control units when required, despite not all components having received adequate training in crowd control.

Just down the hall from the operations room was the senior Spanish contingent representative's office; I would visit him during my coffee break often just to have a chat or see what he was up to. His background as a veteran skipper and as founding member of the Guardia Civil Maritime Service endowed him with a unique and valuable perspective, we were after all on an island. He strived hard in his day-to-day work to raise awareness on the need of environmental legislation, the need for the establishment of a police force to patrol the territorial waters, to combat illegal fishing, and to protect endangered species. It was quite common at the time to see some protected species on sale at market stands, this drove him mad. He was particularly concerned in having various areas of the island declared as protected environmental sites as these were home to endangered wildlife. I was lucky enough to visit these areas and can guarantee that it may be as close to a dreamed paradise as one can get to. His efforts were not in vain.

Working in the capital, also gave me the opportunity to meet my fellow colleagues that were out in the districts when they came to town, we would exchange stories and learn from one another. I still recall the day that a friend of mine narrated how a group had arrived at the village he was stationed at in the Viqueque region and commenced burning huts and chasing the villagers. Whilst some colleagues were in pursue of these men to stop the offence, he made several trips with his vehicle packed to evacuate and place a safe as many villagers as he could. This would not be the only incident of this nature that he experienced as the attacks continued as also did his efforts to protect the civilian populace.

A few months down the line, my background as an investigator led me to be assigned to the newly created "Serious Crimes Unit" (SCU) within the Prosecutor General Office. This unit was tasked to investigate serious crime occurred during the lead up to the popular consultation and in the

aftermath of the results and pulling out of the Indonesian forces from Timor-Leste. I was assigned to the "Bobonaro District Team."

The district of Bobonaro was on the border with Western Timor, the presence of militia sneaking in and out of the territory was notorious, contraband was a way of life, and the flow of retuning IDPs was constant. The district had been home to Joao Tavares, who had been identified as the supreme pro-Indonesian militia commander, and the area had suffered some of the bloodiest crimes before and after the popular consultation for independence; it had been reported that an estimated 250 civilians were killed for their political views, many tortured, and thousands forcibly displaced during this period. The tension was evident.

My new assignment would take my head out of the present that I was then living and submerge me into Timor-Leste' s recent past, which I then thoroughly studied, investigated, and worked towards developing criminal cases with charges for crimes against humanity brought against those most responsible for the atrocities committed in the region.

The SCU was under the Prosecutor General's Office and those UNCIVPOL investigators assigned to the unit were de facto detached from the regular UNCIVPOL structure and became dependant from the Prosecutor General Office. My daily contact with the international policing structure had decreased significantly yet I kept my head up and an eye out and viewed developments within the policing environment as an (almost) outsider for the first time.

As time passed by, the local community started growing tired of seeing the international community going around doing their business and them not being part of it. As more than one Timorese told me at the time, it was starting to seem as just one more colonisation by outsiders. Results were not visible, locals' expectations which were high had not been met, and this stirred a general feeling of unrest in the environment. Clashes commenced both internally amongst Timorese as well as directed against the international community.

The UNCIVPOL in many instances seemed to be unprepared to cope with these escalations of violence in part due to the lack of a solid structure, cohesion, language and cultural barriers and standardization and interoperability issues which soon arose. The combination of individual UNCIVPOL officers with various backgrounds working together did not

necessarily made a unit capable of coping with these tasks where clarity of command and cohesion was required. The lack of inclusion of the local population at all the distinct levels within the policing structures was also troublesome, as the cultural understanding of what was occurring was missing, not to mention the local knowledge and community ties.

To deal with the first of these issues, a new figure arrived in the mission area, units of the Portuguese National Republican Guard (or as called in Portuguese the Guarda Nacional Republicana, GNR) which deployed as Rapid Response Units (RRU). These RRU were robust enough to cope with crowd and riot control as well as to deal with general law enforcement matters. These were well established and formed units with a clear command structure, no interoperability issues, and all were on the same sheet of music when they had to intervene. As they were native Portuguese speakers, this permitted them to interact directly with a great part of the population that had maintained the language heritage from their colonial past.

The GNR that arrived in Timor-Leste as RRU were the predecessors of that was to become known within the UN as Formed Police Units (FPU). In the United Nations FPUs are defined as specialised, cohesive, armed mobile police units, providing security to support the United Nations operations by ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and assets; contributing to the protection of civilians; and supporting police operations that require a formed response. Depending on the mission's mandate, these may perform tasks independently (in the case of executive law enforcement mandate) or in support of existing host-state law enforcement agencies and within the limits of their operations and logistical capabilities, areas of deployment and relevant UN policies.[6]

Regarding the establishment of a local police force, UNTAET commenced the recruitment and training as early as 2000, yet it was not until august 2001 that was officially established and not until the 20th of May 2002 (day of the Timor-Leste Independence) that the terms and conditions for a full hand over were established for the National Police of Timor-Leste.

6 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support, "Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," UNDPKO, 2016.

In March 2003 shortly after the Deputy Prosecutor of the SCU issued two indictments[7] before the Special Panels with charges for crimes against humanity against the top military, administrative and pro-Indonesian militia leaders responsible for the atrocities committed in Timor-Leste during 1999, I decided that my time had come and that it was time for me to return home with the sense of accomplishment. The issuing of these two indictments was the culmination of the focus of my work during the previous two years.

In hindsight it is easy to criticise apparent lack of progress of the mission during this period, of course there had been flaws and shortcomings, yet despite it all, the bases on which to build the countries institutions had been placed. It may have been a small step, but it was after all a move forward.

3. Conclusions

Without the presence of the international policing capability from the outset of the mission, the country would have been in a complete state of lawlessness as the only policing capability that had recently existed in the territory had been the Indonesia security forces which had pulled out (and which had been part of the problem from the start). A state of lawlessness would have been a breeding ground for organised crime, serious personal and property crimes, and would have left exposed those most vulnerable to risk. Crimes would have not been investigated, nor those responsible held accountable, producing a double victimisation of the victims. The added value of having the international policing capability on the ground which extended the tentacles of the head of mission to the most remote places would have been missed, and the flow of information in both directions would have been cut off.

The UNSCR 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999, mandated UNTAET inter alia to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor; and to do so it also authorised the transitional administration to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate. This UNSCR had been described many times as providing a "robust mandate." This characteristic

7 Office of the Prosecutor General Timor-Leste, Indictment Case Number 02/2003 "Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes –Against Burhanuddin Siagian, Joao Tavares et al." & Indictment Case Number 05/2003 "Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes –Against Wiranto; Zacky Anwar Makarim; Kiki Sy Ahnakri; Adam Rachmat Damiri; Suhartono Suratman; Mohammad Noer Muis; Yayat Sudrajat; Abilio Jose Osorio Soares." 2003.

was not however unique to Timor-Leste as previously and in the antipodes of the world the UNSCR 1244 had authorised the United Nations Mission in Kosovo with similar powers.

In this sense both mandates were already aligned with the recommendations that were to be later set forth in the "Brahimi Report." The UN was shifting both doctrinally and in practice away from the humanitarian assistance and monitoring role which had traditionally been assigned to its CIVPOL in emergency response capability towards a more proactive role, which included establishing an interim law enforcement capability, training and mentoring, advisory support, operational support, and which gradually moved on to a further development phase to include law enforcement capacity building. It has been described as moving away from a peacekeeping to a peace-making mind-set.

Although this supposed a big step, the efficiency of this transition at first could be and was questioned, as it had proved difficult at times to establish patrols, teams, stations, and staff headquarters etc... with such a mix of varied police from the contributing nations, in which many times interoperability proved an issue. This is not to say that individual police experts should not be deployed as subject matter experts as their skills, knowledge and contribution can be paramount in identified key positions, but rather it is intended to stress that the deployment of units such as those deployed by the GNR to the mission suppose an added value in the sense that these well-established units are capable of undertaking demanding tasks and activities as well as conducting regular law enforcement activities.

The UN in 2000 it created its Police Division and, in 2007, it became part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. The UN Standing Police Capacity was established in 2007 and is a rapid deployable component of the UN Police Division comprised of senior experienced police officers that can support a start-up mission as well as advising ongoing missions[8].

Having a stability policing capability on stand ready to intervene at the earliest moment to fill the so called "security gap" will mean bringing the policing dimension into the military operation. This no doubt is an added value as it will contribute towards fighting corruption, building integrity

8 Maria Appelblom and Giorgio Giaimo, "Policing in the UN," Stability Policing a Tool to Project Stability. HQ SACT, 2017.

amongst the host nations forces, and towards the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights from earliest moments of a crisis management operation and will help pave the road towards achieving the desired end state.

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8. The Portuguese Contribution to Stability Policing in Iraq – 2003/2005

"…in Iraq or East Timor, the men and women of the GNR know how to act as promoters of peace and friendship among people, establishing bonds of mutual trust and reciprocal cooperation. In the same way, it once again demonstrates the wisdom of opting for police forces with military status, given the relevance and nature of stabilisation and peacekeeping missions, which gives a renewed role to the National Republican Guard in the field of international security".

1. Introduction

This chapter was written following a challenge presented by the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP CoE) to offer personal testimonies of experiences gained during international missions. The main goal is to analyse Stability Policing (SP) as a NATO capability, along with its immense unexploited potential to fill the security gap and establish the rule of law towards a safe and secure environment.

As a conceptual outline for the purpose of this chapter, we can define SP as a capability that can be applied to any NATO operation and includes a wide range of civil police activities that focus on civil populations. In this vein, we assume SP requires a civil-oriented mindset and an expert approach to meet the needs and expectations of the civil population in order to be successful, being in this case the Gendarmerie-type forces (GTF) the best suitable assets to engage in SP missions.

The author chose to bring to light his experience as deputy commander of the fourth contingent of the Portuguese unit deployed in Iraq and integrated into the Italian Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) of the *Antica Babilonia* mission. The Portuguese effort, through the *Guarda Nacional Republicana* (GNR), lasted over a year, between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2005. During this period, the GNR deployed four contingents of the *Subagrupamento Alfa* (Task Force Alfa - TF ALFA), the Portuguese designation of the company-level gendarmerie-type unit integrated into the Italian MSU Regiment.

The testimony covers the mission framework, the organisation, and capabilities of the MSU, the activities carried out and the most significant events that occurred during the mentioned period, as an attempt to demonstrate, through the author's lens, the potential of a gendarmerie unit embedded in a conventional military force.

2. The roadmap to Iraq

16 March 2003
A summit to discuss the possibilities of war with Iraq took place at the *Lajes* American base in Azores - Portugal, bringing together President Bush, the Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The host was the head of the Portuguese government Durão Barroso.

20 March 2003
Launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), led by an international coalition.

July 2003
The Portuguese Government decide to participate in the OIF phase IV (Stabilization, Reconstruction and Transition), authorizing the deployment of the GNR TF ALFA.
Deployment of a GNR Fact-Finding Mission to Iraq.
Deployment of a GNR Liaison Officer to the Joint Permanent Headquarters (HQ), in the United Kingdom (UK).

September 2003
Deployment of GNR staff officers to integrate the HQ of the British Multinational Division South-East (MDN SE) in Basra, and the Italian Brigade in An Nasiriyah, Iraq.
Deployment of a GNR Liaison Officer to the Carabinieri HQ in Italy.

16 October 2003
Issuing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 authorizing a multinational force under a unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq.

12 November 2003
Attack on Italian compound Mistral in An Nasiriyah, resulting in 28 deaths and 140 injured people.

13 November 2003
Deployment of the 1st contingent of the TF ALFA to Iraq.

30 June 2004
Sovereignty over the territory of Iraq was returned to the Iraqi authorities.

30 January 2005
Iraq parliamentary elections.

10 February 2005
Redeployment of the 4th contingent of the TF ALFA to Portugal.

August 2006
Redeployment to Portugal of the GNR staff officers from the MDN (SE), Basra – Iraq.

3. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Following September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001, after the allegation that Saddam Hussein was involved with the terrorist group Al Qaeda and that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, the Former US President George W. Bush ordered the Iraq invasion on 20 March 2003. The main objectives were to overthrow Saddam and also the Ba'ath Party from power and to establish democracy in Iraq.

The Iraq War began in March 2003 led by the United States (US), coordinators of an international coalition, composed of the UK, Australia, Denmark, and Poland, totalling around 40,000 soldiers. An Army Corps-level Theatre Command was established with HQ in Baghdad (Combined Joint Task Force 7 - CJTF 7), divided into two US-led Multinational Divisions, a Polish-led



Pic. 1 Combined Joint Task Force 7, Iraq (2004) @GNR

Multinational Division in the central-southern part of Iraq, and a Multinational Division in the south-eastern part (MND SE) led by the UK.

OIF counted with four phases. The first phase aimed to form the international coalition, and pre-position troops at bases in the region, continuing to act at the diplomatic level to avoid, if possible, the use of force. The second phase consisted of the organization of the battlefield and the attack, through conventional combat operations, on the Iraqi Saddam regime. The decisive operations took place in phase III, seeking to achieve the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein's regime and the Ba'ath Party.

Phase IV consisted of the post-combat operations, with the end state of stabilization, reconstruction, and transition for a renewed Iraqi regime.

This phase marks the end of combat operations and the beginning of stabilization and support operations (humanitarian assistance and reconstruction). From a doctrinal perspective, phase IV usually begins soon after the advent of combat during phase III, and the two overlap. In addition, in Iraq, significant fighting still occurred during phase IV. A better descriptive

term for phase IV would be transition operations, "because military forces try to position the area of operations to move back to peace and civilian government control". As parts of the territory were liberated, these post-combat operations were carried out, even as fighting continued elsewhere.

Pic. 2 Province of Dhi Qar, Iraq (2004) @GNR

Following the normalisation process of the country for the transfer of power to an Iraqi government, the American Command (CJTF-7) was reconfigured into:

- a Multinational Force Command Iraq that fulfilled the functions of Operational Command;
- a Multinational Land Forces Command in Iraq that carried out the functions of Tactical Command.

The Italian contingent, where the Portuguese TF ALFA was integrated, was assigned a sector of responsibility in the southern region of Iraq matching with the Iraqi province of Dhi Qar.

4. Operation Antica Babilonia

"Al-Sadr's forces also proved unwilling or unable to stand against determined and aggressive coalition military action. Where coalition forces stood and fought, they held. Where they acted aggressively, as the Italians did in Nasiriyah, al-Sadr lost, and lost heavily".

On 01 May 2003, with the entry of the coalition forces into Baghdad, the war officially ended, and the post-conflict phase began to create the conditions indispensable for the political, social and economic development of Iraq. Although, in fact, the coalition armies did not yet have full control of the territory and were starting to suffer severe losses inflicted by the Iraqi resistance through several terrorist attacks.
Throughout 2003, dissatisfaction among Iraqis grew being expressed by increasingly violent means and ways, and with a significant rise in the number of attacks perpetrated against coalition soldiers. The threat level was extremely high, leading United Nations (UN) to recognize that "there is no place without risk in Iraq".

The social instability and the increasing insecurity were a serious concern, mainly regarding:

- abductions, which had become commonplace throughout the area of responsibility, caused great concern among the population who have questioned the coalition on the subject;
- drug trafficking, which had been increasing in the MND SE area, originating in Afghanistan, via Iran, or originating from thefts and robberies in hospitals, pharmacies, and their staff;
- vehicle thefts had risen significantly, especially when compared to the period under Saddam when this type of crime was punishable by death. Robberies were mainly carried out along highways and were intended to feed criminal and terrorist networks, such as Iraqi Hezbollah, or for fraudulent trade.

Looting and criminality in the aftermath of the combat operations and the lack of troops on the ground to deal with these security issues undermined the reputation and hence legitimacy of the coalition. The disbanding of the Iraqi armed forces, with personnel left at home without salary, contributed greatly to a chaotic situation. It is relevant to notice the increase of causalities among Iraqi civilians after May 2003, during OIF phase IV, due to terrorist attacks and criminality.

On 15 July 2003, the Italian Joint Task Force (IT JTF), a brigade-level unit, started to operate in the Dhi Qar province, in the context of the operation called "Antica Babilonia", which focused on the general framework of OIF Phase IV, as to create the necessary conditions for security and stability in order to allow the incoming distribution of humanitarian aid and the country's reconstruction. The Dhi Qar region was populated by around 1.4 million people in a 28,000 km2 area, extended as an "L" from north to south

and east to west, being its centre the An Nasiriyah city - the province's capital.

The region was bordered by two rivers, the Euphrates, which crossed the region in the southern part from west to east, and another of lesser importance which crossed the region from south to north, joining the Euphrates at An Nasiriyah. The main cities were distributed along the road axes, which in turn followed the course of the river. From a demographic standpoint, the region was characterised by tribal organisations and orographically it was not immediately perceptible where the desert ended, and the swamps began and where these finished and the cultivated area started. An equal note could be made regarding the territories of each tribe. The whole region was a meeting point between desert and swamps, between caravan routes and markets, and between permanent and nomadic populations. In the province, near Nasiriyah, a mandatory visiting site was the Ziggurat of Ur, a massive Sumerian temple believed to be the birthplace of the prophet Abraham.

Ur was the Sumerians' capital, and the place where they developed an irrigation system, practised sophisticated agricultural methods, and traded extensively with cities around Mesopotamia and beyond. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the work developed by the MSU contributing to the mapping of the archaeological sites in the province of Dhi Qar and conducting operations to protect the cultural heritage.

Located in south-eastern Iraq and the capital of the Dhi Qar region, An Nasiriyah stands on the north bank of the Euphrates, 375 km southeast of Baghdad. Agricultural centre, specializing in the cultivation of dates, An Nasiriyah was well connected by rail to major Iraqi cities. It was founded in the 19th century. The majority of the population was Shiite, but there were also a large number of Christians. In fact, An Nasiriyah actually means Christian city. In 2003 there were 560,200 inhabitants, making it the fourth largest city in Iraq.

The IT JTF was comprised of Italian units from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Carabinieri (Task Force (TF) MSU) totalling around 3190 soldiers, adding 517 from Romania and 128 from Portugal. The IT JTF mission was to ensure the essential security framework to allow the arrival of aid and to contribute, with specific capacities, to the most urgent intervention activities in the restoration of essential infrastructures and services.
In this context, the JTF tasks were as follows:

- reconstruction of the Iraqi "security sector" through assistance in training and equipping forces, at the central and local level, both in the context of the coalition and bilaterally;
- creation and maintenance of the necessary security framework;
- contribution to the restoration of public infrastructures and the reactivation of essential services;
- chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) surveys;
- public order management;
- military police;
- contribution to airport management;
- contribution to EOD activities, also with the use of the K9 component;
- support the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) activities;
- control of the territory and fight against crime.

The IT JTF was initially located in the "White Horse" compound, between the city An Nasiriyah and the Tallil US air base.

In the aerial view of the city of An Nasiriyah, it is possible to identify on the right side of the river Euphrates, near the first bridge, the Compound "Libeccio", also known as "Museum Compound", where the MSU Battalion and the MSU Command were based. On the left side of the river, also near the first bridge, was located the compound "Mistral" (also known by the term "Animal House"), where the MSU Manoeuvring unit was quartered.
After the 12 November 2003 attack on the Mistral compound, the MSU components from the Libeccio compound and the IT JTF, located in the White Horse compound, were relocated to Camp Mittica.



Pic. 3 MSU Regiment organization, Iraq (2004) @GNR

The TF MSU, a regiment-level unit, consisted in general of two battalions: the MSU with three Carabinieri companies, one Romanian military police company and the Portuguese TF ALFA; and, the Manoeuvring Unit, composed of Carabinieri paratroopers and the Special Intervention Group (GIS). The TF MSU still counted with a company-level unit for support (CCS) and the staff which included a medical unit.

On the chart, it is possible to identify the distribution of the 128 Portuguese integrated into the TF MSU. The main missions assigned to the MSU were:

- patrolling the area of responsibility;
- information gathering;
- crowd and riot control (CRC) operations;
- monitoring, mentoring, and training (MMT) the Local Police;
- supporting the legal system;
- linking with civilian governmental and non-governmental authorities;
- war crime investigations.

Regarding the MMT activities, it is worth mentioning that these activities were carried out daily by 7 specialized teams, 10 members each, deployed at the Police Forces HQs and 19 lower commands, and 4 squads (20 units) which followed the local police force patrols during their outdoor day and night duties. The United Nations Transition Integration Program (TIP),

implemented by the TF MSU in the Dhi Qar province, provided the local police (around 6.000 elements) with basic police skills, based on 2-week training cycles, regarding law, police technical and tactical procedures, use of weapons, and use of communications. Regarding the Highway Police, 53 agents were provided training on driving codes, traffic regulation, traffic accidents, first aid, convoy escort, and deployed on Dhi Qar province main routes.

At the Az Zubayr Academy, 10 MSU instructors were engaged in 3-week training cycles to capacitate the cadres, instructors and personnel assigned to the Iraq police investigative units. To be noticed, the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) was pushed into the front line of both public security and counterinsurgency, evolving in an environment of high-level violence and terrorism intermingled with a problematic insurgency movement. This was a mission for which they were not prepared, trained, or equipped. Under the Saddam regime, the police had a secondary status, considering that all serious internal security tasks were handled by other security and paramilitary entities.

Not only did the coalition expect the police to move from being a neglected, secondary player to being a professional police force, but it also encouraged the police to do so in the face of an extreme level of violence that no democratic police force in the world would have likely been able to face. Against this background, by July 2004, the police recruiting, training, equipping, and infrastructure development programs were making progress, compared with their abysmal state early in the mission.

Seeking the restoration of public infrastructures, the reactivation of essential services and the distribution of humanitarian aid, several CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) activities were carried out in favour of the population in the Dhi Qar province. This included the reconstruction of schools, repair and maintenance of aqueducts and sewers, restoration of electrical power plants, restoration of courts and prison facilities, cleaning works in the cities and villages, among other initiatives, such as the use of the Telemedicine Mobile Unit for medical visits and medicine distribution.

On 1 December 2006, in the presence of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of Defense, the flag-lowering ceremony was held which concluded the Italian commitment to An Nasiriyah.

5. Task Force ALFA (TF ALFA)
The Portuguese "Subagrupamento Alfa"

The Portuguese engagement in Iraq could not have started in a worst way. One day before the departure of the first contingent to Iraq, the November 12 attacks in An Nasiriyah occurred. This terrible event, which victimized several comrades and civilians, had a huge impact on the morale of the contingent and their families. Nobody remains indifferent to such an incident. Nevertheless, the Portuguese contingent showed their fibre and all of them embarked on the mission the next day.

Two days after, on 14 November 2003, on the road from Kuwait to Basra, Portuguese journalists seeking to conduct a report on the GNR engagement in Iraq, were attacked by hijackers only 10 minutes after crossing the border. One journalist received a gunshot injury, and another was subsequently held hostage for approximately 36 hours. During this time a $50,000 ransom was demanded for their release, which was not paid. All three journalists returned to Portugal shortly after this incident.

These two episodes indelibly marked the beginning of the GNR mission in Iraq. It undoubtedly demonstrated that we were in a complex, challenging, and risky theatre.

The TF ALFA was a company-level unit of 128 military personnel, articulated in 03 CRC platoons, a Special Operations Team (SOT), an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team, and a support component. Working in close coordination with the TF MSU, there was still a medical team composed of staff from the *Instituto Nacional de Emergencia Médica* and a GNR nurse. To be highlighted that the TF ALFA integrated several female gendarmes, who were mainly dedicated to support functions, but often engaged in operational tasks.

Portugal deployed four TF ALFA contingents from November 2003 to February 2005, totalling a national effort of around 500 gendarmes. The TF ALFA was initially accommodated in tents, due to the logistical movement of the TF MSU from An Nasiriyah to Camp Mittica, and faced hard living conditions due to the rainy season. Later, it moved to five abandoned houses belonging to officers of the former Iraqi Air Force. The houses were named after Portuguese cities: Lisbon, Porto, Coimbra, Braga, and Faro, and assigned respectively to the Command group, support component, and the 03 operational Platoons.

It was notable the work developed by every gendarme in improving the living conditions, building extra furniture, structures, and a bar with used materials collected from every possible place.

The sanitary conditions were not the best as the toilets were in containers, about 150 meters from the houses, which during the rainy season, particularly at night, caused several restrictions. Nevertheless, Camp Mittica was well served with an Italian post exchange (PX), some "restaurants", convenient shops, and dining facilities where it was "mandatory" to eat pizza and pasta every day. Free laundry facilities and a well-equipped field hospital were also available.

In the military area, it was possible to enter the US Tallil air base and have access to the American PX and other convenient facilities. Going to the PX or going to eat an American burger was the "event" of the week, actually an escape to break the routine of intense operational activity and the daily pizza and pasta.

The daily battle rhythm started with the morning parade, 7 days a week. Each contingent completed a 4-month tour of duty without days off or vacations. With some exceptions due to planned operations, the daily engagement was focused on patrolling An Nasiriyah, maintaining a platoon permanently available as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF).

The patrolling was made through predefined routes, covering key points of interest, hot spots, power plants, sites where the training to the local police was being provided, and police stations, among other relevant sites. This task could be done exclusively with our assets or performed jointly with the local police.

Pic. 4 Patrolling An Nasiriyah City, Iraq (2004) @GNR

An Nasiriyah was a chaotic but alive city, full of people and cars, with terrible road conditions, mainly not tarred, where drivers didn't abide by any road traffic rules. Being a flatted terrain and due to the proximity of the Euphrates River, the soil was saturated with water. When it rained, patrolling became a risky task as we could easily stay stuck in the mud, vulnerable to hostile actions. The daily thermic amplitude also did not facilitate the operational duties. During the day it was common to experience temperatures above 40 degrees and, as soon as the sun went down, the rapid drop in temperature would reach negative degrees. Just this circumstance alone, for a European not used to such a climate, represented a huge personal challenge, requiring constant hydration and the advanced preparation of clothing and equipment to make the transition from day to night. It was also clear evidence of the physical resistance of the Iraqis, of their constructions and infrastructures, as rough as they were.

In An Nasiriyah, the electric and telephonic cables that crossed roads and houses constituted a major risk for the outside gunner in our armoured personnel carriers (APC). For this reason, after arriving in Iraq, the Portuguese adapted the APC to protect the gunner, with a metal structure to cut the low cables. Sandbags were also incorporated to stop the ricochet of firearm shots and explosions.

Patrolling was probably the most dangerous task we performed. While on planned and prepared operations we had the initiative and the surprise element, during patrolling we never knew what to expect. The transport (smuggling) of large amounts of weapons or intense air shootings related to weddings, or other types of celebrations are just examples of what we could find during patrolling, thus requiring a constant state of alert.

One of the tasks while on patrol, consisted in checking fuel supply points in order to combat the trafficking of such valuable material on the local black market. It was a particular police operation, denominated "AUTOGRILL", in which "it was impossible not to think of the total nonsense of inspecting fuel stations in order to verify the price at which they were being sold and the quantity in the station's own depots, in one of the chronically top countries in the list of oil world producers".

Pic. 5 Weapons control during patrol, Iraq (2004) @GNR

Pic. 6 Fuel supply station, Iraq (2004) @GNR

In a post-war and highly destabilised environment, from time to time, the shooting with light firearms or rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) directly targeted the TF ALFA patrols. Our reaction was standardised, response to fire when needed and exit the area to avoid collateral damages to civilians. One single event of road improvised explosive device (IED), remotely triggered to aim at a TF ALFA patrol, happened on 12 October 2004. One APC was hit by the blast, injuring the gunner. Luckily the kevlar helmet, broken with the incident, saved the life of the gendarme, resulting solely in light injuries. Nevertheless, the APC did its protective function, having minor damages, while the rest of the crew inside just faced physical inaction for brief moments as a result of the blast wave.

Pic. 7 Crowd and Riot Control Operation, Iraq (2004) @ GNR

During the first period of engagement in Iraq, late 2003, beginning 2004, we applied the same policing model used in other international scenarios. This would include, among others, foot patrol to promote proximity with the local populations and build acceptance of our presence. During this period, the TF ALFA was engaged in several CRC operations, related to the dissatisfaction of the population regarding basic services. However, with the increased threat and the numerous episodes of hostile attacks towards the coalition forces, foot patrols and CRC operations were suspended. In these circumstances, the daily patrol switched to a minimum force level of Platoon (04 APC and 28 gendarmes) making use of APCs.

Another daily activity was the 24H QRF, enabling the TF MSU and the TF ALFA to have a platoon permanently available to provide immediate support to MSU forces.

When conducting operations far away from An Nasiriyah, such as in the city of Suq Ash Shuyukh or even in Al Chabaysh, the QRF was commonly engaged to constitute a prepositioned reserve force and to ensure a communication bridge between the force engaged in the operations and the HQ in Camp Mittica. Whether in patrolling or in planned operations the posture of the TF ALFA towards the population was always the same.

Proximity, support and establishing bounds while providing security. One great "icebreaker" to approach the population was to point at our flag, on our uniform, and say "Cristiano Ronaldo" or "Luís Figo". Surprisingly, even in the most remote places such as the nomad populations of the deserts, without access to electricity and TV, they would immediately smile and repeat the name of the famous Portuguese football players.

Very often the TF ALFA was requested to provide road escorts, to different MSU units or entities, such as the Manoeuvre Unit, the CIMIC Cell, the Local Police trainers or the MSU Commander. This type of task would frequently demand long periods of engagement, depending on the destination and activity to be developed at the visited site. The most common escorts were provided to the CIMIC cell to support the distribution of humanitarian aid at hospitals, schools, or other types of institutions. Although it was a very rewarding task, allowing for direct support and close relations with local populations, it represented a risky timeframe where we were exposed to a larger spectrum of threats. To try to mitigate it, joint engagements were set up, involving prepositioned QRF, perimetral security and/or occupation of high points for situational awareness or sniper support.

The TF ALFA also participated in the coalition force effort to capacitate the IPS, modelled on the gendarmerie model. For this purpose, we counted on a specialized team solely dedicated to the training of the Police in An Nasiriyah. Their task was not an easy one. Their engagement was required daily and for extended hours. They were alone among IPS officers, facing extra logistical and security challenges. Their lessons or practical training required the constant use of an interpreter. Wherefore, the outcome of their work was highly dependent on the trust and human relations built between trainers and trainees. In that environment, considering the cultural differences and the threat we were facing, training the IPS was very challenging, but at the same time, a rewarding mission.

Depending on the duty roster, from time to time, the TF ALFA was engaged in providing perimetral security to Camp Mittica, static or mobile. This type of task was particularly difficult, especially at night with the policy of light restrictions, favouring incidents between friendly forces. Such cases tended to happen with American forces from the Tallil air base and the practice of some soldiers to "in case of doubt shoot first and ask later".

To illustrate the risk involved in this type of task, two episodes are presented. On 20 May 2004, the TF ALFA arrested 6 Iraqis that were

preparing an attack on Camp Mittica with 3 120mm mortar rounds and seized a large number of explosives. On 5 June 2004, the rapid reaction of the TF ALFA personnel prevented another attack, this time prepared with an improvised launcher, and stolen mortar rounds from abandoned Iraqi army barracks. The triggering device was handmade and such a set enabled cheap and available weapon systems to be used against coalition forces.

In light of such a threat, the TF ALFA EOD Team, together with EOD units from the coalition forces (mostly Italian and American experts), was engaged, on a daily basis, to collect and dispose of the thousands of conventional devices (artillery shells, mortar bombs, rockets, missiles, mines, aircraft bombs, etc.) both left behind by the Iraqi Army, or used during the military operations (UXO – Unexploded Ordnance). It was an impressive, hard, and very important job conducted by the coalition EOD experts, for the sake of force protection.

Pic. 8 EOD Team defusing a car bomb, Iraq (2004) @GNR

Besides that, the TF ALFA EOD Team, the only one among the TF MSU, had the key mission of responding to all IED incidents in the MSU area of responsibility. This was the case on 8 November 2004, when the TF ALFA EOD Team successfully defused a live car bomb, during a long and thorough operation, which lasted more than 10 hours. The car was strategically parked next to a road often used by coalition convoys, on gas

and oil pipelines, in order to enhance destruction and losses, if the 65 kg of plastic explosives hidden inside went off.
The IED triggering mechanism combined a victim operated, timed and remote-controlled device, which, together with the sensible position of the car regarding the pipelines, forced the EOD operators to conduct manual approaches (wearing bomb suits) toward the device, in order to apply the so-called "semi-remote render safe techniques". The success of this complex operation was noticed all over the world, especially among the EOD community, putting the GNR EOD experts in the spotlight, as part of the world's elite EOD units. The TF ALFA SOT was also often engaged in high-risk operations, usually working together with the Carabinieri special forces, the GIS, and the Paratroopers.

On 3 April 2004, a joint force of TF ALFA SOT and TF MSU paratroopers conducted a recon mission[1] in the city of Suq Ash Shuyukh, a region usually hostile to the presence of coalition forces. That day was no different. The force suffered a roadblock and was targeted with firearms, RPGs, and mortars for approximately three hours until reinforcements arrived. Three Portuguese and two Italians were injured as a result, and more than 5000 ammunitions were used to defend themselves.

The Battle of Bridges[2] took place in mid-May 2004 and consisted of a series of attacks perpetrated against the coalition forces by the Mahdi Army to gain control of the An Nasiriyah bridges and in this way control the movements in the city. After several serious incidents with the Italian Army and with the TF MSU, on 14 May 2004, following a mortar attack on the Libeccio compound, two Italian Army soldiers were injured. The IT JTF set up a force[3] of two-wheeled tank destroyer Centauro, five APC M 113, nine Carabinieri APC and the TF ALFA SOT reinforced with the medical team. The mission was to rotate the force responsible to secure the Libeccio compound and to provide medical support to the injured elements. The movement to the Libeccio compound was made under heavy shooting of around 100 militias[4] and after arrival, the mortar attacks started. The SOT placement of snipers and armoured vehicles enabled valuable information

1 Instituto Estudos Superiores Militares. Curso de Estado Maior Conjunto 2013-14. Trabalho de Grupo "Debaixo de Fogo no Iraque". Análise de caso de estudo à luz das teorias da liderança.

2 https://en.difesaonline.it/news-forze-armate/storia/la-battaglia-dei-ponti-di-nassiryah-la-prima-offensiva-dellesercito.

3 https://podulscorpionilor.ro/14-20-maggio-2004-la-seconda-battaglia/.

4 Riccardo Cappelli. Iraq: Italian Lessons Learned. Military Review, March -April 2005, pp. 58-61.

for the decision-making process of the MSU Commander who was on the ground.

The extraction manoeuvre was fulfilled more or less after two hours, with fire support from the SOT and TF ALFA CRC platoons, meanwhile activated and positioned along the exfiltration road. In this incident, the TF ALFA alone spent more than 2500 ammunitions and 150 40mm grenades.

Following this event, on 16 May 2004, Brigadier General Gian Marco CHIARINI, Commander of the IT JTF, commended the TF ALFA nurse for his service in Libeccio during the attacks carried out by militias of the radical terrorist group Muqtada al-Sadr, namely, "where just a moment before an Italian soldier had been wounded, without care of the danger, aware that he risked his own life, he also lavished himself in the rescue efforts of the wounded under mortar and light weapons shots".

Nine days later, the Italian Defense Minister Antonio Martino sent a communication to the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs expressing "appreciation and gratitude for the dedication of the Portuguese military personnel operation side by side with the Italian troops with great professionalism, courage and pride". Several special police operations were also conducted to arrest suspected criminals. One of those types of operations took place on 10 November 2004, when the TF ALFA was engaged to conduct a search and arrest operation in the Wardawi Naji area. The operation was very successful and resulted in the arrest of seven persons and a large number of weapons, RPGs, and explosives.

The visit of entities or personalities to Iraq was another type of event that would require the development of a special police operation. On 21 January 2005, when a foreign political authority paid a visit to An Nasiriyah, the TF MSU, including the TF ALFA SOT, was engaged as a QRF in the city centre, in close coordination with the Local Police. For an unknown reason, militias stationed in the "political parties street" opened heavy fire against the SOT moving on the other side of the Euphrates River, leading to an exchange of fire and extraction from the site. Reacting to the episode, an Italian-operated Helicopter AB 412 made a pass through the area, when, unfortunately, the machine gunner was shot and severely injured, having deceased later in the field hospital.

The Portuguese engagement in Iraq ended in February 2005, and on 01 June 2005, considering the excellent relations established between Portuguese

and Italians, Colonels Camelo Burgio, Luciano Zubani, Claudio D´Angelo and Paolo Nardone, Carabinieri officers who commanded the TF MSU, were awarded the Gold Medal for Distinguished Public Security Services at the GNR HQ in Portugal. Operation Antica Babilonia was, most likely, the highest affirmation of the added value of gendarmerie-type forces in stability policing and, from my point of view, a significant step towards the creation of the European Gendarmerie Force[5].

6. Conclusions

The GNR mission in Iraq was a success at all levels. It demonstrated its capacity to generate, prepare, deploy, sustain, and redeploy a significant gendarmerie force to an immediate post-war and extremely dangerous theatre more than 4,000 km away. The professional performance and operational results obtained were recognised beyond borders and, once again, enabled the clear demonstration of the added value of a gendarmerie-type force embedded in a conventional military operation.
In fact, the strong engagement of MSU forces, as afore demonstrated, enabled the IT JTF to properly discharge its mandate, by tailoring the use of force to the level strictly needed to address the different situations. This paradigm provided an unambiguous message to local populations and adversary forces, stating that the IT JTF was there to help and contribute to the reconstruction of a better Iraq. From our standpoint, this approach helped to lower the animosity between parties, discouraging the adversary in its hostile intentions. At the same time, the mindset of a gendarme and its experience in dealing with the civilian community had the potential to provide a better relationship between local populations and the coalition forces.

Engaging army personnel in police matters makes as much sense as committing police to combat operations. Neither has the genetic, structural, or operational conditions to do so. Armies are designed and trained to conduct combat operations, to defeat the enemy, within the International Humanitarian Law/ Law of Armed Conflicts (IHL/LOAC) framework. Police forces are designed and trained to carry out civilian police tasks, prevent crime and arrest criminals, under Host Nation law and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Gendarmeries can, with different capacities and extents, perform both, given their police experience and enhanced robustness.

5 https://eurogendfor.org/.

A gendarmerie-type force has the added value of being able to naturally embed itself into a conventional military force, enhancing the interoperability with military capacities and making use of the common doctrinal background. Concurrently, it has the capacity to develop police work in destabilized environments where the military forces are operating. The historical accounts experienced by the GNR in Iraq are clear evidence of that.

In general, a MSU, being a Stability Policing unit, has the potential to act as a force capability multiplier, offering additional possibilities, given the capacities and expertise, to the spectrum of missions to be conducted by a military conventional force.
Several past experiences had shown its particular effectiveness in the whole area of engagement related to the negative impacts that a crisis situation brings to local populations. This extends also to cultural heritage and environmental protection or the security sector reform, where recent research, especially by the NATO SP CoE, showed the advantages of using SP units as tools to properly conduct "legal targeting", thus enabling the Joint Force commander to carry out actions complying with the IHRL framework.

The MSU mission in Iraq, in which the GNR was integrated, was in this sense an efficient enhancer of the capabilities available to the military chain of command, which, however, has yet to be fully understood and doctrinally recognized.

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BIO:

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At the national level, LtCol Martinho spent most of his career as commander in a Crowd and Riot Control unit, and as Senior Officer served at the Intelligence Directorate and the International Affairs Division. Regarding international deployments, to be highlighted the past experiences as Deputy Commander of the Portuguese Multinational Specialized Unit in Iraq – Italian Operation Antica Babilonia and three tours of duty serving as Commander of the Portuguese Formed Police Unit in East Timor, under a United Nations mission.

LTC Martinho was recently deployed in Italy at the Permanent Headquarters of the European Gendarmerie Force as a Plans and Policy Officer. Currently he works at the GNR - Direção de Investigação Criminal (DIC) in Alcabideche, Portugal.

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9. A Peacekeeping Mission in Trouble: Security Responses to the Protection of Civilians at the Outbreak of Civil War in South Sudan

1. Ta…ta… ta…BOOM! BOOM!

The first time I heard it, I thought the noise came from a generator malfunction. My residential prefabricated container (prefab) was near the part of the compound where the generators were placed, and this large machinery had a habit of producing loud, intermittent rattling sounds in the hot and dusty climate. A peak through my improvised curtains revealed people moving about the base calmly, even though there seemed to be a lot of pointing going on. Unconcerned, I set about my morning routine with the strange sounds continuing in the background. Just as I was swallowing my last spoonful of watery oatmeal breakfast – milk was a rare commodity – another sound joined in, which I did recognize and drew me to my feet with a jerk: the shrill whining of a hand-cranked fire alarm. And so, on 25 December 2013, after working in crisis areas for the United Nations for five years, I had my first experience of gunfire and of running to a bullet-proof shelter.

2. South Sudan at the crossroads

Just two years prior, South Sudan had become the world's newest state, gaining independence after a 20-year war with Sudan. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was a peacekeeping operation aimed at supporting the peaceful transition into a fully functioning independent state.[1] I had arrived in this mission at the end of 2012 to take up the position of Protection of Civilians Advisor in Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile State in the North of the new state. A border county with Sudan, Upper Nile State still had its security troubles around the exact location of the new frontier. In addition, there were cows. Cows are a major form of material and social currency in South Sudan. Cows are dowry. Cows are wealth. Cows are status. I recall that during the UN driving exam – every staff member needs to pass a context-specific driving test in their new duty station – the instructor said: "wreck the car if you must, but whatever you do, do NOT hit any cows!"

But cows, I quickly learnt, also were at the heart of some of Upper Nile State's security problems. Villages would raid each other for cattle, sometimes very violently. This was an ancient tradition, but instead of clubs and spears, nowadays they used Kalashnikovs. After twenty years of war, weapons proliferated. One Kalashnikov cost three cows, or three sheep or goat per cow instead, I was told. In addition, there were clashes between agrarians and the nomadic herder families that would seasonally lead enormous amounts of livestock across the lands, and the herding tribes competed with each other over food and water sources for their animals. This cross-border transhumance also put further stress on the boundary disputes between Sudan and South Sudan.

The South Sudanese armed forces and the South Sudanese police consisted of former independence fighters. They had been given a job, a uniform, and a rank; not necessarily much, or indeed any, training. Many were illiterate and had little knowledge of the law, limits on the use of violence, or human rights. They operated based on their bosses' instructions, their own instincts, and personal intentions. In light of the insecurity level and intercommunal problems, UNMISS invested a lot in rebuilding the rule of law, judicial apparatus, detention systems, and security forces. Capacity building activities consisted of training, coaching, reconstruction of facilities, and on-site advisory visits. UNMISS maintained extensive staff of dedicated civilian and police staff to provide this support in an advisory, decidedly not executive, role.

1 United Nations Mission in South Sudan, https://unmiss.unmissions.org/ (14.09.2022)

3. War again

Then came December 2013, and the new state, the dream of so many, fell apart. The then president and his biggest political competitor, his former vice-president, clashed over their ambition for the big seat of power. A country that just came out of a twenty-year war is prone to answering any confrontation with violence – and that is exactly what happened. The clashes that started in the capital city of Juba spread around the country quicker than an oil-spill and reached the resource-rich grounds of Upper Nile State less than two weeks after the first shots were fired. Since the president and his competitor originated from different tribes, the violence quickly took on an ethnic flavour, which fuelled the conflict even more and added a level of viciousness that I had never witnessed before.

At our logistics base of UNMISS in Upper Nile State, we were hit with a human tsunami. We saw it coming but did not anticipate the full extent nor the speed of what was going to develop. When the clashes started in Juba, a few thousand people fled to the UNMISS base there. They simply cut the fence and sought safety in the space of the UNMISS compound. We expected similar things to happen in Malakal. The staff, already low in numbers because of the holiday season, had been drawn down further to only critical functions at the onset of the violence in Juba. Many of the local staff had left the area to bring their families to safety. The military battalion stayed in full to provide security, but only a skeleton crew of national and international civilian staff and individual police officers remained in mission. With this team, we did the best we could in making emergency preparations: we fenced a large open area outside of the gates, stationed armoured personnel carriers around it, and equipped it with rudimentary latrines. We opened discussions with humanitarian organisations such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) about pre-placing emergency stock in our compound. Team members pulled together to devise Operating Procedures, Action Plans, and emergency logistical arrangements. Everyone was put on stand-by for whatever task would be required: people from the IT were digging pits, police officers were working with security guards to reinforce the gates, and administrative staff were driving loaders with equipment We worked twenty out of each twenty-four hours. And yet we were hopelessly, desperately underprepared for what came next.
On 24 December, throughout the entire day, a consistent trickle of civilians arrived from the town to request the safety of our base. We managed somehow to pass them through security, body search them, and bring them

to the field that we had prepared outside of the compound. It took most of the day and a lot of discussions. Many people were sorely disappointed that there were no tents, no facilities, just the open field with a few latrines. But we had nothing else to offer. I wrote in an email to my brother that night at 00:30am: "We provided emergency shelter to 1020 people. Today was crazy." Little did I know.

The next day the opposition army had reached Malakal and attacked at first light. They took the town that day, the first change of hands in a long sequence of fighting. And the people started to come to the base. As soon as we got all clear and could leave the shelter, my radio and phone started going mad. The trickle of the previous day had changed into massive displacement of people: families, elderly, young people, with bags, packs, cars, children, solar panels, sheep, and donkeys; thousands and thousands of men and women, in a long, uninterrupted train. The sense of disordered control that we managed to maintain the previous day, evaporated in the first ten minutes: this was pure chaos. And we had nothing for them. Every water truck we sent to their shelter field was immediately raided and a lot of water lost. We had no police, no military to create order. The UN military had their hands full with the security of the compound itself. The few police advisors that were not on their Christmas break did what they could, but crowd control was impossible. We managed to get injured and sick people to our hospital, but there was no food, no security screening, only total chaos and quite a lot of totally justified panic. By the end of that day, we had around 10,000 people in that field, and their number kept growing.

4. Come in, come in…

Two days later another clash erupted over the town of Malakal. The people in the field - by then numbering around 12,000 - understandably responded with alarm to the light traces of bullets against the sky and moved en masse towards the outer fence of our compound. Perhaps at this point I should clarify the key point that a peacekeeping operation is not a humanitarian mission, and the personnel of a peacekeeping operation are not emergency service delivery experts. Our compound was simply our own logistics base, with our living quarters, offices and meeting-rooms, sub-sections with the military units, warehouses, generators, vehicle parking and maintenance, and the occasional helicopter landing. All was constructed as a temporary facility with prefab containers and large industrial storage tents rub-hall tents, demarcated with a linked wire fence with gates on either side, and located a few kilometres out of town, beyond the airfield.

We had no expertise, nor the facilities, to provide shelter to anyone, let alone thousands of people.

But what choice did we have? The Juba experience had shown that people in fear of their lives would cut the fence and let themselves in. And we had only a wire barrier – nothing sturdy. Besides, in my view, the people were right: it was not safe for them outside. Remember that the fighting had taken on a tribal note and that certain ethnicities were a target simply based on their identity. After all, we were a peace operation with a mandate to protect civilians. This was one of the first moments in a long line to come, where security and protection principles risked clashing.

We let them in, because they needed it, and because we'd rather keep the illusion of control over the situation by allowing them in ourselves, rather than get overrun. It was again utter chaos. People settled everywhere in our compound. Many found shelter bundling up with their backs against our residence and office prefabs, between old car wrecks at the vehicle section, and inside the warehouses they broke open. People were sleeping on the shelves in between office supplies, building materials, spare car parts. One man took the airfield's spare x-ray machine for a bed. People lost their children, their luggage, started going into labour in the midst of it all, tried to smuggle in their donkeys (a few people succeeded), were pushing each other against the gates. The security staff and UN police did what they could to at least body search people for weapons, to prevent the shelter becoming an extension of the battlefield and to keep some crowd management going. By the morning, the field beside the compound was empty. Our logistics base had become a shelter location, that in due course became known as a "Protection of Civilians (POC) area". This happened not only in Malakal; similar situations were also materialising in other UN bases across the Northern parts of South Sudan.

In the weeks and months that followed, the situation developed into a sort of settled chaos. Malakal kept being a point of strife for the warring factions. There was an airfield, for one; and as capital of the oil-rich Upper Nile State, it was an important political gain. Every time the town changed hands, some people left the compound if their particular tribal background allowed them to move safely; and others came who no longer felt secure with those in charge. The total amount of people in our compound stabilised at around 30,000. Since neither party in conflict possessed high-tech equipment allowing fights during the night, shooting would erupt at first daylight, and typically last a few hours. More often than not fights would take place

around our base, chasing us to the staff shelters and injuring people among the displaced civilians, who had no such shelters. Nevertheless, after some weeks, responses to moments of fighting became more automatic, people knew better what to do, and things settled back into their routine more quickly. Humanitarian organisations that had originally evacuated, came back, and set up shop in our compound, including a joint hospital by the International Committee of the Red Cross and MSF, representatives of WFP, the UN refugee agency, and organisations that started to sort out the water and sanitation situation, such as Oxfam.

5. Internal security shakes on its foundations

After the initial waves of fighting and arrival of the first tens of thousands, the UN had called back some of the staff, notably the UN police. These were mainly police advisors whose duties were not executive, but advisory, as explained above: their original task was to support the local security actors and build their capacity. However, there was no more local police, judiciary, or penitentiary staff. All had joined the army, the opposition, or fled, some of them to our compound. This was no security gap; this was a security canyon. The UN police's role had de facto shifted to surveillance and patrols within the POC areas in our compound, and security searches for weapons at the gates and during cordon searches in the compound. They assisted humanitarian organisations occasionally by providing some security window dressing during activities. And very importantly, they supported community leaders within the various groups sheltered in our compound to create and maintain conflict resolution teams: groups of people who would mediate in disputes, bring situations to the community leaders, and gather information on the general temperature. For crowd control, a Formed Police Unit (FPU) had been dispatched to our compound, of a little more than 100 persons strong. These were equipped with shields, helmets, and batons. If big fights erupted between groups of displaced persons, the FPU were too outnumbered to end the clashes, but their presence and surveillance helped enormously at other times. These tasks were very unusual and not what the UN police had been prepared or hired for, but they performed to the best of their ability in stressful conditions. Nevertheless, things happened that should have been avoided. There were incidents of tear gassing of groups of civilians, that included children. The lack of gender diversity among the troops and police no doubt diminished trust and increased the risk for many vulnerable women relying on them for safety.

6. The beginning of crime

As the overall situation fell into some kind of desperate routine, and the responses to external security threats became somewhat organised, the internal security situation deteriorated with every week that passed. The more protracted the situation became, the more problems manifested themselves. People had been staying in makeshift shelters with too few facilities, food, hygiene, and basic services for weeks and months on end, in a very stressful context of threat, ethnic strife, and at times the very real danger of bullets and rockets. They had lost their possessions, their homes, and their country. Many people had also lost family and friends. One must realise that also the entire population of Malakal prison was in our compound. Stress level was high and human needs were dire, which is when we noticed that crime started. And again, we were underprepared for this hiatus in the security matrix.

The first criminal act that came to my attention was immediately a big one: murder. Minor things had happened before, like the disappearance of small food stuffs; but the community leaders within the groups of displaced persons dealt with it in their own groups. This case was different. The man admitted to having stabbed his uncle. I believe the trigger had also been food, but in any case, the poor uncle did not survive the altercation. The culprit was delivered to the UN police by his relatives and the community leader of their group. "We don't want him! If you send him back, he will be killed." We were baffled. We had no solution for this situation. He admitted to the murder, could not be sent back to his community, and he could also not leave the compound for risk of his life. Under normal protocol, he would be handed over to the local police. Before the outbreak of the civil war, we had had some criminality in the compound before; people breaking in to steal building supplies, and one colleague had their container raided. In such cases, under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between UNMISS and the South Sudanese government, they would be handed over to the local police and dealt with under South Sudanese penal law.

But now, there were no more police in Malakal. There were no facilities where we could safely bring him. Because of recurrent fighting, flights were rare; therefore, even the option of transferring him to Juba for handover to the police there was out of the question. In addition, because of the ethnic side the conflict had taken on, we could not risk handing him over to persons that might end up targeting him. Several solutions were debated, also in communication with the UN headquarters in Juba.

Decision-making in the UN, like in any large administrative structure, takes time. And here, there were important issues at stake: justice, jurisdiction, fairness, the man's safety. During this time, the UN police kept him in their conference room. He was given a mat and a corner, and a UN police officer was always on duty to ensure he stayed there. In the meantime, the conference room continued to be used for meetings - with him living in the corner of it. The man had no privacy, no dignity, no due judicial process. One of my colleagues, not yet aware of this situation, came to me one day looking slightly bewildered, saying: "I have just been in the oddest situation. I attended the weekly confidential security meeting with local informants in the UN police's meeting room, and all the while, there was a man sitting on a rug in the corner!" In the context of the conflict and how other displaced persons were surviving, his situation seemed to many not that bad and was maintained for weeks. It was a sign of how the conditions of war and stress had blurred the lines of police persons' professional perceptions.

With the passage of time, and the news spreading that this man who committed a crime was being kept by UN police, others started to be "delivered" to our door. This one stole rice, that one injured someone, this one attacked my daughter. The conference room became so busy, that meetings were no longer held there. By now, at least two UN police were permanently on duty to guard the persons in the meeting room. These UN police were not trained guards or penitentiary staff and many of them were uneasy in this role, for which they were untrained and unprepared. Escapes were frequent. Amongst others the classic movie trick of pretending to need the bathroom, and then climbing out of the window, was used successfully more than once.

As a peacekeeping operation, we had no executive powers of jurisdiction to keep people in detention nor the right facilities to do so. We could not maintain secure operations. Moreover, we had no way of guaranteeing their minimum rights as detainees.

7. "If that's how you behave, we are not guarding you!"

The practical and formal struggle lead to the following outcome in the end. A facility was built to "hold"' these people. Since we had no legal powers to arrest or detain them, we were to call them "holdees" that we were not detaining, but "holding" in the "holding facility". The structure consisted of two shipping-containers that were placed opposite one another, fitted

with metal bar doors and windows, and covered by a sunroof. The FPU was designated to guard them. But these men too, were not trained detention staff, and the tasking had been provided *ad hoc* after their arrival in mission. And so, things continued to go awry. Escapes, overcrowding of one holding container because they preferred to keep the other one clean, keeping minors and adults together instead of separate. One day, during a fierce rainstorm, the FPU sought cover in between the holding containers. The "holdees" began to riot, calling the FPU guard names, spitting, and finally tipping their urine bucket out towards them through the metal bars. At this point, the FPU drew a line in the sand. "If that's how you behave, we are not guarding you!" they said and left for dry land in the UN police's office. When they came back out after the rain, an hour or so later, the doors had been forced open and all "holdees" had absconded, save one, who felt more secure and better fed in the holding area than out.

8. Security or protection?

With the installation of this "holding" system, in addition to the practical management of the security thereof, another question presented itself: how long to hold them, and on what grounds? Here too, the normal course of action would have been to transfer them to local police and judiciary. But they had gone. And in a country in the midst of civil, ethnically influenced war, dispatching them to Juba was only in very few cases a safe option. Again, in the absence of a policy or doctrine on this issue, a solution was improvised with support from the UN's legal department. A case review committee was established consisting of the chief of security, UN police, and the human rights section and myself as Protection of Civilians Advisor. This committee would assess each "holdee" case and decide how long they should remain "held". It sounded like a good idea at first, but soon became unmanageable. This was not a proper judicial process and debates in the committee often centred on the opposition between security needs and the safeguarding of people's fair treatment and basic rights. Specifically, cases of sexual violence were dealt with inadequately. It resulted in people being "held" for weeks on end for stealing a bag of beans, while alleged perpetrators of sexual assault were let out the next day, because it was considered too challenging to investigate and seen as an invasion of domestic spheres; particularly male colleagues were uneasy about dealing with such allegations. Uniting security measures with human rights and protection standards became too uneasy for the committee, and the human rights colleagues and myself were no longer welcome.

This same dichotomy occurred regularly at the compound's main gate. Many of the displaced persons would leave during the day, the situation outside allowing, in order to forage for their families. The compound's gates would close at 6:00 pm, and people coming later would not be allowed in. This was for security reasons, it was stated, although no one was able to outline what these security reasons entailed. And this stance dominated decision-making. It once happened that a group of children – the youngest were only 11 years old – was left outside for an entire night and ended up getting beaten by some men. Women, who had to leave the relative safety of the compound to collect firewood in order to prepare the raw food they were provided by humanitarian organisations, were frequently also among the persons left locked out if they arrived at the compound after 6:00 pm, despite the risk of sexual violence being very high. Human rights colleagues and I engaged with the security staff on this issue, explaining that people followed the sun rather than the clock; and moreover, that the protection of persons should take precedence over procedural issues. If it is safe to open the gate and let people enter after 6:00 pm, they should do so, and pay particular attention to minors, women, and other people who might be at risk when left out. At times we succeeded in getting the gates to open; other moments we did not.

9. The gap

A great many more things happened during that first year of the civil war in South Sudan. The issues I tell here, are for me the clearest examples of the security gap as it appeared. It was not just one gap or one issue. It evolved and changed with the context we were living in, which was in itself highly unpredictable and highly stressful. Such situations require grounding in basic principles of professionalism, human rights, due diligence, good decision-making, and above all, flexibility. The ability to change gears and adapt and learn is essential when surrounded by conflict and madness. Many colleagues responded to the crisis and the severe stress we were all living under by falling back on what they knew, where they felt safe: their own office, their own tasking. How often I heard the words: "No, I cannot help with searches at the gate, that is not on my task list." A similar response is what lay behind the security issues in the "holdees" committee and at the main gate: an inability to look holistically at the entire situation, to see not only security, but also protection (which was the actual goal of all we did!); not only insecurity, but also basic human rights issues at stake.

We worked with many different colleagues, civilian, police and military. All highly skilled, motivated, willing. Yet, there were cracks. Serious cracks. Lack of capacities, personal drive to make things work, risk-averseness, absence of a support system for stress management; but also lack of knowledge on how to successfully navigate security concerns while respecting human rights, how to operate in a legal limbo where nevertheless crime must be responded to, how to coordinate and collaborate with military, police and civilians alike, how to work in an environment where bullets fly from time to time. Individuals or units with the specific capacity and expertise to work in this security gap would have helped mitigate many of these challenges. A Stability Policing unit, with an executive mandate and the expertise to take over the police function in the absence of the local police could have been instrumental in creating and maintaining public order in the compound. Bridging between the military realm of security and the need for civilian policing functions, a Stability Policing unit would have contributed to safety and stability, giving confidence to the women, men and families seeking shelter within our compound. Particularly knowledge, expertise, and doctrine in managing basic human rights in the face of such a severe security crisis, weighing security and protection against each other, and applying fair and due process to the situation of the "holdees" would have enabled better safeguarding of their rights and the pursuit of justice at the same time. A Stability Policing team would have made a discernible positive difference.

South Sudan is slowly recovering and moving towards peace. We did a lot, as a mission. We could have done more.

BIO:

Welmoet Wels is an international consultant with a background in the Classics and in Public International Law. She worked for seven years with the UN in DR Congo, South Sudan, and Mali, on human rights, protection of civilians, and gender issues. She is now focused on completing her PhD dissertation on the management of dead bodies in armed conflict, an area that she gained practical experience with as a first responder in South Sudan. As a consultant and owner of Bellica Consulting, she conducts programme reviews and evaluations, as well as studies on protection, gender, and civilian harm. She is also an experienced trainer on protection of civilians and peacekeeping.

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10. Covan in Iraq[2]

1. Sayidi



Picture 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq-Attack trends and location heat map. © Kurtis Kjobech

In a time of national or regional turmoil and instability, using the heavy hand of the military to help quell violence can be very effective. However, that same hand quickly begins to work against any transition back to peaceful and stable civil society. To maintain security and stability, a developed nation relies on an established legal system and an enforcement mechanism that starts at the federal level and extends down to the local level. The Iraq that I deployed to in 2006 had certainly become unstable and the U.S. and

1 The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Government, Department of Defense, Marine Corps or Marine Corps University or represent these entities in any way.

2 The U.S. Military Transition Teams (MTT) 3-2-7 callsign was "covan". Our team leader chose this to pay respects to the U.S. Marine advisors in Vietnam who were called "covan" by their Vietnamese Military counterparts.

Iraqi Security Force apparatus was operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to combat insurgent forces and terrorists operating throughout.[3]

Operation Iraqi Freedom was started in March 2003 to depose the existing regime and any weapons of mass destruction. That mission quickly shifted after the regime's destruction to a multifaceted counterinsurgency operations and national reconstruction efforts. Reconstruction focused on improving security and stability by rebuilding credible security forces, establishing a functioning government, and aiding economic development.[4]

As a key part of the Iraq strategy to build up native security, the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) stood up in 2004 and started flooding Transition Teams in Iraq in 2006. They were spread judiciously throughout and dedicated to the diaspora of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). These included Army units from Battalion to Division size, Police Forces in many larger towns and cities, as well as Port of Entry and Border Security Forces. As one would expect since the preponderance of the US resources were pulled from the Armed Forces, the U.S. Military Transition Teams (MTT) were the main effort for development. Each MTT's mission was to train, mentor, and advise our foreign counterparts in Iraq Security Forces in the areas of intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics, operations, and infantry tactics. MNSTC-I had reportedly trained and equipped approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services by the end of 2006, including 138,000 Iraqi Army soldiers and 188,000 Iraqi policemen.[5]

> *ISF Overall Assessment: The Commission finds that in general, the Iraqi Security Forces, military, and police, have made uneven progress, but that there should be increasing improvement in both readiness and their capability to provide for the internal security of Iraq. With regard to external dangers, the evidence indicates that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be able to secure Iraqi borders against conventional military threats in the near term.*[6]

3 James Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. Department of Defense, 6 Sep 2007, p. 29.

4 Catherine Dale, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress, Congressional Report Service, RL34387.

5 James A. Baker & Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report. October 2006.

6 James Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. Department of Defense, 6 Sep 2007, p. 8.

In any U.S. and NATO military operation, the return to civil governance and rule of law must be the end state. Given the quick deterioration of security and stability following the initial US invasion, it was understandable that military forces be the main effort to help reduce instability in order to enable these other elements of national power to mature. Hence why MTTs and Police Transition Teams (PTT) were not resourced equally in the early period of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Hybrid warfare as a new form of war has similar characteristics to proxy wars and counterinsurgencies. The US Department of Defense and the Marine Corps have ample experience in these. As the Marine Corps redesigns itself to meet the challenges of the 21st century it often looks back to its history in small wars. Many lessons from counterinsurgency and combat deployments in the Middle East share similar lessons learned from the tactical to the strategic level. Some of the tactical concepts employed in Iraq are still useful in great power competition and the effort to prevent or deter conflict. These small unit actions enabled our team to collect intelligence, counter adversary intelligence collection, influence both friends and allies and bolstered the rule of law to a limited extent. In the U.S. Marine Corps history, they have been used in numerous small wars and are being explored again in current operating concepts competing against modern adversaries across the globe and for the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design 2030.

2. It was the best of times, it was the worst of times…

Picture 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq-Attack trends and location heat map. © Kurtis Kjobech

Our assigned area of responsibility (AOR) was a patch of the largely barren desert inside of the larger Area of Operations (AO) Denver. It spanned a segment of the Main Supply Route (MSR) Bronze that followed the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of Al Qaim down to Hit. Our Forward Operating Base (FOB) was in the town of Rawah, Iraq. The partnered U.S. unit was located in a FOB just north of town in the desert.

Rawah sat on the northern side of the river and oversaw was a key crossing point where the Euphrates River curves south where it eventually meets with the Tigris River and empties into the Persian Gulf. The nearest river crossing points to West or Southeast were some 40 miles away. The Euphrates River was a deep and swift river that could easily drown a fully loaded soldier and would carry anyone along for a great distance even if you managed to stay afloat and get out.

The town of Rawah was both developed and third world. Home to some 15,000 Iraqi citizens, it contained a few vibrant markets and shops, a hospital, schools, a semblance of civil governance, and lush fields for crops. What it lacked was stability, security, and a sufficient economy to enable it to thrive.

3. The following story captures my time with Military Transition Team 1/7 in Iraq in 2006:

I was assigned to MTT 1/7 which was deployed in January 2006 with the primary mission to enable the 3d Battalion (Bn) of the 2d Brigade (Bde), 7th Iraqi Army Division. I received notice late in 2005 that I would be sent out and had a little over a month. Much further into the training continuum than the rest of the team.

Our Team was comprised of 13 US Service members including 11 Marines and 2 Airmen, and 2 Iraqi interpreters. Our fearless leader was Major "Bull", our two infantry Captains were "Fester" and "Bruce", our fires team included Capt "Coach" and SSgt "Rock", our communications chief was SSgt "Smoke", adjutant was Lt "Dirk", our medical corpsman was "Doc", the intel team was SSgt "Butcher" and I (1stLt "Nick"), and finally our security lead was SSgt "Law Man". To help maintain our equipment we had two US Air Force maintainers dubbed "Air Force One" and "Air Force Two". The Iraqi interpreters "Sam" and "Rex" were the workhorses we needed to live and fight alongside the Iraqis.

When we arrived in the winter of 2006, the traditional wet season, the temperatures were almost enjoyable except for the occasional rainstorm. When it rained vehicular traffic was nearly impossible in areas with heavy "moon dust" or in sandy areas outside of town. This occurs when a heavy vehicle regularly traffics a dirt road and pulverizes it to a fine powder that hangs in the air. Springtime is short and provides a nice window of both comfortable temperatures and dry conditions. The summers quickly back to the ground. By June the temperatures regularly reach and stay above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. This increases to 110s in July. Which makes patrolling with a full combat load a struggle for life not just against insurgents but against hydration.

Our home away from home and source of protection on this deployment was a house inside of an abandoned water treatment facility on the northern edge of town. We shared the lives of our Iraqi soldier counterparts. Every member of our team enabled patrols in town and along the outskirts looking for insurgent activity. We had teams of three Marines rotate responsibilities throughout the week. These shifts were dedicated to supporting patrolling, base protection, and acting as the Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Patrolling activities included general route planning with the soldiers, helping them maintain formations, and giving position reports to the U.S. forces. Each team conducted well over a hundred patrols in our seven-month tour. These patrols had two primary purposes: to train the security forces and then to show presence to the locals hopefully deterring insurgent activity. They also helped to understand the level of local activity and interact with local officials to see what concerns they had and build rapport. During occasional firefights or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) finds MTT members would direct actions if the Iraqis weren't moving and enable coordination for fire support or reinforcements if necessary. Daily activities involved helping the Iraqi leaders and soldiers administer their pay and leave cycles, conduct the basic drill, enable resupply runs back to Al Asad Air Base, plan and conduct local patrols, and liaise with our partnered U.S. unit. One team per High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) enabled us to react with Iraqi detachments of trucks, technical, and Iraqi HMMWVs.

Numerous challenges quickly emerge when partnering with Iraqi forces and this region. Iraqi Army units were moved from their home location, Ramadi in 3/2/7's case, to not have close ties to the leaders or populations they were protecting and less susceptible to corruption or coercion. One of the most significant challenges for us was that at any point in time up to half of 3/2/7 could be gone when we compared the official roster to those on hand. Some

of this was likely due to corruption or "ghost rolls" where the roster would be padded, and the leadership would receive and take additional funds for themselves. However, those on leave were afforded a few weeks at a time, but adherence was not strictly enforced as it would be in the U.S.

Other cultural differences between our U.S. military penchant for rigid planning and execution timelines and the Middle Eastern more laid-back execution timelines. The common response when a planned action deadline had come and gone and U.S. service members asked when it was going to occur was "Insha'Allah" or "when Allah wills it".
Attacks were regular but infrequent during our time. The adversary forces in our AO were not prone to conduct well-coordinated attacks. We largely received indirect fire and short, small-arms fire bursts. The preferred tactical response by the Iraqi patrols was what the MTT called the "Iraqi Death Blossom". This involved all soldiers on the patrol immediately firing in all directions until their magazine was empty. It was a poor copy of an effective technique to immediately lay down suppressive fire against a known or suspected enemy firing point to allow movement and maneuvering. As one can imagine whether well or poorly it is dangerous to whoever was not in the middle of the "blossom" including civilians and U.S. service members in the surrounding areas.
Indirect fire through rockets and mortars was the other technique we frequently experienced. Often done at a somewhat regular time of day towards the evening. One of our MTT members had a habit of calling his wife around there only to frequently have to hang up on her with explosions ringing in the background. We often jokingly wondered, with the dark humor only combat brings, who would develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, first the SSgt or his wife. On one occasion insurgent mortars finally found their target and shots landed very close to our house including one on the roof. Thankfully for our interpreter who was making a telephone call home on the roof, it did not explode. He limped back down the stairs with a bleeding leg after a piece of concrete shrapnel hit his leg but recovered quickly once we realized it was superficial.

April 2006 was an especially violent month with three suicide bombs targeting our AO. On 11 April, a suicide vest targeted U.S. Army soldiers supporting a vehicle checkpoint on the northern edge of the bridge killing 1 and injuring 2 U.S. soldiers. The suicide vehicle targeted the Iraqi vehicle checkpoint along MSR Bronze south of the bridge killing 1 and injuring 1 Iraqi soldier. One more suicide vest bomber targeting the

same checkpoint north of the bridge on 28 April did not injure anyone.[7]

As the Intelligence Officer, my key task was to enable intelligence support between our Iraqi unit and partnered U.S. Army unit (4th Stryker Squadron, 14th Cavalry). We joked that thanks to Saddam Hussein's internal security controls and paranoia, Iraqis were fairly adept at Human Intelligence (HUMINT) or eliciting information from human sources. The two Iraqi soldiers I worked with included Major Hassan and Sergeant Major Ali. Maj Hassan was not proficient at managing or assessing intelligence information as SSgt "Butcher" and I were trained to do. However, we lacked the real-world experience that living and surviving in Iraq provided. Maj Hassan's motivation was never questioned as he detailed the story of how insurgents had tried to kill him and his family in a market in Ramadi and showed us the five bullet-hole scars he had as a memento. SgtMaj Ali was quieter but was more methodical and skilled in HUMINT. He had a kind but affable demeanor and developed a network in Rawah by making friends with various local leaders and informants.

As a result of this information sharing, I was able to help establish a regular targeting meeting with the Intelligence section (S-2) and HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET) from 4-14. For the moderate price of a few high-powered cordless phones (HPCP), SgtMaj Ali set up his network tip line and would feed information to the American Forces. This became one of the focuses for 3/2/7 and helped to bolster actual relationships between the two which had previously been tepid, forced cooperation at best. As a direct result, 3/2/7 was assigned an independent tactical AOR in mid-2006 in which they operated with minimal U.S. support.

The 4th Stryker Squadron of the 14th Cavalry Regiment was the U.S Force responsible for combat operations in this AO. They occupied a FOB some distance north of Rawah and conducted operations both in and around the town and further out in the desert along the Euphrates. Operations were conducted unilaterally and combined with Iraqi Platoon and Squads. This included both mounted and unmounted patrols. This included getting stuck during the monsoon season during a routine patrol.[8]

7 Robert F. Davis, Community Value Above Individualism: A Common Cultural Element in Modern Suicide Bombers Air Command and Staff College, Air University, AY09. April 2009.

8 345th Public Affairs Detachment. Hands stretch across the desert in Iraq. News ID: 5597. Posted: 03.04.2006 13:55: https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/5597

Eventually this relationship deepened and a place on the U.S. FOB was carved out to allow 3/2/7 to occupy a portion. This afforded them additional tactical and operational security from insurgent actions by allowing more freedom to move in and around the town from various entry points vice just the water treatment plant.

This mutually beneficial relationship was exactly what Security Force Cooperation is designed for. Using foreign forces contributions to build up HN forces in order to provide their own security so that foreign forces can leave security to its own people. Coalition enabling host nation forces with enough capability and confidence to successfully plan, execute and manage their own security operations. Although military forces are not the preferred option for most developed nations to use for internal security, Iraq had no other capacity to create the stability necessary to set the conditions for rule of law. This security eventually translated to the Police Teams that were still developing and spreading at this time.

> *"And I'll tell you that, as a nation, we've invested far more in the training of the Iraqi army than we have in the Iraqi police, and 2006 was supposed to be the year of the police. Look at the Iraqi army MTT teams, headed by full colonels, lieutenant colonels, 11 guys per battalion. When I got out here, the provincial PTT team consisted of one U.S. Army major, Chemical Corps."*[9]

The Police Transition Teams (PTT) had a similar construct in how they allotted teams to various levels within the Ministry of Interior, however, they were under-resourced compared to MTTs. The Police in our area were more limited in equipment, capability, and confidence. The PTT assigned to Rawah covered a larger area and rotated through occasionally but did live with the police stations they were assigned to support.

> *Iraqi Police Service Conclusion: The Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence. The police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. To be effective in combatting the threat that officers face, including sectarian violence, the Iraqi Police Service must be better trained and equipped. The Commission believes*

9 Timothy McWilliams and Kurtis Wheeler, Al-Anbar Awakening Volume I; American Perspectives-U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-20092009. Marine Corps University Press, 2009.

that the Iraqi Police Service can improve rapidly should the Ministry of Interior become a more functional institution.[10]

4. Training and Preparation

I was told to squeeze in whatever training I could. This amounted to Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) driving. The rest of my team had an extra month for some tactical training however there had not been a set training regimen identified from our higher headquarters, so it was largely on the teams themselves to identify what they needed. I had missed the Phoenix Academy, a two-week course in Iraq culture and Arabic language inside Iraq at Al Asad Airbase. Since it was still in its infancy the value was marginal as described by other team members when compared to more mature courses that were eventually built.

Years later I was offered the chance to attend a more refined version in the US before another deployment to the Middle East. It was more in-depth and focused on those things those numerous previous iterations had recommended as the most important subjects and skill sets. From around the U.S, they brought in regional experts and Ph.Ds. on history and culture to discuss and explain salient information and skills we would need to survive and accomplish our missions. These primarily provided a more thorough awareness of the history and culture we were deploying to but also included practical lessons on key activities like how to run a Key Leader Engagement (KLE) event.

5. Conclusions

The end state for every military action is the eventual transition from military back to civil authorities and local security. No society can exist indefinitely under martial law. U.S. strategies in OIF placed a premium on developing host nation security force capacity and capability to meet hostile force challenges from both within or outside Iraqi borders.

However, as the U.S. wrestles with living today in competition with other great powers any strategy and specifically security cooperation plan needs to support the development both military and law enforcement.

10 James Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. Department of Defense, 6 Sep 2007, p. 10.

Hybrid activities from U.S. adversaries work to undermine both local and regional stability by collecting on and eroding our foreign partner capabilities through a spectrum of activities. These actions are limited only by the creativity of planners and the leadership's willingness to accept risk. Everything from eroding political will at the national and local level through influence operations, to delaying meaningful action or reaction using legal means, to technical disruption using direct and indirect attacks against any type of networks or systems. Focusing development only on the military still leaves any population susceptible to infiltration and influence by the adversaries. A successful strategy to counter this must include operations that build local level security, law enforcement, and governance.

Picture 1: Multi-National Forces-Iraq-Attack trends and location heat map. © Kurtis Kjobech

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BIO:

Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis Kjobech *is a U.S. Marine Officer that has served at echelons throughout the Ground Combat Element and the Intelligence Enterprise. As a young officer from 2004 to 2011 he had multiple Middle East combat deployments: including Intelligence Officer for both 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment in Iraq and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment in Afghanistan; a combat advisor to 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division; and as a liaison officer from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force - Afghanistan. He served at various staff echelons from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity to Marine Forces Special Operations Command to 3d Intelligence Battalion. More recently he has operated in the Marine Corps Training and Education realms serving in the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group and the Marine Corps University.*

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11. UN Formed Police Units: Evaluation and Training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia

1. Introduction

Looking back, it has been and still is an incredible adventure. Not in my craziest dreams would I have imagined that life and my profession would offer me such a rich series of opportunities and experiences, propelling me around on 4 continents. Following my grandfather's steps, I wanted to become a Carabiniere, to join a police force like no other, having a regiment of paratroopers, countering drugs and terrorism, performing military police duties, having specialized personnel in almost all ministries, and being everywhere on the Italian territory: on land, on the seas and in the skies. After the Warrant Officer school 1990 - 1992, I volunteered for a transfer to the middle of the Dolomites as Deputy and then, only 24 years old, I accepted the Command of a Carabinieri Station. This entailed experiencing a share of human misery but also learning first-hand how to interact with people and solving problems through mediation or dialogue.

Native of Alto Adige I was no stranger to ethnic tension but realized early on that earning and keeping the trust of the population is an absolute must to succeed. Passing some language exams gave me access to missions abroad on temporary duty that interrupted the idyllic life of a police commander in the Dolomites hunting poachers and policing the skiing tracks. I always

welcomed the specific challenges each environment brought; the first was to Israel as unarmed observer, followed by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I witnessed this innovative approach to military operations invented by the Carabinieri, develop from its infancy. The MSU was tasked with policing civilians abroad, in particular through patrolling, info gathering and crowd and riot control (CRC) and became necessary to answer the police-related needs of the populace. The police in Bosnia were frequently ethnically biased, the International Police Task Force, the UN police mission, was not robust enough and therefore ineffective, and the NATO combat force – which included a Military Police - did not have sufficient expertise or experience in policing civilians.

A curious coincidence had brought me to the MSU, while one of the officers that worked for me at the station back home served as SFOR MP with authority over me. Already back then, the strict division between policing civilians and conducting MP functions was clear to me; I would in time learn that others had very confused ideas in this regard. Subsequently, I deployed to Bosnia with the UN Police, went to Kosovo with the UN Police cooperating with the NATO Kosovo Force MSU, served in Iraq in a non-NATO MSU as part of the Coalition of the Willing tasked with policing civilians, and even as UN MP in Eritrea and Lebanon. In 2008, I was still commanding my station as Maresciallo Aiutante sostituto Ufficiale di Pubblica Sicurezza, the NATO rank equivalent to OR-9, when General Command Carabinieri called about my interest in participating in a project aimed at assessing UN Formed Police Units (FPU) in the Congo. I was told it would be a very different kind of UN mission, and they were right.

2. Chapter UN Proficiency Testing and Training Team (PT3) – preparation in Vicenza

The UN Proficiency Testing and Training Team (PT3) project gathers all stakeholders relevant to the deployment in the field, including instructors, team members and supporting UN personnel, in Vicenza at the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) at the beginning of September 2008. Almost all are officers, while two more Carabinieri Warrant Officers will go to Darfur. On the one hand I am sorry, since their area of deployment is extremely challenging, but part of me actually envies them for the same reason. The broader outline of what is expected of us includes expertise in firearms and CRC, command and control and in general the management of a police unit. I join a Lieutenant Colonel of the Romanian Jandarmeria

and a Captain of the Jordanian Gendarmerie; my first impression is of serious professionals with solid backgrounds. We are quickly informed that the mission will be challenging, of high importance and quite urgent. A rumour circulates that two civilians were killed during a riot control activity in a UN mission and now the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and especially the Police Division (PD) seem to be very worried about the little knowledge they possess on what kind of personnel are deployed as FPUs, their tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), especially their firearm proficiency.

During the briefing sessions we are first taught what an FPU is, namely a police unit with a strength between 125 and 140 officers that a Police Contributing Country offers to the DPKO for deployment in UN missions. There they are to perform three main tasks: protect UN personnel and facilities, provide security support to national law enforcement agencies and capacity building. Normally these company-size units encompass four platoons, of which three are performing policing duties and one focuses on logistics, personnel, administration, communications, welfare, and other sustainment functions. PT3s are tasked to evaluate these FPUs focusing on command and control, logistics, crowd control and firearms proficiency. Activities maintaining and improving moral, and welfare should also not be overlooked.

I felt uneasy, hoping to be able to match these serious expectations, but even more uncomfortable when the next morning I am told to take the lead of my team. Voicing concerns, assuring my fullest commitment and availability to support the higher-ranking officers in any possible way are all to no avail. An ultimatum is simply offered: agreeing to take over the leadership of the team that will deploy to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or be replaced. Perplexed, I accept and immediately vow to begin damage control with the teammates, as it turns out, quite unnecessarily.

We resolve to adopt a kind but firm approach with our counterparts and to be just and honest in our reporting. This should enable our colleagues on the ground to be put in the best possible conditions to absolve their duties and return safely back to their families. We receive a number of lectures to create a common ground and facilitate our understanding of how an FPU is supposed to work within a UN mission. The methodology of the proficiency testing is explained in detail. We are all assured of the fullest support of DPKO, the DP and of the missions, whose leaderships, we

are told, have already been informed. Our status will be that of UN police officers (UNPOL) and as such we will fall under the Police Commissioner's authority. Initial doubts are assuaged by repeated assurances of the PD leadership's availability as reach-back entity. We are clearly directed to report any sign of lacking cooperation and "technical difficulties" or indications that the mission might be dragging its feet. Moreover, a dedicated PD team will travel to the different missions to monitor and evaluate the implementation of this initiative. I embrace the feeling of expectant agitation that precedes all deployments to the fullest and pursue the usual preparations such as reading up on the destination and the origin of the conflict, the evolution of the UN mission and specifically about possible police-related issues. One aspect my experience identifies as absolutely key is adopting the proper lingo and being conversant about mission-specific documents. The UN as an organization and its personnel definitely talk, move, and think differently than the Carabinieri or NATO, therefore, to be effective and to have a chance of being understood, one must use established protocols, mechanisms and naturally also terminology. Having experienced several missions emanating from different entities, but never twice in the same location, endows me with an extremely useful and ever-increasing flexibility I plan to put to good use. Learning that thirteen Italian aviators were slain and butchered for cannibalism, in Kindu on the 11th of November 1961 during their deployment within an earlier UN mission adds to my tension.

3. Chapter UN Pro iciency Testing and Training Team (PT3) – deployment to the DRC

Once we receive the green light, we deploy to Kinshasa, where the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo (MONUC) is located. The induction phase is quite uneventful and slightly more efficient than previous UN experiences would have suggested. I find a room on the seventeenth floor of a 21-story building in Kinshasa, not too far from the main shopping mall. The tower has no working elevator, but the freight elevator is aptly piloted by a young local who, with the help of a foot-long screwdriver, disengages the safeties to allow our movements. No door screens us from the shaft walls passing by. The elevator calling system is reduced to its essence; one simply shouts the floor number in French until the transporting device reaches the landing. Looking out of the windows and learning that there are no emergency stairs, I am shown a thick rope said to be enough to "almost reach the bottom". In case of a fire, I am strongly suggested to lower myself, stop at the first flatter area

of the building and try to jump or crawl down to the bottom from there. The surrealism of the situation is not wasted on me. Indeed, we will witness a fire developing inside the close-by mall. Similarly, to the police, the fire department is lacking proper equipment and we learn that firefighters attempt to penetrate the building to extinguish the flames wearing sandals! The support of UN personnel and equipment allows to master the inferno, but do not do much to appease my concerns.

We brief the mission's top management, learn the whereabouts of the FPUs and receive summary updates of the situation in the area of responsibility which allows us to devise a plan of action. An email is sent out explaining the purpose of our inspection, our expectations and allowing the FPUs to prepare with ample forewarning. After an initial meet and greet, the FPU leadership will deliver an initial briefing about their unit, which will be followed by inquiries to assess the command-and-control proficiency. A visit through the compound will allow us to get acquainted with all the structures and precede the sustainment assessment. A crowd control display is to be prepared and there will be a demonstration of safe weapon handling before proceeding to the closes shooting range to perform the life-firing tests. We explain that all relevant personnel, transportation, equipment, weapons, ammunition, and targets should be ready on our arrival.

Taking a UN passenger flight to then hop on a Mi-8 helicopter and continue flying to reach the farthest cities of the immense DRC allows the PT3 to experience the vastness and overwhelming beauty of this country. I welcome these transfers as opportunities to concentrate and focus on the tasks ahead. While the severe noise prevents verbal exchanges, in my head I formulate addresses to commanders and staffs seeking to convince them to cooperate as much as possible with the final aim of improving their performance. While verifying the command-and-control performance, the personalities, professional and personal cultural backgrounds of commanders and officers lead to differing results. They range from near absolute obedience to orders received through the mission chain of command bordering on being irresponsible to blatant resistance bordering on disobedience. We document that operations and contingency planning are widely underestimated and neglected, while the information gathering, so valuable to produce the actionable intelligence required to police proficiently, is almost absent. Our suggestions seeking to improve the FPU leaderships' performance are always offered following a

persuading approach more than being imposed; it seems they are received with interest, if sometimes leaving the impression that only lip service will be paid to them.

Pic. 1. Inside a FPU camp, unknown location, DRC (2008) ©Stefano Bergonzini

The FPU's accommodations vary ranging from housing in adapted buildings to a mixture of the same and tents. Hygienic and sanitations conditions are wanting occasionally bordering on the dreadful, with missing septic tanks and lack of proper sewage disposal. Oils, grease, and fuel are often directly discharged, without even limited treatment or attempts to prevent pollution. Electrical systems are makeshift and very wanting, kitchens are unsanitary and dirty. Mission allowances (in specific cases just above one US $ per diem) and funds for recreational purposes and welfare are often found to be insufficient, inefficiently paid and distributed. The PT3 decides to demand from commanders that they organize a welfare activity as part of the testing process. This gives many colleagues one of the few, if not the only possibility during their mission abroad, to participate in a recreational activity outside their FPU base. Two units are used to switch their personnel, forcing police personnel to spend their leisure days inside their sister compound. Unbelievable!

The fact that trips to neighbouring rivers, natural areas and cookouts are conducted in our presence blatantly contradicts previously

attempted excuses due to security concerns voiced by FPU leaderships. The sustainment and operating evaluation are conducted by visiting all premises within the different compounds, taking pictures and directly engaging personnel in all roles and activities. Sadly, there is never a need to resort to intense questioning or delving into details, since inefficiencies, shortcomings and even outright dangerous situations are commonly discovered. I inquire with a young and zealous commander, why his men are keeping loose ammunition for their duty rifle and hand grenades in an ammunition box inside their patrol vehicle. He replies that only one clip is allotted to each officer, while the hand grenades might be useful when performing policing duties. Surprised, I dig deeper, asking which kind of duties my require them, highlighting that they are not listed within the UN-sanctioned law enforcement equipment and weaponry, hoping he might infer their use as a last resort in camp defence. When he answers that in case of rape the use of grenades might be envisioned, I cannot believe my ears!

Fire extinguishers were rusted down or simply empty. Oil, grease, and petrol are seeping into the terrain in and around the kitchens, where vehicles are being serviced and in the workshop. Clearly, they are being emptied into manholes leading into the sewers, completely disregarding the hazards this constitutes for the personnel and the environmental pollution. I find explosives with detonators in the immediate vicinity stored inside a container with all sorts of other flammable material, all absolute no-nos. In one instance the wooden box with explosives sits just below above an air conditioner in disrepair and covered by rugs connected to the power net through a make-shift arrangement.

After an initial safety briefing, we document that great incompetence and severe safety violations in weapon handling are the norm. Police officers do not know their weapons, how to operate them in the most basic way and are more often than not unable to solve even easy malfunctions. Gun disassembling and re-assembling tests initially meet with disastrous results, but a little supervised practise bears fruit. At some units, the assigned weapons are in atrocious conditions worn, rusty and dirty. Officers mostly do not have zeroed-in rifles, submachine guns (SMG) and handguns assigned to them. So-called sharpshooters have never installed the scope on their costly sniper rifles, an unbelievable negligence rendering the expensive equipment practically useless. Weapons with adjustable aiming devices, which include scopes, require being assigned to a specific

officer, and used by the same to correct inaccuracies, allowing them to consistently hit the targets where they are aimed.
What enrages me, definitely not a professional characteristic but a human feeling, is the fact that some units lack proper equipment and the wealth necessary to purchase it but show the willingness and engagement to improve. Others, who are equipped with first class weaponry, excel for their laziness in performing the most basic tasks. I feared we might not be able to find shooting ranges, but the reality is actually worse. Even when suitable areas are available, FPU personnel are regularly unable to meet the minimum standards during our firing tests. I make a point of honour of demonstrating my proficiency with all weapons systems, showing how to mount and zero-in scopes and the basic maintenance and handling procedures.

Pic. 2, FPU officer wears his crowd control helmet backwards, unknown location, DRC (2008) ©Stefano Bergonzini

After some remedial training, most officers are improving their performance. The CRC display unveils further shortcomings. Not all officers are issued the whole protective equipment or know how to correctly don it. One particularly sad colleague wears the CRC helmet backwards! Some units' CRC helmets lack a front shield, exposing their wearers to projectiles.

When we ask the commander to request better helmets, after a long wait he proudly shows us the newly arrived ones.

Pic. 3. FPU plastic CRC helmets without face shield and motorcycle helmets, Kinshasa, DRC (2008) ©Stefano Bergonzinii

Again, I cannot believe my eyes, when confronted with the motorcycle helmets! The movements, coordination and responsiveness of the CRC assets are not encouraging either. We ascertain that the conditions of the vehicles can also vary quite a bit, with some being broken down, others heavily rusty with missing parts and others in various state of disrepair or in need of mending. Since the FPU is supposed to be logistically self-sufficient to a certain level, we always require the use of the towing/recovery truck. In one case the recovery truck is lifted on his back wheels due to its inadequacy, in another case, the pulley of the towing truck crashed to the ground, luckily without injuring anyone.

DPKO Policy on FPU 2006 – point 4.2

FPUs are specialized, well equipped and fully mobile rapid reaction police units... self-sustained with attendant equipment owned by the contingent and deployed...

None of the tested FPUs fulfils the requirements to be fully operational, a fact we brief the mission leadership about, before returning to the CoESPU in Vicenza for the final PT3 backbrief. There, high authorities, and police commissioners are in attendance, regrettably we are told that each team will brief only one topic and we are tasked to report about equipment-related issues. This is not an approach I particularly embrace, since the shortcomings and deficiencies our team has verified and documented encompass many remits, from

logistics to leadership as well as command and control, from training to human resource management and administration.
Nonetheless, striving for the best possible effect and determined to make a stern statement to foster real changes in the field, I start from the definition of the FPU. Then a series of very eloquent pictures details the neglect, the state of abandonment and severe disrespect for safety, procurement, maintenance, use and disposal of equipment we documented. There were differences between the inspected FPUs, but the overall level was still insufficient, proving DPKO's and the DP's concerns. I conclude my presentation with words to the effect of "I'll probably never work for the UN again, but I cannot understand how you can sleep at night knowing what kind of personnel you have deployed in this very moment." I was to be proven very wrong. In fact, a few months later my phone rings again and I am offered the chance to contribute to the follow-on endeavour, the Mobile Training Team (MTT).

4. Chapter Mobile Training Team– preparations in New York and Pennsylvania

The MTT and supporting personnel meet at the UN headquarters in New York to be briefed about their new mission: designing a training curriculum for FPUs and provide immediate remedial training to the units in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). I am very surprised and positively impressed; this means our previous deployment and detailed reporting has achieved the effects we were hoping for, namely inducing the top leadership within the UN to act and seek practicable solutions. The compact team brings diverse experiences and nationalities, policing models and cultures together, some have already participated in the PT3 endeavour and experienced first-hand the dire need and urgency for such an intervention. Others, who were not involved in the first phase of the project, bring fresh and unbiased perspectives.

We move to Fort Indiantown Gap, the US National Guard Training Centre located in Pennsylvania, where the group particularly appreciates the availability of a simulation-city to try out CRC actions. The project has its foundations in the will of DPKO and the PD to improve the proficiency of FPUs, in the collaboration of police officers from different Police Contributing Countries in a professional cross-pollination, in the analysis and mitigation of differences in legal frameworks, tactics techniques and procedures as well as in equipment and weaponry. We spend many hours discussing, trying out, rehearsing, and criticising each other and are at

the end able to come up with a provisional training curriculum. We are learning as much, if not more, than teaching each other. The camaraderie and working atmosphere are very positive, we are eager, committed and determined to succeed. Some minor tensions arise due to misguided attempts to steer the activities in a direction suiting national perspectives. They are quickly identified and overruled by the group prioritizing professional reasoning, experiences in the field and striving to deliver the best possible product to the end users, our colleagues deployed in UN missions. The pressure to deploy prevents us from refining this product to the levels we would have preferred, and soon we fly to Liberia.

5. Chapter MTT – United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)

By the time we reach Monrovia, the capital of Liberia on the Mesurado river, and UNMIL's HQ, the mission leadership, the FPU coordination office and the senior officers within the FPUs have clearly been informed of the unsatisfactory state of affairs. During the PT3 their performance was rated the lowest amongst all deployed UN missions and therefore assessed as needing an immediate remedial intervention. I am thrilled to finally witness a changed approach within the UN that starkly contrasts my previous experience and perception. This time shortcomings are being addressed not only with words, but followed by concrete and, in my opinion, decisive actions. The in-processing is completed with some difficulties and the team leader, and I find an accommodation whose location requires crossing the largest city market every time we move by car to and from the UN HQ. This confronts us with an endless series of info-graphs, colourful humanity pursuing its lives, at times too much for expediency and speed of travelling. Getting to know the local pace is but one of the main requirements of a versed UN peacekeeper. Traffic is something else and the innovative and resourceful local drivers test our attention and occasionally our nerves too. One easily forgets how stressful such a deployment can be.

The overall issues we have to overcome as we set to accomplish our tasks are of administrative, command, logistic and liaison nature. We need to find and gain access to shooting ranges and areas suitable to train in crowd control tactics, techniques, and procedures. Weaponry, ammunition, other relevant and protective equipment need to be located and made available. An initial discussion with the Police Commissioner seeks to lay down ground rules and there is a clear need to link-up with the FPU coordination

office and obviously with the FPU commanders. As usual I meet and interact with colleagues and individuals who react with enthusiasm to our arrival and presence; these are police officers who still harbour hope, want to make a difference, and see our deployment as a possibility to improve the overall situation. They want to accomplish something and are willing to actively engage and support the MTT. Others are not only less welcoming and open, but sometimes I sense outright hostility and reluctance. I vow to try influencing and persuading them into changing their perspective or at least seek to mitigate the points of hardest contrast. I see recurring to interventions by superior authorities and initiating disciplinary actions as last resort options that would be best to never enact. Navigating these professionally and, why not, also politically challenging waters strain my expertise, experience, and skills. Sharing the accommodation with the team leader means we spent much time together, have plenty of opportunities to discuss the mission and look together for possible solutions to a host of problems. I am extremely grateful for the years of service as a deputy and then commander of Carabinieri stations and the different types of missions I participated in because they complement each other well, allowing me to operate proficiently and contribute to the team's efforts. An initial assessment of the current performance of each unit is performed to tailor training sessions accordingly. We seek to improve the proficiency of all units, therefore an overall plan is established and widely circulated, aiming at an active participation in solving availability issues and conflicting commitments. The FPUs still need to perform their mandated mission while we work with them.

There is a showcase unit, in which the "traditional" (till that moment) gender roles within an FPU have been inverted. The commander, most officers and operating personnel, i.e. those performing law enforcement and policing duties, are females. On the other hand, supporting roles such as administration, cooking, and, for some unknown reason, driving is performed by males. This FPU will be my main focus and I'm still in awe of some of their members, in particular a couple of non-commissioned officers, who show commitment, passion and a desire to learn and improve I will hardly ever find again. Overall, this unit's performance does not deviate much from the level of other units. The MTT employs a similar approach to the one we applied in the PT3, trying to gain the trust of the FPU leadership and throughout the ranks. Since the UN-established, if only provisional, training material is new to all, we follow an approach of incremental workload. First a theoretical lecture is given to be then demonstrated by MTT mentors in its proper practical execution. Then our trainees are

called to perform the same exercises first under MTT guidance and finally on their own with the help of their instructors. At the end, we finish by reviewing the performance together with our colleagues. The command-and-control module is directed mainly at officers with the aim to clarify their roles emphasizing the proper interaction with the chain of command. In particular we remind them what tasks the FPUs are mandated to carry out as opposed to others they are being regularly, but unduly, been charged with within the mission. The DPKO and the PD are kept updated about the situation in the field and follow our actions with great interest. We are serving as pilot endeavour and testbed for follow-on missions and our experiences, including our mistakes and shortfalls, will result in an improved curriculum but also better chances at achieving success for those colleagues who will deploy within MTTs to all UN missions.

The crowd control subject matter is presented starting again from the main FPU tasks to delve into details concerning information gathering, risk assessment, planning and execution of crowd control operations and actions, proper use of force starting from negotiations, the necessity and quality of the information flow including a standardized system for giving orders. Some major points we try to convey encompass the involvement of FPU commanders as main decision takers, anticipate events instead of being reactive only, delegate authority involving the middle management and employing adequate – now UN-standardized – crowd control tactics. Individual skills, including basic policing techniques, protection, use of cover and proper use of non-lethal weapons need to be honed just as much as proper communications, firearms and use of water cannons or armoured personnel carriers.

Firearm proficiency starts with safe weapon handling, disassembling, and re-assembling of all issued handguns, SMGs and rifles and is conveyed through the above-mentioned training approach. This includes hand over, receipt, loading and unloading as well as the use of safeties. FPU members are taught to identify and solve stoppages and jammings on their own. Shooting orders and stances, aiming, breathing and, trigger-pull are discussed, then shown and practised. We practise dry firing first, then at the range with life ammunition in different, tailored and increasingly challenging exercises.

The improvements in FPU performance at all levels and in all sectors are apparent and documented, hard evidence that even with limited resources, but sufficient will, with a small number of experts, but operating cohesively and

comprehensively, positive results can be achieved in a short period of time.
I will always cherish the feeling of having accomplished something during the MTT mission in Liberia.

6. Conclusions

Many years have passed and nowadays I am in the enviable position of serving within the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence in Vicenza (Italy). The title of my current position as Staff Assistant within the Standardization and Interoperability Section of the Doctrine and Standardization Branch does not nearly cover the range of challenging but also fascinating, captivating and very rewarding activities and responsibilities I am entrusted with. One of the most gratifying aspects of the current job is that operating mostly, but not exclusively, in the remit of Doctrine, I have the opportunity to share professional knowledge, experience and expertise as Subject Matter Expert for Stability Policing. Participating in a host of national and international events championing SP and not only within NATO, I continue to draw from the accumulated vast and profound professional background. In fact, it allows me to discuss and argue proficiently during the review of existing and drafting of new publications and concepts, the development or improvement of education and training solutions, commenting best practices, lessons identified and learned. The modules and presentations the Centre's leadership trusts me to deliver are at the same time an opportunity to relate and transmit my experiences, garner new insights about the same when confronted with questions from the audience and a constant and welcome reminder of the people, lands and situations encountered during my deployments.

I feel deeply honoured and proud to have been selected and given the chance to participate in the PT3 and subsequent MTT in UNMIL. These deployments allowed me to give a personal contribution trying to improve the situation of fellow police officers operating in some of the most challenging environments in the world. The aspect I most appreciate is without doubts the tight and intense collaboration with other colleagues, seeking to bring in our diverse experiences and expertise for the common good. I am still benefitting from these experiences. In fact, during a very recent address to a NATO body I could draw from lessons garnered in these endeavours and during two decades of policing and law enforcement deployments overseas. They enabled me to paint a clearer picture about Stability Policing and its essence, exalting the cutting-edge evolution started by the MSU, pointing out differences to other remits like the Military

Police and approaches by the UN and other international organizations. My background grew on this diversity, it flourished nurturing from past difficulties and solutions others had indicated me and matured into a better understanding of SP as a concept. My determination to improve and develop existing solutions or design innovative ones in the field of law enforcement abroad is still being guided by the principle of endowing police officers and organizations with the best possible tools to accomplish their duties; the fundamental drive has not changed; it aims at allowing others to avoid making the same mistakes I and others have already made.

BIO:

Stefano Bergonzini *has a bachelor's in administrative sciences by the university of Siena. Joined the Italian Carabinieri in 1990, holds the rank of Luogotenente Carica Speciale and has been a deputy and commander of Carabinieri Stations for over 15 years. Deployed to 9 peace and humanitarian military and civilian missions in Israel, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq, Eritrea, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic Congo and Liberia and as Chief Security Officer at the Italian embassy in Washington DC (USA). Since 2014 at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence in Vicenza (ITA) as Staff Assistant within the Doctrine and Standardization Branch as Subject Matter Expert for Stability Policing, Cultural Property Protection, Non-Lethal Weapons, Counterinsurgency and Urbanization. Member of SOS Archivi and Società Italiana Protezione Beni Culturali (SIPBC).*

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National Gendarmerie, France

12. How NATO Gendarmerie-Type Forces Successfully Paved the Way for the European Union Mission EULEX

1. Introduction

The transfer of policing authority in the Northern, and most sensitive, part of Kosovo, between the NATO Gendarmerie component and the new EU mission called EULEX Kosovo, has clearly demonstrated the added value of Gendarmerie-type forces in stability policing in a highly volatile environment. The author of this chapter was in command of the Gendarmerie component of the task force for the North of Kosovo and handed over this component to the new EULEX mission in December 2008. The way in which KFOR successfully addressed the security gaps and ensured a peaceful handover to the EU mission, which was not welcomed by the local population, is a clear success that deserves to be analyzed and explained. Beyond this success story, some weaknesses in NATO's policing layout must also be underlined in order to identify room for improvement for the future. These personal lessons-learned and analysis are of course subjective but are indeed comprehensive because this point of view is from the battalion level, that is to say both very close from the field but with a clear awareness of the challenges at the theater level.

This study will include an analysis of the historical context, the geographical constraints, the security challenges for the local population, in particular the security gaps that need to be addressed, the different actors involved in policing, the conditions for transferring the police layout to EULEX, and the lessons learned from this handover.

2. Short historical context

We will not try to resume here the incredibly complex and complicated history of the Balkans, but we must anyway underline the main factors that underpin our reflection here. For centuries, the Balkans have been an area of tension between Eastern and Western Europe on one hand, and Islam and Christianity on the other hand. This region is therefore a crossroads of influence for the major powers as well as a crossroads for unofficial traffics, outside the main legal trade routes.

In recent history, there have been a lot of exactions between different populations, notably during World War II (WWII). These tensions stemmed from religious and political differences, with some populations being allied to the Axis powers, others to the Allied powers. It is worth highlighting that transversal criminal networks continued to exist during these troubled times.

Immediately after WWII, the situation and tensions were frozen, with the emergence of a new communist country, Yugoslavia, under the strong authority of Marshal Tito. With the collapse of the Communist bloc in the 1990s, Yugoslavia disappeared after 2 major internal conflicts (Bosnia 1992-95 and Kosovo 1998-99), giving birth to 6 new countries: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

As a result of this complicated history, the ethnic breakdown of Kosovo's population is essential to understand the way KFOR was organized and the designation of the different framework nations for each of the 5 sectors.

In order to illustrate the reality of ethnic tensions, suffice it to say that during this operation in Kosovo in 2008, I never saw the flag of Kosovo but rather, depending on the area, the Serbian flag, or the Albanian flag.

3. The primary importance of the physical geography

From both military and policing perspectives, the geographical location of Kosovo is key to understand how KFOR was organized to stabilize a highly volatile situation. Kosovo is an east-west plain, surrounded by mountains. To the North, Kosovo is bordered by Serbia, with very few mountain passes. There are two major passes indeed along the river valley, "Dog 31[1]" at the West of Zubin Potok and "Gate 1[2]" to the North of Leposavic. As far as criminality is concerned, this explains why the biggest trafficking criminal organizations are active in the central part of the province, while the northern part is more impacted by nearby smuggling with Serbia. Regarding intelligence and public order, whether in terms of patrolling and riot control, the northern part is objectively the most difficult to control and because of its proximity with Serbia, it is also the most politically sensitive. It is also the sector with the largest number of enclaves, that is to say isolated village with an Albanian population to the North of the Ibar, and others with a Serbian population to the South of the Ibar River. These highly vulnerable populations are in a precarious situation and deserve special attention in terms of public order, with a proximity policing that Gendarmerie-type forces know how to deliver.

4. The legal framework

The legal framework in Kosovo was at the same time quite clear, yet differently interpreted by each country involved in the conflict or its resolution. The legal basis was the UN Security Council Resolution which states that Kosovo is a province of Serbia. Although many countries had recognized the unilateral independence of Kosovo just after its announcement on the 17th of February 2008, other members of the UN, the EU and even NATO did not. In this context, KFOR received a mandate to conduct a peacekeeping operation encompassing police missions including criminal files, with the view to transfer gradually these competencies to the local police forces. The events in Kosovo were subject to different legal classification as defined by the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. First, it was an international armed conflict (IAC) between several allied countries in Kosovo and Serbia. Unlike what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this NATO intervention was not legally validated by the United Nations. It therefore became a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between governmental forces and non-state armed groups. It is currently

1 Under field military baptism.

2 Idem.

considered as other situation of violence (OSV), as defined by international humanitarian law.

As far as policing and law enforcement are concerned, it should be remembered that in 2008, the situation in Kosovo was already classified as other situation of violence and no longer as an armed conflict. Therefore, international human rights law (IHRL) and domestic law were the only applicable law. In most of these situations, domestic law is the primary reference. Nevertheless, in Kosovo, considering the international differences in appreciating the legal status of the country, IHRL was and is a reference of primary importance, notably to elaborate the dedicated rules of engagement and behavior.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo is a great example of a military operation for which a good understanding, interpretation, and implementation, constitutes imperative conditions for success. In such a complex situation and environment, the presence in the force of a Gendarmerie-type component is clearly an asset, as it enables the command not only to better understand the legal framework but to also integrate the legal constraints effectively into the operational and planning documents. Indeed, the Gendarmerie type forces are all experienced practitioners of law enforcement. They thus provide command with operational solutions that are both legal and effective.

5. The Kosovo Force

The Kosovo force (KFOR) was a NATO operation established by the Security Council resolution, to insure the freedom of movement (FoM) and a safe and secure environment (SASE) in Kosovo. The stabilization dimension of the situation in Kosovo was indeed at the heart of this mandate entrusted by the international community. The KFOR layout was divided into 5 sectors each entrusted to a task force:

- North sector: French responsibility.
- West sector: Italian responsibility.
- North-East sector: British responsibility.
- South-East sector: USA responsibility.
- South sector: German responsibility.

Regarding the framework nations of these sector, it must be said that for both political and historical reasons, Italy and France were the two nations equally appreciated by all the ethnic groups living in Kosovo, especially by the Serbian and Albanian populations.

On 10 June 1999, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizing military, and civilian deployment to the Serbian province of Kosovo as part of a peacekeeping operation. It is worth underlining that the KFOR, regardless its military nature had by its mandate, under the 1244 UN Resolution, a clear police responsibility, from public order up to criminal police:

- As a key KFOR player to reach the FoM and to insure a SASE.
- In support of the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
- In close cooperation with the UN mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), namely its formed police units (FPU) and civilian police officers (CIVPOL).

Therefore, this international military operation having to deal with police missions, NATO KFOR organized a law enforcement component composed of Gendarmerie-type forces.

6. The KFOR Gendarmerie-type force components

1 The Multinational specialized unit (MSU)

Stationed in Pristina and directly under the orders of the force commanders, the MSU had a theater wide competency on all Kosovo. Under Italian commandment, but also including units from other nationalities, this component had a large range of competencies, from public order, to specialized intervention, up to the criminal police regarding the high criminality, the transnational trafficking networks, and major interethnic crimes. MSU was one of the centralized task forces, notably aside with the KFOR tactical reserve battalion. The MSU concept was innovative, promoting a global approach both executive and non-executive, respecting the principle of subsidiarity.

2 The Gendarmerie component of the multinational task force North

Pic. 2. Joint crowd and riot training, Novo Selo (2008) © Philippe Cholous

Each of the 5 sectors had its specific organization. Under the French responsibility, the northern sector was, for geographical, ethnic, and political reasons, the most sensitive, both from a military and police perspective. In this sector, the challenge of stabilization was considerable, as demonstrated by the number of serious incidents. That is the reason the multinational task force North, had a dedicated police component composed of:

- 1 mobile Gendarmerie squadron.
- 1 armored Gendarmerie platoon with 4 heavy armored vehicles.
- 2 SWAT teams.
- 1 intelligence cell.
- 1 provost cell.

It is important to note that this Gendarmerie component was purposely co-located with the French detachment of maneuvering helicopters, to constitute the intervention echelon of the northern sector.
The missions given to this battalion level component were the following ones:

On a daily base:

- Intelligence by patrolling.
- Contact with population by patrolling.

- Defense of both:
  - The Albanian enclaves North of Ibar river.
  - The Serbian enclaves South of the Ibar river.
- Quick public order and SWAT response force.
- Training in the use of force of all the military unit of the MNTFN, including the operational response force (ORF).
- Advising the HQ, the officers in command and the units on all law enforcement and rule of law matters.

In case:

- Support to the NATO military forces.
- Support to the local police forces.
- Crowd and riot control.
- Specialized intervention.
- Blue box for MSU operations.

3 Coordination MSU, Gendarmerie component of the MNTF-N in law enforcement

Even if coordination problems have sometimes arisen, the complementarity between the MSU, centralized police component competent on all the Kosovo, and the Gendarmerie component of the MNTFN, competent on the most exposed and sensitive part of the theater, that is to say the Northern part, was more than relevant.

7. The no-surprise policy specifically conducted in the North sector

At the sector level, and parallel to the work of preparing hearts and minds by the Gendarmerie component in its daily security work, the commander of the North sector, BG Michel Yakovleff, had theorized and implemented through weekly meetings of all parties involved in the situation of violence, a concerted strategy of no surprises. These meeting were gathering all stakeholders including the so-called hardliners. The idea was to share our analysis of the current situation and commit to taking no action that might surprise the adversary. The implementation of this original approach worked very well. It fitted in well with the culture of Serbians from Kosovo, for whom keeping one's trust is key.

Consequently, the transfer of the Gendarmerie component to EULEX and the reopening of the Courthouse in Mitrovica, had been announced with discussions around the releasable elements of the ongoing planning.

I was thus able to observe that this strategy specific to the North sector, has very effectively contributed to the appropriation of the stabilization process and consequently to making possible the deployment of EULEX to the North of the Ibar River in the immediate wake of KFOR.

8. The reality test of our stabilization function

Pic. 3. SWAT team training for airborne maneuvers, Plana (2008) © Philippe Cholous

A few months after the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the NATO military layout had been defined and positioned on the field. From this time, the military units fulfilled a dissuasion role to prevent reescalation of the conflict, while remaining immediately able to resume combat if necessary. Unfortunately, resentment ran deep on both sides of the Kosovo population. Consequently, the tensions induced were and still are frequent and sharp, and the incidents numerous. I can think of two examples that show why and how a very calm situation can suddenly turn into heavy confrontations between Serbian and Albanian citizens in Kosovo. The first one was caused by the defeat of a Serbian basketball team against a Turkish one. Immediately, there were provocations on both sides of the Ibar River, followed by unrests. The second one took place on the 30th of December 2008, when violent clashes broke out between Serbs and Albanese in Kosovo, following the alleged attack on a young Serb by young Albanians. These events alone show how volatile the situation was given the long history of conflict and liabilities between the communities.

In sum, and if we want to assess precisely the type of paradoxical situation of the relative daily acceptance of KFOR elements north of the Ibar River, we must remember that in 2008 no hostile act was perpetrated without reason against the patrols of the Gendarmerie component of the northern task force, but that any international vehicle left alone had its windows systematically stoned and broken.

The extreme instability and prejudices inherited on both sides from the history of the Balkans, highlights the fact that judicialization of the offences based on objective evidence resulting from objective and rigorous judicial investigations, is the only way to restore trust between the parties to conflicts and situations of violence, and consequently to return to a sustainable peace.

In this sense, the new model tested and promoted within KFOR, namely that of a Gendarmerie-type component capable of dealing not only with public order and intelligence capability, but also with the judicial police executive powers, constitutes a major step forward in terms of an effective stabilization policy. This was from the outset a great success which contributed to a clear elaboration of stability in Kosovo, to the point that the EU authorities in charge of designing, planning, and deploying EULEX Kosovo were largely inspired by it. It is in this context, moreover, that the Gendarmerie component of the MNTFN was transferred with all its functions to EULEX Kosovo, constituting the basis for the deployment of this operation in the North of the country.

9. The handover to EULEX

In July 2008, I took over the command of the Gendarmerie component in the North of Kosovo. Everybody already knew at that time, that this component was set to come under the responsibility of the new European Union Rule of Law Mission EULEX, hopefully by the end of the year. We had a lot of meeting with EULEX HQ, to plan the handover. In that perspective we first had to explain to our EU counterpart, the context, the function of the Gendarmerie-type force component on the field and its added-value when it came to stabilization. This transfer went beyond the usual framework of a traditional transfer of instructions, since it was a question of benefiting from another international organization, our knowledge of the environment, our know-how, our lessons learned, our experience and our situation analysis.

The handover was technically simple at the component level, as the units only had to exchange the KFOR badge of their outfits with the EULEX badge, and to report to EULEX in Pristina rather than to the NATO MNTFN in Novo Selo. From a logistical point of view, as this component was composed of police officers from the framework nation, the support did not really change.

On the other hand, other immediate challenges arose on this transfer of authority over a Gendarmerie-type component engaged in the execution of permanent and imperative missions. First, this transfer was to take place during action. Moreover, while the Gendarmerie-type component of KFOR had proved its worth to the population over the past decade, the European Union, in the form of EULEX, was neither trusted, nor welcomed by the Kosovo Serb population. In addition, EULEX HQ had decided to mark the first day of EULEX deployment North of the Ibar River with the reopening of the Mitrovica court, under international control, an authority whose jurisdiction was not recognized by the Serbian population. It should be known that a few months ago in March 2008, during an operation to evacuate occupied premises at the Mitrovica court, 8 French soldiers, 25 police officers of the UNMIK and 80 Serbian protestors had been injured, some of them seriously. Therefore, the deployment of the EULEX North of Ibar was really challenging and the question of whether to set up support and protection by combat units, according to the green box/blue box logic, was clearly posed. Fortunately, if not chosen, this option would have been disastrous in terms of image, both for NATO and for the EU, signaling the failure of the stability policy.

10. Highlight on one of the unique capabilities of the Gendarmerie-type forces

The Gendarmerie-type force component of the MNTFN brought to EULEX its wide range of capabilities, ensuring its transfer without interrupting or even slowing down the execution of its missions. Without going into details, these few pages do not pretend to be exhaustive, this transfer provides an opportunity to illustrate one of the many added values of Gendarmerie-type forces in their contribution to the stability of areas of tension, violence, or conflict. Indeed, it is important to mention here the ability to collect, verify and exploit reliable information. On a daily base, I noticed that both the MNTFN commander and the KFOR commander, wanted to read more than any other the daily intelligence report of the component in the North. It was of course because these Gendarmerie officers were the only ones to patrol North of the Ibar River, it was also because Gendarmerie-type forces are used to get in touch with the population and to establish relationship and trust. Lastly, it can also be explained by the fact that these Gendarmerie reports were based on the methodical exploitation of observed facts instead of mere scoops or hypotheses. In the specific case of the handover, KFOR and EULEX HQs jointly asked me as Head of Component to be transferred, my situation assessment and risk analysis. After five months in command there and on the basis of the related intelligence we gathered, we assessed that the handover as well as the reopening

of the Mitrovica courthouse would be a challenging but successful process because, on one hand, there was no change of contingents so the population knew the Gendarmes in charge and, on the other hand, because of the nationality of the officers (French) and their status (Gendarmerie-type forces). These elements were all factors of appeasement and de-escalation. It should be noted that there is in Serbia a Gendarmerie recognized and esteemed by the population.

The course of events confirmed, if necessary, the relevance of this prior evaluation by the Gendarmerie-type forces.

11. Lessons-learned

The stabilization of a situation of conflict or violence in a theatre, and consequently the stability policy implemented by a military force in operation, is one of the imperative conditions for the success of a peacekeeping operation and the *sine qua non* of a real way out of a crisis.

The choice that NATO did in this concept (CONOPS) and plan (OPLAN) of operation, to set up global police components able to deal not only with public order, but also to deliver proper intelligence and to assume executive powers up to the field of criminal police by the MSU, was innovative and relevant. This really contributed to the stability of the theatre. In addition, EULEX was able to step in and adopt this concept in its broad outline, to move towards a way out of the crisis.

I must add that as commander of the gendarmerie tactical battalion in 2 successive theaters of operation, Ivory Coast in support of the UN and Kosovo under the NATO banner, I was able to determine that the main contributions, some of them unparalleled, of a Gendarmerie-type component to a policy of stability are the following ones:

- Ability to operate on a theater up to combat situation.
- Full interoperability with combat units (planning, orders, materials, procedure, culture, more).
- Mastery in a potentially degraded situation of all the functions now devolved to the most modern police forces.
- Operational comprehension of the legal framework by law enforcement practitioners.
- Law enforcement intelligence culture that's to say the ability to get trustful information from the population and on the field, and to produce on a daily base, a reliable intelligence only based on facts.
- Ability to deploy all the professional skills necessary for a comprehensive approach to law enforcement, in an executive or non-executive way.

12. Conclusion

The crisis of Kosovo is a great example of crisis in which NATO had been successfully involved because it went through the entire spectrum of crisis, from war to peace via all the stages defined by international humanitarian law: international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, and other situations of violence.

The experience of the transfer of the Gendarmerie component of the multinational task force North in Kosovo, from KFOR to the EU's EULEX rule of law mission, is emblematic of the added value of Gendarmerie-type forces in the strategy of stabilization and then exit from the crisis. In sum, the fact that the transfer of responsibility north of the Ibar requires the immediate switch of this battalion-level component demonstrates the key role it plays in this type of geopolitical and security situation. Therefore, this undeniable success and its lessons learned, must serve as an example for designing, building, and deploying future crisis management forces and doctrines.

BIO:

After studying literature, Philippe Cholous was trained and recruited as an infantry officer. He served as infantry combat platoon leader in the French Marines. He then became a career officer in the French National Gendarmerie. He successively served as a swat team leader, company, and battalion commander up to the rank of colonel. He was deployed twice as battalion commander, both in Ivory Coast and Kosovo. He was then embedded in Afghan counter insurgency units for 2 years. He completed a 2-year mission in French Guyana and another one in the French Antilles, as well as short terms missions in Russia, Romania, Bosnia, Cameroon, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, and New Caledonia. He graduated from the Joint Staff College (Ecole de guerre) in Paris and has published several books in the field of policing and military. Married with 5 children, he retired in 2018 to join the ICRC as a delegate to the security forces (Police/Gendarmerie) in Central Africa and Chad. He is currently the Police/Gendarmerie delegate at the ICRC HQ in Geneva.

Lieutenant Rafael Obrero Madueño
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13. "POMLT in Qala e Naw": Training Police Units in Afghanistan Case Study

1. Introduction

The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon by the terrorist organization Al Qaeda was the trigger for the intervention of international forces in Afghanistan. A country where there was no government structure, but tribal chiefs, no organized security forces, but militias, and where the Taliban maintained their power over an increasingly neglected and subdued population.

The international forces have worked hard to achieve peace and stability in the area. Their mission has adapted over the years. Initially providing security in the capital, Kabul, they later extended their presence throughout the territory to suppress the insurgency, train Afghan Security Forces and support the reconstruction of provincial infrastructures.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a multinational security mission in Afghanistan that participated in the war against insurgent groups in the country from 2001 to 2014.

In 2010, Police Operational Mentoring and Liasion Team (POMLT) units were deployed in Afghanistan as part of the NATO ISAF mission to train local police forces in the town of Qala e Naw in Badgis province.

The author was posted in Qala e Naw as a NATO Police Officer from September 2010 until March 2011, at an extremely critical moment after suffering an attack by an insurgent infiltrator in which two POMLT

members of Guardia Civil (Captain Galera and 2nd Lieutenant Bravo) lost their lives while training with the Afghan police at their HQ in Qala e Naw.

2. The Beginning

It was the end of June 2010. I will never forget that call in which my Unit asked me if I was interested in taking part in a mission to train the Afghan police. I was stationed in the Reserve and Security Group (GRS) No. 2 based in Seville and a company specialising in international missions had recently been created called the Foreign Reserve and Security Company (CRAEX). The mission was to be part of a unit called Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (POMLT) made up of member of the CRAEX and the Rapid Action Group (GAR). On 25 August 2010 we were in Madrid preparing to leave when we were surprised by the unfortunate news of the attack in Qala e Naw. Captain Galera and 2nd Lieutenant Bravo had been killed by their driver. On that fateful day, an Afghan police driver had fired a shot at the POMLT members while they were training at the Afghan Police Headquarters (HQ) killing our two colleagues and the Iranian interpreter who was working with them.[1]

Pic 1. Members of POMLT in Spanish Base "Ruy González Clavijo". Qala e Naw, Afghanistan (2010).

1 EL MUNDO, *Taliban driver infiltrator kills two guardias civiles training Afghan policemen* (25.08.2010) https://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2010/08/25/espana/1282718179.html (30.06.2022)

Subsequently, there were large-scale riots caused by some of the local population and instigated by insurgents in the area. The Taliban's plan was to create a conflict between the local population of Qala e Naw and the Spanish forces that they were training the Afghans at HQ. Eventually, the local forces were able to contain the protests, although the POMLT colleagues had to remain inside the facility for more than 24 hours, until the local police were able to contain the conflict.
This happened when our team was collecting the material at the "General Cavalcanti" logistics barracks in Madrid. Our Captain told us not to say anything to our families so as not to worry them, but this was difficult advice to follow, because the news had already been on the TV breaking news and it didn't take long for the phones of all our partners to start ringing, as their families had already heard about what had happened.

Our trip began at Barajas International Airport, with a flight that, after a brief stopover in Istanbul (Türkiye), took us to the Belgian-French base at Duschambe in Tajikistan. After that stop, a Hercules aircraft of the Spanish Armed Forces would take us to Herat and from there to Qala e Naw airport. During the trip we could look out of the windows at the rocky, mountainous desert landscape of Afghanistan. It was very impressive. We could already feel the butterflies in our stomachs from the great adventure we were about to embark on. The first shock on leaving the plane was the amount of dust in the air. From the plane to the base, our first walk through the area, a distance that we covered on foot, carrying our backpacks, between the walls of protection in the area.

The entrance to the Spanish base "Ruy González Clavijo" guarded by our soldiers stationed in the area, and a long, steep climb to adapt to the environment. Our facilities consisted of containers that we would share between two or three members of the Unit. Our working area was next to the area of the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID, acronym in Spanish) with which we had a close relationship. Among the many civil-military cooperation activities, the most important were the insurgent reintegration programme, the execution of civil works such as the diversion of a river to improve irrigation or the repair of road surfaces and the distribution of health and humanitarian material in the province.
Inside the base, we had a call centre so we could keep in touch with our relatives in Spain, as well as internet stations so we could connect to the web. We also had a canteen, a small supermarket, gym, laundry, and hairdresser. You could say that in terms of facilities on the base, we couldn't complain. Inside the gym there were mats to practice martial arts and even some video game consoles, all of this to keep the personnel distracted in

their free time, though nothing comparable to the Herat base, with more possibilities for restaurants and leisure.

3. The Relay

We were preparing to relieve the POMLT that was deployed there. The atmosphere was not the best, the recent loss of our comrades in the attack was difficult to assimilate. It was very difficult to accept that despite all the efforts to help and train the Afghan policemen, one of them had turned against them and, logically, there was a feeling of sadness and contained rage in the air. The only thing that made up for that tragedy in the minds of our colleagues was that in a few days they would be leaving for Spain.

From then on, the security measures were increased. We had to continue our mission to train the Afghan police, but with the assurance that none of the recruits could carry any concealed weapons with which to attack us. For this purpose, the POMLT was divided into mentor components and others who were dedicated exclusively to providing security, so Afghan police trainings could take place in complete safety. The first activity in the morning after was a briefing, in which training missions were assigned. One part of the mentors was dedicated to police training at the airport and the other part to visits to their assigned police stations and the Afghan Police Headquarters. The components that went down to train the police at the airport, went down on foot and met at the airport premises together with the security team, consisting of two armoured vehicles model Lince and the security personnel who previously reconnoitred the runway in anticipation of any improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that might be present.

Early in the morning, we met the Afghan police recruits at the Qala e Naw airport facility, which was located directly opposite our base, and the first thing we did was an intensive search of all participating Afghan policemen. This initial distrust was absolutely necessary in order to conduct the training in a more relaxed manner and thus deter potential insurgent infiltrators from attacking us or their fellow police recruits. We had to strike a balance between security and creating a good atmosphere with the Afghan policemen we were training. The searches were conducted by the security team. After these security searches of the airport facilities, we would do a warm-up runway run, for which it was very important to be connected to the Air Force air traffic controllers who coordinated the landings of the military flights landing on the runway and gave us enough notice to be able to pull out when the flights arrived on the runway.

I remember the first days of training, with what enthusiasm these future Afghan policemen performed the warm-up exercises. It must be said that for many of them, this type of activity was very new, which was noticeable in the lack of coordination with which they performed our "military gymnastics". On the other hand, we must recognise the merit of these people, who probably had no previous academic training, and whose footwear and clothing were not the most suitable for exercise. During these open field trainings, that the exposure to an insurgent attack was very high, but the confidence we had in our security team was infinite, which allowed us to focus on mentoring these personnel. In fact, in mid-December there was an attempted attack by a suicide bomber who was shot by Afghan airport police.[2]

It must be underlined that in terms of our mentoring role, our objective was not to create an Afghan Guardia Civil. Our work consisted of observing how they carried out their police work and then advising them on the police procedures we use in Spain. We taught them police defence techniques, how to carry out controls, as well as training to avoid disturbances in large concentrations of people. We also did target practice, both with rifles and light machine guns. In these exercises, each mentor would stand behind the shooter, to prevent any infiltrator from turning on the instructors or his own colleagues. Safety must always come first, and after recent events, the police recruits understood this.

Pic 2. Light machine gun practice with Afghan police. Qala e Naw, Afghanistan (2010).

2 ABC, *Terrorist blows himself up next to Spain's main base in Afghanistan* (13.12.2011): https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-suicida-afganistan-tropas-201112130000_noticia.html (5.07.2022)

Each mentor was assigned a police station. Number four was mine. The first trips to the stations consisted of meeting with the local chiefs of each station and gathering information about their capabilities, both in terms of personnel and equipment. When we left the base, we had to cross the airport, the characteristic low adobe houses were already visible, and the dense cloud of dust raised by our vehicles was beginning to be felt. We then had to cross a small stream near a market. I remember the locals wearing their typical Afghan hats and the women in their blue burqas, which covered up every patch of skin or hair.

On one of those days when we visited the police station, we were invited to tea. The truth is that we were a little afraid of catching an illness, as the hygienic conditions were not the most favourable. Our health services advised us not to eat local products, so another risk we had to take in order not to be unhealthy was to drink tea in glasses that were passed from one guest to another with a simple rinse.

One of the great health hazards in the area was the great possibility of catching a disease commonly known as Yala-Yala[3]. It was a kind of acute gastroenteritis, capable of leaving the companion who caught it in bed for several days and with a great loss of weight. For this, the habit of washing one's hands at every opportunity, and especially before meals, was essential. Luckily, I did not have the misfortune to experience this.

The work of the interpreters who accompanied us in all our activities, most of them of Iranian origin must be highlighted; they were essential to enable communication with the local population. They accompanied us on all our outings to the village. The most widely spoken languages were Pashto and Dari. The routine during these visits was to meet with the chief of the station, check the number of police officers stationed there, find out if there were any absences and if they were justified, check the equipment, weapons, ammunition, and vehicles, and ask about the needs they had at the police station, relevant police events, altercations in patrols, number of controls, etc.

There is one thing I always kept in mind, the longer the time in the station, the more exposure to a possible attack, therefore, with that in mind, I always tried to get as much information as possible to fill in our reports,

3 SCIELO, *Yala-Yala: how was gastroenteritis like in Badghis (Afghanistan)?* (2016): https://scielo.isciii.es/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1887-85712016000200008 (5.07.22)

but without staying too long on site. Over time, we also began to patrol the area around Qala e Naw with them, setting up access control devices. In these cases, we would give them instructions on how to position the vehicles in order to carry out the controls as safely as possible. It was quite curious to observe how people coming with their motorbikes and turbans were searched by these novice policemen and how strange these activities seemed to the locals. Another of the most picturesque events was the search of those who came on donkeys.

Pic 3. Joints patrols controlling Access to Qala e Naw. Qala e Naw, Afghanistan (2011).

Other missions, which we carried out with the staff of the police stations, were foot patrols. In these cases, and thanks to the interpreters, we were able to listen to the personal stories of these policemen. Many of them had the dream of someday being able to travel to Spain to see a Real Madrid or Barcelona match. In terms of crime rates in the area, being a small town, there was not a lot of common crime. The biggest risk, obviously, was the possibility of attacks by the insurgency, that oftenly carried out attacks with IEDs, which they would leave buried and hidden on the roads in such a way that they would explode when vehicles passed by. Therefore, training in the detection of IEDs was essential. Be aware of signs on the ground,

disturbed earth, try to follow the tracks of the vehicle in front, or avoid the logical route to overcome obstacles on the road.

One of the attacks we experienced at close quarters occurred on one of those inspection trips to my police station. Our unit consisted of two Lince vehicles, there were ten of us in total, a mentor, an interpreter, a shooter and a driver per vehicle and the rest of the staff to provide security. Normally, the first to enter the police station were the security team and once they had secured the area, the mentor could enter to conduct his interview with the police officers at the station.

Pic 4. Police station entrance in Qala e Naw. Qala e Naw, Afghanistan (2010).

That day, the plan was to gather the personnel and material data I needed for my report, as well as any news of insurgent movements in the locality, and return to the base. After meeting with the station chief, I signalled my team to get into the vehicles and return by the quickest route, which just happened to pass through the central square of the village, very close to the new Afghan police HQ.
However, when we had gone a few metres, knowing that my good friend Sgt. Yelamos was also interviewing the Chief of Station 3, it occurred to me

to change the plan and I decided that we should go to that station before to come back to Base.

Suddenly, we heard a big explosion, so we moved to Station 3 to regroup with the other patrol. On arrival, we decided to block with our Lince vehicles the two entrances to the street of the police station and prepare for any kind of attack that might occur and wait for instructions from the chain of command. My first impulse as Guardia Civil was to go to the area of the explosion to help the possibly injured and cordon off the area. But we were not in Spain, and we had to pay attention to the information that the head of the Afghan police station was giving us, and that the interpreter was translating for us. Someone had been wounded; at the time it was not known whether it was a policeman or a civilian. We began to manage a medical evacuation with the information we were given, which was scarce and very confusing.

Apparently, a motorbike bomb had exploded near the Afghan Police HQ, which had been parked near the policeman's post regulating traffic at the central roundabout in Qala e Naw. As was usually the case on the occasions of such attacks, there was a certain quietness in the area. This was because the insurgents used to warn the civilian population and traders in the area of these attacks so as not to provoke an anti-Taliban reaction among the locals. Meanwhile, the rest of the POMLT was training with Afghan police recruits at the airport. They requested permission to come to our assistance but were not allowed to come to our position to avoid risk. After a few hours and after the evacuation of the wounded, we were told by transmission that we could return, but avoiding the site of the attack. Later, we did contact the local authorities to carry out the police investigation and try to clarify the facts.

4. End of the Mission

We were about to leave the next day. Six long hard months had passed. I had already made the handover to the sergeant who would take over my duties, we had checked the equipment, weapons, and ammunition in our storage, and I was ready to celebrate with the rest of the Unit, our next departure home.

I was in the canteen with other comrades, and we had ordered a bottle of Rioja wine and a bacon sandwich when suddenly, the sirens of the base began to sound. We quickly had to rush to our assigned bunker.

I remember, inside the bunker, two or three hours passed, waiting for something to happen.

There were several colleagues from military intelligence who spoke to some informants, who told them about the movements of the insurgents who were trying to attack our base. Specifically, it was two men on a motorbike who wanted to launch a rocket at us. All the rest of us in the bunker stood around waiting to see how the situation would be resolved. Suddenly, there was a loud bang and a few seconds later a thud from the impact of the rocket. All the fellow smokers near the bunker entrance rushed into the bunker with incredible speed. The rocket had entered the top floor of our containers, right in the premises of the Guardia Civil, but fortunately the projectile charge did not explode. It later transpired that the cargo was not of very good quality because the material used was obsolete, usually Russian artefacts from the time of the Soviet invasion. The impact caused minor damage to the toilets on the first floor of our container.[4]

The most relevant anecdote happened to one of the members of the POMLT, who had recklessly entered the container to go to the toilet, and the impact caught him inside. I remember how, with his face unhinged, he tried to tell us what had happened to him, shaking off his uniform, as the impact had caused him to fall to the ground and he was full of dust. Fortunate to be able to tell the story, that day he was born again.

The next day we took our flight to Spain with the satisfaction of having accomplished the mission, without any regrettable casualties in the team and thinking that our work in these six months would help the local police forces to take control of the locality and that the population would live more securely. Unfortunately, the Taliban had a phrase that every person who arrived in that country had ingrained in their minds. "You have the clocks; we have the time".
In August 2021, the Taliban are back in power after 20 years, returning to the past and erasing all international efforts with the stroke of a pen. Maybe one day we can come back to finish the job and help these people. Who knows.[5]

4 MINISTERIO DE DEFENSA, *Launching of two rockets at the Spanish base in Qala-i-Naw* (21.03.2011): https://www.defensa.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa/2011/03/DGC_110321_Cohetes_Ruy_Clavijo.html (5.07.2022)

5 BBC, Afghanistan conflict: Kabul falls to Taliban as president flees (16.08.2021): https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58223231

5. Conclusions

When we went to Afghanistan to train the Afghan police, the "security gap" was more than evident, a police and military force had been established by the official Afghan government, but the Taliban were still operating in the area and creating great insecurity for the population. The roads were exposed to continuous IED attacks, the main hybrid threat used by the insurgents to terrorise the population. After the military operation, it was essential to deploy a stability police force to ensure that the population could return to normal life. It was no coincidence that Spain chose a mentoring unit made up of Civil Guards to be integrated into the Spanish military contingent. The Guardia Civil is a police force with a military character, a characteristic that determines its way of acting, its internal structure, and whose hierarchy, discipline and organisation provide extraordinary cohesion and efficiency in the fulfilment of any police or military mission. Added to this is the fact that it has had a great deal of experience throughout history in training police forces in other countries.

It would be very difficult to provide police training in areas such as crime investigation, forensics and criminalistics, public order and policing to a military unit that would subsequently have to train, in this case, the Afghan police. But it is no longer just a question of technical police matters, the Guardia Civil is constantly dealing with the everyday problems of the population, which is why the careful treatment of the citizen is another of the main characteristics that lead us to success in this type of mission, which is also commonly known as the "left hand".

In short, we integrate into the military force with total naturalness due to our military nature, our ranks, and our uniforms, but with the added bonus that our work consists of solving police problems, which requires us to be very flexible and empathetic with the citizen.

In the Afghan police stations, we managed to gain the trust and affection of those policemen, and this had a positive impact on the service provided to the Afghan population. Our advice and police techniques had to be adapted to the local culture, but it was clear that these policemen knew that they were being trained by more senior police colleagues and therefore we were the mirror in which they wanted to see themselves. I therefore believe that gendarmerie police are ideally suited to be integrated into the Joint Commander and to carry out the stabilisation policing necessary to make a conflict-stricken population feel safe again.

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BIO:

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14. Stability Policing in the Caribbean: A Case Study on the Application of Stability Policing after the Impact of a Class 5 Hurricane

1. In the beginning

It is 32 degrees Celsius; sweat is pouring down my face, I'm tired, hungry, my mouth is dry. I need to sleep but I can't. While driving in a patrol car I see the fuel light beeping. On my left there is an airplane, it is perfectly flipped and lying on its back with the windows shattered. A bit further up the road there is a boat, a boat!, on top of another one. A car perfectly planted vertically against a tree standing in the garden of a, once perfect, holiday villa. It feels as if I'm driving through a surrealistic painting, a movie.

1 The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of their agency or represent their agency in any way.

The beeping sound of the car brings me back to reality. Fuel is down, and the car lets me know it needs energy. But where do you get gasoline when there is not a single gas station operational? The island of Saint Martin is an entire society that is crushed overnight.

Pic. 1. Marines and Marechaussee at a mobile checkpoint. Saint Martin, 2017. © Ministry of Defense.

Saint Martin is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Like Aruba, Curacao, and The Netherlands, it has its own government administration and acts autonomous from the other countries in the Kingdom. The country received its status in 2010 with the creation of a new statute that provided autonomy of governance. In addition, the statute provided rules for mutual cooperation, assistance, consultation, and the constitution of the countries. Humanitarian aid and maintaining law and order as result of hurricane passages was part of this.

I'm back in the car and think of the person I was a few years ago, sitting in an office, behind a computer gazing outside the window of my cubicle. In 2010, I decided to give up on a career in business consulting in order to genuinely serve the public. I felt a strong need to find a deeper meaning than just making money, to make an actual difference. And this was the moment, this was it!

A group of young men is running away from one of the looted electronic stores while holding some headphones and other items that were left there. Everything passes by in slow-motion.

It brings me back to a movie I once saw in which for one day a year law enforcement did not exist and civilians could do as they please. The intensity of this feeling was overwhelming. “Is this the true essence of our human nature?”, “How would I act if we switched places?”, “Can I understand these people?”, “is it just peer pressure or innate human behavior?” just so much to ponder on.
Based on factual observations I can state that with the absence of law enforcement, the complete Island had become anarchistic overnight. There was not a single shop that wasn’t looted or attempted to be looted. There were even rumors that some of the local policemen were part of it. What I witnessed was survival mode in its full nature. I was shocked by the speed in which a society changed from civilized to full outraged frenzy anarchism. Most people that died that week weren’t victim of the class 5 hurricane but from violence that followed in absence of law enforcement.

2. Silence before the storm

It is September 2017. The sensible changing atmosphere tells us that we’re entering the hurricane season again. Every year we have had this period of almost two months in which nature reminds us of who is actually in charge. This season comes with heavy tropical storms that can evolve ultimately into hurricanes. As a precaution, I send two men from my unit (existing mostly out of Military Police) to Saint Martin, to assist the local platoon. The rest of our unit, including myself, is on standby, preparing ourselves for a potential deployment.

Just days before we send the man the news of a nearing storm southeast of the Islands started to drop in. Day by day the media broadcasted information about the storm and the warnings were taken serious by the inhabitants. Hour by hour the intensity of these warnings grew and so did the storm. When the storm evolved into a hurricane it was baptized Irma. Based on calculations, there was a significant chance the storm was going to hit the Saint Martin, better known as the Friendly Island.

The radio started to broadcast warning messages; the news anchors advised everyone to start preparing for impact. Most people were accustomed to this news and knew exactly what to do. More and more people started to buy the wooden panels at Home Depot. You could see trucks driving back and forth to the shop. Supermarkets were selling more canned food and water bottles. Everyone wanted some extra fuel for their aggregate. The sound of the wooden panels that were being attached to

cover the windows instilled a sense of acquiescence amongst the locals. They knew what was coming.

And then it became silent.

The sun disappeared and the serene blue sky with its specific Caribbean tint turned dark. The distinct island chirping of birds faded away. The silence before the storm was deafening. It started with the first drops of rain, soon it was pouring. Then the wind increased and increased and increased. Within a few hours the outer ring of hurricane Irma hit the land. All light objects that weren't attached or shielded started to become airborne. The howling and whistling sound combined with the impact from flying chairs, parts of trees and other items grew. All communication channels were cut off. No electricity. I had contact with my colleague via satcom. He stayed in an apartment complex. A tree hit the electricity cables creating sparks. The water stopped running. Somewhere in the building it started to smell like fire. This troubled him. Luckily there wasn't a fire in their building, but the alert state remained high.

Never ever in the history of the island had there been a record of a hurricane with similar force, magnitude or destructive power. The brutal violence of a class 5 hurricane was incomparable with all the storms the Island had seen before. During the peak the winds had a velocity of 185 mph that is the equivalent of 295 km per hour. To get an impression of this immense power of nature, a single human being can be moved by 67 mph, and a car can be moved by 90 mph. The wind at Saint Martin reached over 185 mph and was able to move airplanes, boats, and even park cars in trees and lift entire houses. Basically, everything became a missile with these wind speeds. Most people that die during a hurricane get injured by the impact of debris, pieces of trees and small parts of metal.

Early in the afternoon the eye of the storm appeared. This was the first moment that we could do a damage assessment. With the absence of normal communication systems, we only had satellite phones to communicate and even those were not 100% reliable. We started to receive news about the impact. It was way worse than we expected. The Island was unrecognizable, according to the news 2 people died and 43 were reported injured. We received news from one of our colleagues. Together with his family he sought refuge hiding in kitchen cabinets.

Others lost the roof over their head while trying to protect their family. It sounded like the aftermath of a city that was under heavy attack.

3. Deployment

During the storm I was one of the officers that rotated in our Operation Centre, located on Curacao. This was the place where all information came in and where we strategized on the necessary actions. Short after the damage assessment I received the call to lead the first team. Because of our military background we were trained and drilled to be ready at all times. Bags were packed way in advance. With military precision our equipment was displayed on the ground of the square, the heart of our brigade in the Caribbean. Check, check, double check! We had received little news about the actual situation at the airport. The storm ripped off most parts of the new roof, it was chaos, people were walking on the runway, protective fences were gone. This is what we anticipated.

The airport was the most important hub for organizing the logistics for relieve and also for the evacuation of tourists, other foreigners, and locals. Taking control of this main hub was our first objective. In order to get there, the Caribbean coastguard offered an opportunity. They had a timeslot open to fly us into the crisis situation. With less than two hours to be at the airport I had to make the call. Are we going or do we wait for another opportunity? I gathered the men on the square and asked them the question. Are you prepared to leave within the next 30 minutes? Wholeheartedly the unit confirmed with a "yes". I saw smiles appearing, faces that showed increased concentration and elevated heartrate displays. Now it was serious! Within a few minutes the first group was on their way to Hato international airport. Because of the crisis situation we brought our Glock 19 and some HK MP5. Based on the latest information the airport was in full crisis mode and it wasn't unlikely that we had to use force in order to establish control over this important area.

Less than two hours after the notice to move we were on board of the propelled airplane. The noise was loud, the seats uncomfortable but we were all smiling, I felt a form of excitement and anticipation. In the late afternoon we started our descent. From a distance you could see the once famous Maho Beach located at the beginning of the landing strip. This is the spot where people hold on to the fence of the airport and show their courage in their fight with the wind speed that is created by the powerful engine of a departing KLM Boeing 747.

The beach was gone. Nothing but a few rocks on the side were the remaining evidence of this hotspot. There was no air control, nor any airline staff on duty, no guidance for the pilot. The skilled pilot navigated on experience and managed to get us safely on the ground. He taxied to one of the terminals. When we stepped outside of the plane, we couldn't believe our eyes. It was as if we walked on the soil of different planet. We saw airplanes flipped over; boats perfectly placed near the landing strip. Parts of the roof of the airport were scattered all around. The island that is marked by its fresh green surrounding turned completely brown. All the trees seemed dead as if a large fire burned it all down.

Our expectation of the full frenzy chaos was now complemented with a visual picture of reality. Apparently, a Dutch army unit was also present at the airport and had established a form of control. The idea and mindset that we had to immediately go to action was scaled down and replaced by a more strategic approach and mindset. I met with the leading army officer to receive a briefing and get a heads up on the current situation, intelligence, and action plan. The SITRAP (situation rapport) was clear. There was a sense of control over the airport, yet it was difficult to manage the growing population of people that wanted to leave the Island. They needed water, food and shelter. We realized quickly that another vital element they needed was information. It was crucial to manage information and share this with people that were lining up and even camping outside the main gate. Managing information however was tricky because you don't want to give anyone false hope. We received news from the Netherlands about airplanes that were charted to get people out. Now the task was to follow the guidelines for who was allowed to board the airplane. We shared information about the people that were desperately waiting outside of the gate. People in a specific age group and people with medical conditions had priority. Especially acute medical conditions were to be evacuated fast. The hospital on the Island was not functioning properly and medication was a critical element. People with a specific type of diabetes, heart problems and other conditions were on the top of the list. This meant, however that others couldn't go, and it was heartbreaking to see this. Yes, of course it's part of the job, but it's a good thing not to get accustomed to it.

Pic. 2. Evacuation of citizens. Saint Martin, 2017. © Voa news / AP news.

4. Different working styles

During the first few days of the mission, a group of former Special Forces was in charge of evacuating American nationals that were stuck on the Island. They did this with robustness, professionalism, and a clear focus, to get the job done as effective as possible. I like this attitude, it is efficient, fast, and noncompromising. During the short meeting with their team leader, it became clear that they were already at the final stage of their operation, while we were just getting started. The heavily trained men, recognizable by their dark sunglasses and special vests (opsvest), were completely covered with communication devices. They were moving like a smooth oiled machine. Directly after the end of the storm they started the evacuation of American citizens. So, way before any other country started to offer relieve, they were already out. The news of American property owners that had the intention to leave the island forever was supported by stories of people that just threw their car keys into the crowds, or let their cars open with the keys in the ignition.

5. Maintain law and order

As Dutch military police we have strong experience in both the area of military and law enforcement. We are policemen with a military foundation.

Many of us have had the experience of working in military missions like Operation Enduring Freedom, Resolute Support in Afghanistan, or NATO training missions in Iraq. This mindset of working amidst destabilizing crisis situation enhanced with the day-to-day experience of regular police work creates a perfect profile for these types of missions. We work with civilians yet can scale up to full operational military operators. This full range of both mindset and skillset makes us a valuable asset during our public performance in a civilian environment. This attitude combined with extensive knowledge of the law was crucial during the crisis on Saint Martin. Restoring law and order in a destabilizing environment is crucial for rebuilding the Island and establishing and reinforcing good governance. Stability policing helps to make a difference especially in situations like this, in a contained public arena with dysfunctional law enforcement.

According to Harvard Professor Amy Cuddy, the endocrine profile of high testosterone and low cortisol creates the best leadership profile of one that can make decisions in stressful environments without losing their head. This profile is often seen within military and law enforcement surroundings. Man and woman that love to act, do something yet know what their body does when the stress increases. The men and women from the Marechaussee that were living on Saint Martin had strong relations with the local police force KPSM. For years they had been working alongside local police to equip, train, support and assist in areas such as money laundry, safety and security at the airport and counter trafficking. Many major operations were co-created to rescue woman that were victim of human trafficking. Now, in the aftermath of the hurricane, the local police force was struggling. Many public servants lost their house and their belongings. They had to guard their territory to prevent robbery. They needed water, food, fuel, and protection from the rain. Even though the team of Marechaussee, which lived on Saint Martin, had endured similar conditions, they chose to reorganize and setup up a plan to enforce public safety and maintain law and order.

There was a curfew that had to be enforced. In order to maintain law and order the curfew helped to decrease looting, robberies and other criminal activities that took place. It was one crazy and wild arena where everyone just did like they pleased, thereby creating a very unsafe environment. Many people were robbed, right after the hurricane moved on. Gang violence led to the killing of several people. With the aim of reducing the chaos and the sudden shift in safety the curfew set some specific guidelines.

Everyone that was out without proper cause either got fined or ended up in an improvised jail.

6. And then they closed the borders, on the Island

A few days after the hurricane, everyone started rebuilding. The people were just making the best of it. A Dutch woman opened her restaurant, or what was left of it, and started to cook and feed those that were starving. Because of here strong entrepreneurial mindset she could organize help and relieve for many people. It was inspiring to see this movement of empathy, courage, support, and love. And then the day came that nobody expected would ever come. Top government officials decided to close the border with the French side of the Island. This happened on an Island with a rough estimate of 36,000 inhabitants. This decision was made to further improve safety, security and give law enforcement the chance to establish control.

Pic. 3. Men and woman that are stuck at the border on the Island. Saint Martin, 2017. © Ministry of Defense.

This had an unintended effect on people that went out early in the morning to find water, food, maybe patrol or basically anything they could do to improve their chance of survival. They left the house in the morning in search for anything they could lay their hands on. Then, somewhere in the afternoon, when they wanted to return to their homes, children, and family, they found the Friendly Island suddenly had physical borders that were created with the use of freight containers. The road was blocked! No one could get back or cross these borders that were nonexistent hours before.

In order to enforce the borders, the army was commanded to physically protect this piece of land. Many, many cars were blocked on the French side. The sound of honking cars reflected the increased frustration of the drivers. A group of 6/7 air assault red barrettes (Special Forces) held their ground in the damp heat. With full packs, heavy bulletproof vests, a radio on their back recognizable by a long antenna, they were securing the perimeter. After a few hours the atmosphere started to deteriorate. More and more people went from annoyed to frustrated, from frustrated too angry and from angry to furious. The tension on both sides created a serious hostile atmosphere.

Our poor communication devices picked up on the increasing deteriorating situation the hostility. Together with an experienced colleague we went out to the border to see what was needed. Driving over the bridge that connected both countries we saw the big freight containers blocking the roads. We parked our car, checked inn on with our communication device and walked to the newly created physical border. I remembered on of the lessons I learned during our military training; "never enter into the incident", if you want to lead, always keep some distance from the incident itself, don't get sucked into the incident but observe and use your mind to know what needs to be done, only by acting like I am able to lead in a high stress and high conflict environment and make the right/needed decisions based on the presented and observed facts.

First contact, what is the situation rapport (SITREP)? A young corporal gave me a brief and punctual summary of the events of that day leading up to the current situation. New information came in. Madame préfète, the mayor from the French side, was on her way to inspect the physical border. This poured more oil on the fire. Rumors were that she wanted to cross through 'our lines'. This was perceived by our military colleagues as a pure sign of hostility and disrespect. Everyone was tired and it was increasingly challenging to think straight. And then I heard some of the army group leaders say: "if people try to cross the border, we will start giving warning shots". WOW! Now I know it was serious!

As Military Police, we are always focused on the wellbeing of our citizens. I understood the difference in training, in mindset, in attitude in behavior, in interaction. These brave men are trained for a different kind of environment. Yes, they are equipped to execute operations in a civil military environment (and they are trained well). Yet this situation needed a more subtle, more diplomatic, more deescalating attitude. Our

mindset and professional behavior is strongly conditioned in such a way that we always try to find a way to deescalate (if necessary with the use of proportional force). Yet we always find a way to deflate the situation. It was decision time. Together with another officer we made a call to take responsibility in this situation. I climbed on top of railing beside the road while looking at the group of men:

"LISTEN UP! My name is Lieutenant Menno Bakker. From now on I will be responsible for this situation. First thing. WE WILL NOT FIRE WARNING SHOTS! ROGER THAT? I WILL REPEAT, NO WARNING SHOTS! These people are civilians, we will find another way."

While talking to the men, I noticed the sound of several nearing cars. I looked to my left and saw a group of French soldiers getting out of their vehicles. They created a cordon around a tall woman that moved elegantly into our direction.

"Guys! The person you see coming our way is the mayor of the French part. Address this person with respect. The actions of the mayor might be provocative, but don't be provoked. Let her go her way! I will go up to her to negotiate."

Together with one of my close colleagues we ran up to the préfète. When we were at around 100 meters we slowed our pass, we regulated our breathing, whipped the sweat of our face, and gently walked up to the nearing group of military personnel that acted as a human shield to protect the French government official that was heading our way.

At a distance of 15 meters, I introduced myself in English and clarified the need and reason for a short meeting. She responded in French. So, we continued in French. The intensity in her tone calmed and a subtle smile appeared on the left side of her mouth. The protection detail allowed me to enter the cordon. She expressed her absolute outrage over the inhumane situation and made clear that she was on her way to cross our line. While listening I heard her tone soften a bit. "I understand and agree with you". I responded with a request to first instruct my men on the other side. She replied positive.

Together with my colleague we ran back to our side and informed the team. I said *"Guys, heads-up. The préfète is coming, she will cross our lines. She is heavily protected. DO NOT BE PROVOKED, NOT BY ANYONE, stay cool, respectful!"*

A few minutes later she arrived, inspected our side, she walked through our lines and showed the many civilians that were present that she dared to do this. It felt like a spectacle.

With the right mindset, a clear focus to deescalate, no unnecessary casualties were made that day. Within my military career this day on the

Island of Saint Martin gave me one of the greater and humbling lessons I received during my military missions.

7. Leadership and influence

Making the call includes taking the responsibility. In order to be fully responsible, we must understand all sides of the story. Be swift to act without judgement. Being professionals means we can't act based on our feelings. We are trained to fight; we know how to use force but can't treat random civilians that struggle for survival as a threat. This preconditioned mindset will not have the right effect. Therefore, I find strong value in the mindset that is broadly defined as stability policing. Even though within the military, we are trained and equipped for different types of missions including missions like these. The essential conditioning is different, incomparable, and fully complementary. The army has its own conditioning, just like the military police. Both have complementary attitudes and provide crucial components of any military deployment in crisis areas where law and order and good governance must be enforced. We, stability policing and army, speak the same language; we went through the same military training, but we complement this with our conditioning altered later on during the execution of our day-to-day job. This makes us fully adapted to a civil environment where law enforcement support is needed.

8. Conclusions

As military police in crisis situations we are differently trained than regular police. Our military training builds the foundation to endure hardship and act amidst high stress situations for a longer period of time. Our ability to rapidly deploy makes us interoperable and complementary within quick response teams. We are trained to resist the urge of the brain to go into hyper focus. With simple breathing techniques, combat drills and awareness training we help to increase the flow of oxygen and decrease the release of cortisol. This gentle equilibrium was created while going through our basic training and instilled strong leadership skills. During the crisis at Saint Martin, where there was a clear gap between an active and efficient operating police force and the military deployment of the Dutch army and Special Forces. As Royal Marechaussee we find our unique skillset in which we feel comfortable acting and cooperating with both law enforcement and with the military. We communicate in both languages, supplemented with the right mindset. This attitude make us

an indispensable link in the chain to establish stability and bring back the peace to the beautiful and Friendly Island of Saint Martin. After all is said and done, we are public servants ready to serve the general public in any situation and any place on this beautiful planet!

BIO:

Captain Menno Bakker serves as an Officer within the Dutch Royal Marechaussee. Over the course of his service, he assumed the role of detachment commander during Afghanistan's Operation Enduring Freedom and Resolute Support. Notably, he also undertook the responsibility of deputy head of operations in the Caribbean, contributing to Haiti and taking part in the leadership efforts following the impact of Hurricane Irma on Saint Martin. These experiences have deeply enriched his understanding of human behavior within crisis contexts.

At present, Captain Bakker holds the position of diplomatic attaché at the embassies of Spain and Malta, focusing his efforts on countering terrorism and human trafficking. His academic background has built over the years. He has a bachelor's degree in communication science, master's degree Public Administration, and an executive master in Business Administration.

Lieutenant Colonel Christophe Nied
Commandement de la Gendarmerie d'Outre-Mer / Commandement de la Gendarmerie des Opérations Extérieures / Groupement des Opérations Extérieures, National Gendarmerie, France[1]

15. A Personal Experience within a European Union Non-Military Mission in Mali/Sahel

1. Introduction

For more than 10 years now, Mali and the Sahel area, some of the poorest countries in the word, are affected by multi-sectoral crises (terrorism, civil war, political crisis, security crisis, economic crises, religious crisis, lack of state administration, decline of the rule of law, corruption, etc…), which consequences are displaced populations, growing organized crime, no trust in state and political organisations… Those rogue states are a direct threat to the security of neighbouring states and to Europe (especially through illegal immigration, organized crime, political destabilisation, terrorism…). For about the same period, many military operations, led by national armies, regional coalitions and international organisations tried to fight terrorism and organized crime, with some results, but the threats are still growing and affect new areas. At the same time, the security gap and the rule of law are declining, but they are, together with development policies, the key to support re-establishing a safe and secure environment.

1 The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of their agency or represent their agency in any way.

2. Global Context

1 The decline of Mali:

Pic. 4. Map of Mali (main cities and neighbouring States)

Mali, a former French colony, independent since 1960, is a landlocked country in the Sahel area, belonging to the poorest countries in the world. Since 2012 and the outbreak of separatist and jihadist insurrections in its Northern part, this country has been plunged into deep security and political crises. Following the takeover by jihadist groups of the locality of Konna, strategic lock in their march on the capital Bamako, the state of emergency was declared throughout the country on January 11th, 2013. On request of the interim President of Mali, Chad helped Mali with large numbers of troops. The following French military interventions allowed to push back the jihadists. However, those groups have reorganized themselves to adapt to asymmetrical warfare, by carrying out surprise attacks and bombings, by exploiting local resentments and intra-community conflicts, by intimidating local populations and expelling representatives of the Malian state (closure of schools and health centres, departure of magistrates and civil administrators etc.). Despite all international support, especially military, and some results, instability, corruption, economic crisis, and all other form of crises are still existing and growing. Two coups d'état in August 2020 and May 2021 have reinforced the tragicity of the situation and led to the withdrawal of a number of international actors, leaving the Malian population to face a

dilemma that today seems impossible to resolve.

2 The whole word helping Mali:

Facing a dramatic situation for the country's population and the risk of seeing this country and the sub-region of the Sahel ungovernable, the international community mobilized to support the Malian government's efforts. It can even be said that, and that is specific for the Sahel area, because of the threats to their own security or interests, all countries of the world, all international organizations and all non-governmental organizations are acting there with their various programs in the areas of defence, security, governance, economic development and even more.

3 Multilateral missions and operations:

After the success of Operation Serval, France announced on July 14th, 2014 that this operation "will be carried out in partnership with the five countries of the Sahel area"[2] (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad). On July 16th, France and Mali signed a defence agreement that "identifies the main areas of defence cooperation: exchange of information and regular consultations on security issues, training, advice and equipment"[3]. Operation Barkhane is France's largest current foreign military operation, which mobilized up to 5,500 soldiers in 2020 in operations conducted mainly in the northern regions of Mali and the Liptako-Gourma area (the three border areas between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso). During several intense operations, many jihadi fighters and some of their emblematic leaders have been neutralized. 53 French soldiers have been killed in action.

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out several security-related tasks. The Council further decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization, and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights, with a reinforced presence in the northern regions and around Mopti in the centre. Particularly targeted by the

2 Jean-Yves Le Drian, French Minister for Defence, July 14th, 2014, TV interview France24,

3 New French-Malian military cooperation agreement, Reuters.

jihadists and criminal groups, this United Nations mission recorded the highest number of killed among its members, (more than 160).

The European Union, through its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), is active in the Sahel area, in addition to its delegations in each of the five countries concerned, with two missions deployed in Mali (a third mission is deployed in Niger):

European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali) is a military training mission which has started in February 2013. With approximately 550 members, the aim of EUTM is "to provide in the southern regions of Mali, military and training advice to the Malian armed forces operating under the control of legitimate civilian authorities, to help restoring their military capabilities and to enable them to conduct military operations aimed at restoring the territorial integrity of Mali and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups"[4].
European Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP SAHEL Mali) is a non-military capacity-building mission which has started in January 2015, with about 150 staff from 16 EU members states, 3 third countries and from Mali. About 60 senior experts (gendarmes, police officers, magistrates, civil administrators) are advising and training governmental authorities, commanding officers, and specialists of the three Malian internal security forces (National Police, National Gendarmerie, National Guard) in the fields of human resources management, logistics, fight against terrorism and organized crime, crisis response, border management. EUCAP SAHEL Mali is also able to find solutions for all needs expressed by the security forces, through advisory actions (long-term actions), training (rapid effects) and project management (12 million Euros invested annually in infrastructure, material supply, sustainability of actions, etc.).

G5 Sahel is an institutional framework for the coordination and monitoring of regional cooperation in matters of security and development policies built up in February 2014 by the 5 following Sahel states: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. In November 2015, the 5 heads of state announced the creation of a joint military counter-terrorism force. A coordinated international financial effort allowed the joint cross-border military force (FCG5S), composed of 7 battalions (Mali and Niger providing both two battalions regarding the areas of operation of the force) to

4 https://eutmmali.eu

slowly establishing itself in order to carry out military operations fighting terrorism and organized crime on the common borders.

4 Bilateral support and NGOs:

It is totally impossible to list all existing bilateral support mechanisms to Mali, as there are so many of them and they do vary: supply of equipment, financial support, infrastructures building, military, police, judicial, administrative, economic, educational training, and advice etc. Additionally, a lot of supporting states are not always very communicative or transparent on their actions. The same constatation applies to the actions of hundreds and hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the country which are, like intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) victims of criminal and terrorist abuses committed throughout Mali. But those two kinds of supports are essential for Mali!

5 National operations and programs:

Mali has set up, with advice and coordination of several international organizations among those cited above and with bilateral financial support, civil and military plans, and operations to try to regain state authority on the vastness of the country and to provide the needed support to the affected populations. Those national plans, consisting in military operations and supporting state administration return, are almost unknown to international opinion and are not often mentioned in medias except at their lightest lapse, but do benefit largely from international support.

3. The Limits of Military Operations: Distinctive Features of the Crises in Mali/Sahel

Talking about Mali by mentioning only the security crisis/ terrorism is terribly reductive and does not allow to measure the extent of all issues on the one side, and to understand the priority that must be given to stability policing allowing deeper results than just military operations, on the other side. Regarding our topic, I would like to focus on two closely linked crises that gathers the world's attention and causes intervention: terrorism and organized crime. Both crises are linked because it is obvious that the members of terrorist groups and organized crime organizations are mainly the same; organized crime financing terrorism and terrorism advantaging organized crime. Terrorism and organized crime are not acts of war that must be defeated by military action. Yet, they are criminal offences that

require legal prosecution. A terrorist or a member of a criminal organization is not a soldier, but a criminal who must be treated as such, which means he or she must be identified, arrested, being subject to investigation and tried. They must account for their actions before a court. It is also often forgotten that a terrorist or a member of organized crime does not act alone or on his or her own, but is part of a group, a sprawling organization, whose sphere of influence and ramifications go far beyond a country or a region, like Mali or the Sahel. An only local action may just reach local results on a short time scale but is totally insufficient to dismantle international organizations and eradicate the threats. The modes of action of terrorists or criminal groups are not limited to attacks or bombings. These groups aim to control large territorial areas and part of populations, they want to impose their ideology and their "values", they will control local economy to satisfy their own logistical needs. Therefore, they have a well-planned strategy, aimed at cutting off populations from all state support, including basic social services (health, education, communications) and state role (security, justice, administrations). Finally, they would do everything to discredit the national and international military actors present in their area of influence by blaming them or pushing them towards the commission of wrongdoing, commonly called "abuses". What makes fighting these terrorists and criminals even more difficult is that most of them, in Mali but also in other countries subject to that type of crises and asymmetrical warfare, are members of local communities, immersed in their natural environment, being a shepherd or a farmer by day but a thief, a robber and/or a killer by night.

To fight these groups and "pacify" large territorial areas, the military tool is essential. In a country as large as Mali (2.5 times larger than France) and in which security is the responsibility of about only 25,000 police officers, gendarmes and national guards (10 times less than in France), virtually absent in the northern and in vast areas of the central regions (and this also applies to civil administration and justice), only the military (national, regional coalitions, international organizations) is able to fill a security gap and face an organized adversary, well equipped, very mobile and often invisible. This is not shocking, as in our western democracies we also employ the military to face the daily terrorist risk… Despite the daily setbacks, Malian soldiers also reach some results in their fight against terrorist and criminal groups. The Barkhane Force neutralized more than one internationally or regionally known terrorist/criminal leader and inflicted severe human and material resource losses to these groups. Many members of those groups were captured during military operations and brought to justice. However, the security situation in the central regions is continuously

deteriorating throughout the past few years and is now beginning to affect Mali's Southern regions. One reason is that a sole military operation is not enough in an asymmetrical warfare, which requires another approach to reach sustainable results. I want to be clear, as I do feel respect for the fabulous work done by the soldiers of our armies and of local armies, and I bow to the memory of those who have been killed in action. But a military action must be accompanied by stability policing and its tools.

4. Stability Policing in Addition to Military Operations

The aim now is not to praise the EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission, but to advocate for this type of mission in addition to military operations led by national and international forces. During my 4 years' work in Mali, a lot of exchanges found place with the G5 Sahel Joint Force Command, the Barkhane Force Command, the Malian Armed Forces Headquarters, and the Malian ministries in charge of security with the wish to work closely together in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, to develop the obtained results and to enable reorganizations of the led operations. I will therefore highlight some major actions undertaken during my four years presence in Mali that are beneficial tools in filling the security gap and establishing the rule of law and a safe and secure environment, in addition to military operations. I must stress on the fact that the completed work only applies to the period of my presence in Mali, from October 2017 to October 2021. That period includes the two coups d'état of August 2020 and May 2021, before the "Transition" changed its nature in terms of international support and its consequences.

1 Advising all national authorities in charge of security policies

Pic. 4. Visit to Konna with the Malian Regional Armed Forces Commander, the Malian Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, the Governor of Mopti and the Head of the EU Delegation in Mali (2019) ® Eucap Sahel Mali

What has been noticed during my time in Mali is, on one hand, the multitude of actors et donors present in the fields of defence and security (already

mentioned above), but on the other hand the lack of coordination of their actions (even if this particular point was at the heart of my concerns and my pleas, I will not write anything in details on that crucial point), the rotation of international organization members dedicated to advice in some ministries or forces (4 or 6 month terms only, 1 year for senior officialsand last but not least, the gap between some Malian national authorities and these actors and the Malian key players forgotten by some international organizations. Being a non-military actor, EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission holds a special position and role in all related points above. Acting in the field of security, concrete security sector reform actions and support to national and regional stability policing are possible because EUCAP SAHEL Mali international and national senior experts and advisors are working in all Malian ministries, forces and specialized agencies concerned by security policies and issues: prime ministerial level (national policies coordination), ministry of defence (armed forces, to which the national gendarmerie and the national guard belong, military operations, military justice, force inspections, etc**,** ministry of security (first in charge for implementation of security policies, national police, responsible for the national gendarmerie and the national guard in their security missions, elaboration and implementation of the PSIRC), ministry of justice (responsible, through the prosecutors and judges, for criminal justice investigations led by the national police and the national gendarmerie, as the Malian justice system and its criminal procedure are inspired by the Latin justice system), ministry for territorial administration (responsible, through the regional governors and prefects, for the implementation by the three security forces of their daily prevention missions and controls) and, as far as needed, other ministries concerned by security policies (ministry of finance, of national education, and for religions).

Confidence and long-term working with Malian authorities is a key for sustainable stability policing. EUCAP SAHEL Mali members have a 12-month mandate, which can be extended for several new 12-month periods, if requested by the member, wished by the mission's hierarchy, and allowed by its national regulations and administrations. This long-term presence reinforces the links with local authorities and a perfect knowledge of all issues and possibilities. This long-term presence allowed EUCAP experts after the coup d'état in August 2020 to brief the new inexperienced staff (ministers and their advisors) appointed by the military on ongoing Malian policies and operations. These explanations were their survival for some Malian policies!

2 Judicializing military operations and fighting against the soldier's impunity

As already mentioned above, the special feature of the fight against terrorism and organized crime is that it cannot be limited to only military operations, which can only be the beginning of a broader operation called criminal investigation. Judicializing a military operation means not to investigate on what the military has done, but to investigate from the results of their operations to allow either new military operations, or to dismantle criminal organizations. During their operations, soldiers may capture individuals suspected of belonging to terrorist or criminal groups and seize material (weapons, telephones, money, illicit products, etc.) but are then unable to do more. The Barkhane Force, just like the French armies in operations, includes in their means gendarmes, who are soldiers and criminal investigators, called "provosts". They can start the first acts of investigation directly on the battlefield on these captured persons and seized material. They have all logistical assets to bring those persons and means to the national court in charge of terrorist or criminal investigations (in Mali the Pole Judiciaire Spécialisé "Specialized Criminal Pole" and its Brigade d'Investigations Spécialisée "Specialized Investigation Brigade", all assets concentrated in Bamako).

Pic. 4. Organization of a G5 workshop to prioritize the needs of equipment requests of the Police Component of the FCGSS (2019) - © Eucap Sahel Mali.

Whether for the G5 Sahel Joint Force, starting with the first regional workshop on the design of its future component unfairly called "police component" (in fact its judicial component), in December 2017 in Bamako, then in Niamey in April and December 2018, or for the Malian national military operations, I

oversaw organizing or animating several of these workshops to explain the mechanism of judicialization of the battlefield. While many international organizations have supported the development efforts of special anti-terrorist investigation units, they almost all have forgotten the essential role played by provost marshals in operations, if they are dedicated to fighting terrorism in areas where police forces and justice actors are missing. First very sceptical, the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters of the Malian armed forces, as well as other international actors supporting the Joint Force and its Police Component, finally agreed our explanations and propositions to create, train and equip provosts. We achieved to dedicate in the international founding of the G5 Sahel Joint Force a special budget for the provost units. It was also necessary to convince the Malian gendarmerie itself (but some senior officers had understood that approach and tasked our Mission to prepare gendarmes for this special duties) and sensitize army executives to this need.

In cooperation with the Barkhane Force, we also trained Malian provosts in Gao, who then participated in joint operations between Barkhane and the Malian Armed Forces.

In the same way, to stabilize and to recreate a climate of trust between Malian populations and armed forces in their areas of operations, often source of incidents (abuses or allegations of abuses, theft, violence, etc.) and a situation exploited by terrorist groups, a major effort had been dedicated to explaining the role of provosts on the battlefield, the place of the military justice and the force inspections as a guaranty to fight impunity of the military. In Mali, the military enjoys a special aura and soldier are citizens of exceptions, tried by exceptional jurisdiction which is the military justice.

Little known, destitute, and neglected, force inspections and military justice have been supported by EUCAP SAHEL Mali and some bilateral states, notably Germany, to allow members of the Malian armed forces who commit serious offences to be tried and convicted if proven guilty. A major lock is that the signature of the Minister of Defence is required to authorize the prosecution of a soldier. A great effort of explanation was made, and from 2019, all the requests were signed by the diverse defence ministers and first appearances in front of a military court were effective at the end of 2020 and went on after the coup d'état of August 2020, a notably sign of the importance attached to the credibility of military action when it is controlled.

3 Supporting State return

While efforts to repel terrorist groups and regain control of the lost territories have been all military from 2013 for the international community and from 2015 for the Malian side, the Malian government, with support from EUCAP SAHEL Mali, has developed and signed at the end of 2017 the Plan de Sécurisation Intégré des Régions du Centre (PSIRC), an inter-ministerial plan for Central Regions (Mopti and Segou) to strengthen security in order to put in place governance and economic development. This is the first plan integrating stability policing aimed at enabling state administrations' return and satisfying basic social needs of populations harassed and exploited by terrorist and criminal groups. A special communication had been organized to gain support of the international community.

For obvious coordination reasons and to enable implementation of all the plan components other than security, this plan, initially put under the responsibility of the Ministry of Security, has been coordinated since 2019 on prime ministerial level through a dedicated office called Secrétariat Permanent du Cadre Politique de la Gestion de la Crise dans les Régions du Centre ("Permanent Secretariat of the Policy Framework for Crisis Management in Centre Regions"), for which I was appointed to be the EUCAP SAHEL Mali advisor to its head. This new coordination level has allowed to federate all the ministries concerned, to reinforce the technical and financial partners awareness about this stability policing in addition to military operations and to capitalize on the results obtained. In the same way, we managed to concentrate the efforts of international partners and some NGOs to support Malian efforts on key cities.

The most visible example of a coordinated effort are the actions conducted in the city of Konna, whose strategic position has already been mentioned above. In Konna, in 2019, the World Bank launched the financing of the rebuilding of the fishing port, totally destroyed by the terrorist groups in 2013 (economic development aspect), EUCAP SAHEL Mali concepted a new type of reinforces camp to host a robust National Guard company in charge of security missions, the European Union financing its building and the unit's equipment, EUCAP SAHEL Mali leading the pre-deployment training of the unit (security aspect), EU and EUCAP built equipment for the supply of water to populations and herds (health and economic development aspects), and the Malian army strengthened its presence (defence aspect).

Since then, Konna has never been again subject to an attack and various NGOs were able to resume their activities.

The building of other reinforced camps, financed by the EU, had been going on in other cities of the Centre Regions and most of the units dedicated to security missions in the framework of the PSIRC implementation had been trained first by EUCAP SAHEL Mali and is now led by Malian instructors under supervision of EUCAP SAHEL Mali trainers, a perfect example of transfer of skills and sustainability in terms of training. Aware of the need to capitalize on their results, EUCAP was asked by the Barkhane Force Commander in 2019 to solicit the Malian authorities in matters of security, justice and civil administration to organize state return in an important city in the north of the country, Barkhane wishing to withdraw from this area in order to reorient its military operations, without seeing all the military efforts of the force reduced to zero: nature abhors emptiness, so terrorist groups pushed out of the city would have returned there as soon as the French military has gone. Unfortunately, Barkhane had to stay… Some explanations will be given further.

As already mentioned, EUCAP SAHEL Mali had its place as an advisor to the Malian Ministry of Justice and especially in Mopti, we supported the magistrate action in Mopti. In the same way, it had been decided to act towards the civil administration. In 2021, I had to prepare for the arrival of a new senior advisor within our Mission, specialized in supporting civil administrations. However, contact with administrative authorities have always been a priority for us and any regional travel always starts with a meeting with the local governor. The Malian Ministry for Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) warmly welcomed this support, as it was planning a new training for civil administrators. In fact, in military operation areas, those posts were given to officers (and non-commissioned officer [NCOs]!) from the Malian Army, who became the supervisory authorities of the internal security in charge of the daily security work. Due to the local insecurity and the difficulties encountered to send in those areas civil personal, such a decision can be easily understood, but those officers and NCOs must be trained in the subtleties of administrative law and the limits of police action compared to military operations. Otherwise, the concerned populations would lose their confidence in them…

5. Conclusions

After four years spent in Mali as part of a European civil mission oriented to reform the Security Sector, in close collaboration with justice, civil administration and defence, and in the best possible synergy with other international actors, whether multilateral or bilateral, and with a number of NGOs, in the context of an asymmetrical warfare, fighting against terrorism and organized crime (I repeat: two criminal offences which must be dealt with in a context of the rule of law, while not of international humanitarian law applicable in the time of armed conflict), I am more convinced than ever of the urgent need to implement stability policing in addition to military operations, however indispensable they are. This is this only way to capitalize on the results of military operations, to guarantee the stabilization of a State in all its sovereign functions, to give the populations, who are suffering directly from all the damage caused by their adversaries, peace, access to basic social services, economic development and therefore a future in their own country. Despite all difficulties encountered!

BIO:

Currently being a Lieutenant Colonel, Christophe Nied has spent 33 years as a gendarmerie officer in several units in France (anti-riot squadron, Republican Guard, territorial company), within the General Directorate of the National Gendarmerie (international cooperation, Cabinet of the General Director) and in regional headquarters (as an intelligence officer or deputy head of operations). He is also an experienced officer in operations overseas and has served twice 6 months in former Yugoslavia (1995 within UNPROFOR as a military police platoon commander and 1996 within NATO as gendarmerie adviser for the commander of the South-Est Division, 1998 within the Maw Enforcement Support Team of the CIMIC Battalion) and for 4 years in Mali (2017-2021, as Deputy Head of Security Sector Reform Component and Senior Inter-Ministerial Advisor within EUCAP SAHEL Mali Mission).

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16. Experiences during the Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations at the End of the NATO Resolute Support Mission in the Context of Stability Policing

1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present my experiences garnered during the service in the non-combatant evacuation operations at the Kabul Hamid Karzai International Airport, under the aegis of the NATO Resolute Support Mission in which I served between April and August 2021, and to evaluate this process in the context of Stability Policing.

My assignment to the NATO Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan has been reported to me approximately three months before my deployment. This news was quite exciting as it marked my first overseas mission experience, and I was delighted at the prospect of being involved in a mission that had been successfully carried out for two decades under the NATO umbrella. However, this period, coinciding with the first quarter of 2021, was also a time when the Covid-19 pandemic was at its peak, and global restrictions were at their tightest level.

1 The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of their country or agency.

2. Before the deployment

Before deployment, all personnel involved in the mission underwent a mandatory 14-day quarantine period to take prudent countermeasures in terms of pandemic. At the same time, NATO was undergoing a planned and organized force reduction process of Allied forces from Afghanistan, in accordance with relevant agreements[2]. Regrettably, a week prior to our scheduled deployment, we were informed of the "ambiguous status" of our deployment, which brought about a tremendous sense of disillusionment. However, after a few stressful days of waiting, the final decision was made, and we arrived in Afghanistan via a military cargo plane departing from Etimesgut/Ankara on April 23, 2021, which coincides with the 101st anniversary of the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye.

3. During the mission

After enduring the typical cacophonous and uncomfortable flight that is characteristic of military cargo planes, we finally touched down at the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA following a roughly five-hour journey. NATO had a separate apron at the HKIA, where military aircrafts land and enter the base from there. Upon disembarking from the aircraft, I, like any other individual exploring a new destination for the first time, took in my surroundings with a sweeping 360-degree gaze. My attention was immediately drawn to the colossal surveillance balloon hovering above the city. At first glance, it was possible to understand that the area was quite mountainous and barren. Trees, which were rare in the mountains, could even be counted from long distances. After getting off the plane and taking our luggage, we completed our first registration procedures by entering the base with the assistance of the personnel stationed there.

My first post in the NATO Resolute Support Mission was as an Education Program Advisor on the Afghan National Police (ANP) under the Train, Advise, Assist, Command – Capital (TAAC-C). At that time, the Afghan National Police unit was gradually being integrated into the Afghan National Army (ANA) as part of the efforts to increase the army's presence in the continuing conflicts with the Taliban. Organizational

2 The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, commonly known as "The Doha Agreement" was a peace agreement signed by the United States and the Taliban on 29 February 2020 in Doha, Qatar.

changes in Afghan units led to changes in our team as well, and some of the Police Advisor Team members were transferred to Afghan National Army Advisor Teams. It affected my position as well, in this context, I was assigned to the 111th Capital Division (CAPDIV) Advisory Team just after two weeks I started to work.

Throughout my tenure in Afghanistan, I bore witness to a particularly impactful period marked by the pervasive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a profound impact on our duties. This challenging period rendered the execution of advisory duties almost unfeasible. To protect the health of the NATO personnel, our assignments were confined within the base, and external access to the base was also restricted. As a result, advisory activities to the Afghan counterparts were being conducted through remote means. However, it could be argued that these were not being properly executed. Since there were no on-site activities, it is appropriate to point out that much information could not be transmitted in a timely and complete manner, especially considering working through interpreters.

Operational and strategic level commanders in the ANA could often be changed for political reasons. The replacement of the CAPDIV Commander was brought to our attention with a delay of two days after its occurrence. When we asked the reason for the delay in the flow of information, we found out that "the official document stating that the commander had taken over the duty had not yet been written". The concomitant effects of regional instability had permeated all facets of governance, inducing pervasive and adverse ramifications.

Starting from May 1st, continual reduction of forces within the scope of the Allies' withdrawal plan was initiated, alongside the complete cessation of duties of countries with a low number of troops in the Resolute Support Mission. Day by day, the number of flags waving in the flag-pool was decreasing progressively. As I remember, initially, the "Quick Reaction Force (QRF)" unit was withdrawn. This unit was responsible for providing the first reaction in the situation of an emergency in terms of security. In the following days, the "International Military Police (IMP)", which provided sort of "rule of law" and "public order" within the base and ensured the implementation and monitoring of the rules written in the SOPs, returned to their country. The responsibility of both units was taken over by Turkish troops.

4. The Taliban's progress and NATO's non-combatant evacuation operations

As we went about our daily obligations, kept our eyes and ears open on concerning the Taliban's gradual progress and other regional occurrences. Throughout this period, I maintained a vigilant watch on the unfolding events in Afghanistan, particularly scrutinizing the Al-Jazeera news website for the latest updates. In parallel with the advancing towards Kabul of Taliban forces, level of the violence across the country was also escalating. There were several bombings in places heavily frequented by the public, such as mosques, schools, and markets, almost every week. One of the most tragic incidents was the explosion that occurred near a school in the western part of Kabul on May 8, 2021, which caused a huge number of fatalities, many of whom were children[3]. During that time, I often asked myself, "What is the fault of the people living here?" and "Why do they have to spend their days thinking about staying alive?". The presence of Afghan National Police checkpoints at the entrance of urban areas was an established practice that aimed to ensure security and prevent the movement of insurgent groups. However, both the Afghan police and government had a reputation for rampant corruption, which was widely accepted by the populace.

As part of the planned withdrawal of NATO forces, the US continued to evacuate its military bases located in Afghanistan. In parallel with the withdrawal of the US and NATO forces, the unsafe environment, instability, and chaos in the country were escalating. At that time, the question on the international community's mind was "What will happen to the security and social life in the country when the NATO presence in the region ends completely?" and the situation looked like a desperate case.

At the HKIA base, as the Allies were in the process of withdrawing, there were reassignments of duty locations among the personnel who remained. A number of personnel were required to assume additional responsibilities. In this context, my role in the Advisory Teams underwent a change, and I was subsequently assigned to the Kabul Airport North Operation Centre (KANOC). At KANOC, we were required to maintain daily operations on a rotating shift basis. With my transition to the KANOC unit, I had an opportunity to be aware of "what was going on" on the field.

3 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/8/blasts-kill-dozens-near-school-in-afghan-capital-kabul

During my time at KANOC, I had the chance to gain a bird's-eye perspective of the city by monitoring the large surveillance balloon that I mentioned before in this article. (It is worth noting that another surveillance balloon was installed later close to the evacuation process.). Despite the gradual progress of the Taliban towards Kabul, life in the city was continuing as normal, albeit with "some" explosions. Markets remained operational, and people began their daily commute during the early hours of the day. Thanks to the advanced camera systems on the surveillance balloon over the city, it was even possible to identify individuals' faces even kilometres away from them.

As time went on, the Taliban made steady advances across kilometres of territory with little resistance from the Afghan army or police. We received reports that many soldiers and police officers manning checkpoints abandoned their posts and either fled or joined the Taliban without fighting against them. It was a well-known truth that the Taliban were a major source of fear for both the local civilian population and even the Afghan security forces.

In the early morning of August 15th, after completing my shift at KANOC, I retired to my room to rest. Later on, I was abruptly awoken by the blaring of the warning alarm inside the barracks. This alarm bell was a daily occurrence, with an increased frequency of exercises in recent days. Typically, an announcement would follow the alarm to indicate that it was an exercise. However, on this occasion, there was no "exercise" announcement, and a "ground attack" warning was sounded instead. Looking out from my room's window, I saw soldiers taking their positions. Upon checking my phone, I discovered from both our communication groups and the news that "Taliban forces had entered Kabul".

I hastily donned my gear and uniform before rushing towards KANOC. As I was making my way there, I witnessed soldiers who took cover all around maintaining a vigilant watch with utmost determination. Meanwhile, gunshots were also heard from a very close distance. As I stepped inside KANOC, the scene that unfolded before me was nothing short of chaos, just as I had anticipated. The Command Group was all there, the surveillance cameras were displayed on the screens, and all eyes were focused especially on the places where the entrance gates were located. Taliban forces could be seen around the base, but they did not have any aggressive attitudes towards the base. They did not either try to breach the base or direct any kind of weapons to the Allies troops.

In subsequent developments, they declared that they would not make any attacks if the Allies withdrew by September 1st. The reason for the alarm was not a "ground attack" but due to the need to react quickly in the face of the initial uncertainty, the warning had to be given. After completing my duties at that moment, I left KANOC to return for the night shift.

The sudden turn of events had disrupted the normal operation of the base. It became apparent to me during dinner that the flow of daily life had already been affected. There was limited food available, and most of the staff of the dining facility (DFAC) were absent. It was later announced that the company would evacuate all personnel within the next two to three days, and meal services would no longer be provided. As the days passed, the DFACs were shut down, and the ration system was implemented. The once luxurious 5-star hotel-standard menus were replaced with canned foods.

As I mentioned before, the populace, even the National Army and the Police, were terrified of the Taliban forces. After the complete withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, the local people who didn't want to confront the Taliban alone, soon understood that their only hope for survival was the HKIA and the evacuation flights departing from there. The number of people attempting to enter the airport was overwhelming, and the runway was completely packed with thousands of individuals who had flooded in through the civilian entrance. From the surveillance balloon, the tarmac of the runway was barely visible beneath the sea of people. It was not only unsafe but also impossible for planes to land and maneuver on the ground. Witnessing people desperately clinging onto the planes' landing gears and falling to their deaths was heart-wrenching. It was difficult to comprehend what kind of fear could drive someone to such madness.

Pic. 1. On the left side, the "Flag-pool" on the first day of my deployment (24.04.2021), on the right side, the same place on the last day of my deployment (27.08.2021), Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan (2021) © Emre Oğur

Pic. 2. HKIA runway was hardly cleared from the "people flood". Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan (2021) © Al Jazeera

The evacuation process initiated amidst a chaotic environment. To ensure the safety and sustainability of ongoing evacuations, it was necessary to clear the runway and pave the way for planes to land and take off. After hours of struggle, the local people were finally removed from the airport and the runways were cleared. Following this, a joint initiative by the Afghan Special Forces and even the Taliban resulted in the establishment of security checkpoints at various locations surrounding the airport and its approach roads, effectively prohibiting unauthorized access to the airport premises.

After establishing checkpoints, it became apparent that accessing the airport entrance was no longer feasible, locals began to gather at the primary entrances to the airport, namely Abbey Gate, North Gate, and East Gate. In a short notice, thousands of people flooded at each of these gates. We heard that there were families who lost their children amidst the chaos at the gates.

Pic. 3. Abbey Gate after Taliban forces entered the city, Kabul, Afghanistan (2021) © Emre Oğur

The Allied forces had significantly bolstered their troops to ensure a safer evacuation process. Nevertheless, the accommodation facilities were inadequate for such a surge in the quantity of personnel, and it was seen that many of the newly arrived troops were forced to sleep outside buildings and on the side of roads due to the extraordinary circumstances. During the initial days of the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the evacuation process gave priority to the contracted personnel working for NATO in

the base. This had an immense impact on various aspects, especially in logistics and technical matters. As an example, when the Close Circuit Television (CCTV) operators left from KANOC, this critical task was left unmanned for a brief period. Afterwards, three Turkish female non-commissioned officers were assigned to operate the cameras in shifts. Although they adapted to their duties on short notice, it was noticeable that the professional technical knowledge required for the task had decreased.

At KANOC, there was a significant increase in the number of daily phone calls we made, particularly from diplomatic missions seeking coordination for evacuation. While many countries had already closed their diplomatic missions and left the region before the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, some missions remained and awaited evacuation. However, the most complex part of the process was the influx of people attempting to seize the opportunity to enter the base with mission representatives and vehicles, which led to a high-security risk. To manage this situation, we had to increase the number of personnel at the gates and even resorted to fire warning shots into the air. In this situation, it became clear that effective public order management skills were crucial. When we compare the mindsets of police and military forces, it is easy to see that police officers are more experienced in dealing with situations that require interaction with the public. This is since being better equipped to navigate complex public interactions because of their regular, sustained engagement with the communities they serve. Through daily contact with the public, they gain an intimate understanding of the community's needs, expectations, and values, allowing them to build trust and establish rapport with ease.

The Allies initially evacuated diplomatic mission personnel and their citizens living in Afghanistan. The main criteria for the evacuation of local people from the area was that these individuals had worked or were working for NATO and Allied countries' interests and could document it officially. That's why it is so common to see people waiting with the hope of entering the gates waving some papers in the air.

On August 25, 2021, I received a phone call from an interpreter whom I had worked with in Advisory Teams. They had documents proving their employment with NATO but were unable to enter due to the large crowds at the gates. They had returned home in despair and expressed fear of staying in Kabul. Although some of the interpreters had already been evacuated, there were still those who had not yet been reached. I couldn't bear the thought of leaving them in such a dire situation.

On a daily basis, we were keeping a close eye on the situation at the gates by means of CCTV cameras. We decided that it would be better to observe the scene with our own eyes on site. Eventually, me and couple of my friends from Advisory Teams went to the Abbey Gate using a pick-up truck to make an assessment whether it was possible to safely and systematically facilitate the entry of our interpreters who had contacted us. There, we witnessed a human tragedy with our own eyes. Right outside the barbed wire fence, there was a water channel about 7-8 meters wide and 2-2.5 meters high. The channel was filled with water up to an adult's knee level. The people who came there hoping to enter the airport had gathered on the other side of the channel, waving their documents. There were small bridges in some parts of the channel to facilitate crossing. These bridges were being controlled by Allied soldiers to ensure controlled entry. After our reconnaissance in the Abbey Gate area was completed, I called back the interpreter who contacted me, and told him to come to the point I would describe with our other interpreters and their families by bringing official documents at 3:30 pm, to stand together, and to shout us by calling our names when they saw us.

Pic. 4. Abbey Gate just one day before the bomb explosion (2021), Kabul, Afghanistan © Emre Oğur

We returned back to the Abbey Gate area at the decided time. Upon reaching the designated meeting spot, we positioned ourselves to face the opposite side of the channel. Knowing well about the chaos in the vicinity, we had brought a megaphone along with us. Utilizing the megaphone, we

called out the name of the interpreter with whom we had been in contact. After a while, I was able to spot him in the crowd. Then, we indicated them to move towards the bridge. At that moment, some of our interpreters jumped into the channel without even going to the bridge, perhaps to cross over (or maybe to embrace the salvation) and climbed up by reaching their hands out to us. We took more than 40 people through the Abbey Gate by following the security corridor. Once inside, we asked them to stand side by side, open their bags, and show their official documents, including passports, identity cards, and NATO mission certificates. These documents were necessary to ensure the safe and proper evacuation of those who were eligible.

Additionally, to avoid posing a threat to the safety of both the evacuated individuals and the country they would be evacuated into, people were not allowed to have any firearms, sharp or pointed objects, or illegal materials along with them. We ensured the security check through metal detectors and physical search techniques. We underscored that our control was only the first stage and that there would be more detailed checks in terms of documents and belongings while waiting for the planes. Therefore, we warned that anyone who had an unauthorized item belong with them should surrender it, otherwise they would not be able to board the plane. There was no rational explanation for taking such irrational risks that would end the possibility of evacuation for these people who had probably felt like they were in hell for days. However, we had to be sure.

After ensuring that everyone was "clean", we transported them to the Passenger Reception Centre, where detailed and final checks would be performed before they boarded the planes, using our two available pick-up trucks. As there were only two vehicles available at that time, we would have had to make maybe 5-6 trips to move everyone. I went on the first or second trip to coordinate the vehicle disembarking point. We checked the numbers, everyone was there. At that moment, evidently there was hope in their eyes and excitement in their hearts. They wanted to take a picture to immortalize the moment, so we took the picture below. Today, I still talk on the phone with some of them, they have all opened a new page in their lives since that day, and some have even had new babies. Looking back, I can say that it's indescribable happiness to have "touched their lives".

Pic. 5. "Catch the moment" with our interpreters to be evacuated, Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan (2021) © Emre Oğur

As the evacuation operations neared completion, we ensured that our belongings were packed and ready for immediate evacuation if necessary. While I was in my room organising my belongings on the evening of August 26th, I suddenly heard an incredibly loud explosion. The sound appeared as coming from the direction of Abbey Gate, the location that I had visited the day before and knew to be heavily populated. I thought it might have been a bomb explosion.

I donned up my equipment and made my way to KANOC. There, I had the chance to gain first-hand knowledge about the incident. As I had suspected, there had been a devastating explosion at Abbey Gate, and as time progressed, it became apparent that numerous Afghan civilians, and 13 US soldiers had lost their lives in the blast. In the immediate aftermath, the gathering of people who had been waiting at Abbey Gate dispersed in fear of another explosion.

On the morning of August 27th, as the remaining Turkish troops *(some of us had been evacuated the day before)*, we were informed that we would be evacuated in the afternoon. Since I had been on shift the night before, I had come back to my room in the morning to catch some sleep. I could say without a doubt that this was the most stressful nap of my life. I had nightmares about falling asleep and missing the flight. I woke up to the sound of my alarm, which I had set for a short amount of time. I gathered

my belongings, took one last look at my empty room and the corridors, and stepped outside.

My cell phone rang, and I was notified that my friends had gathered as the flight departure time had been rescheduled to an earlier time. Since they couldn't find me (*knowing that I had finished my shift in the morning and retired to rest*), they rushed to my room to check on me. I saw that two of my colleagues had come with a vehicle to help me with my belongings and to move more quickly. I felt like my nightmares were almost coming true after the rescheduling flight departure earlier and my friends rushing to help me. Three of us got into the car, and we took a different route from the one my colleagues came on and encountered a large crowd. We stopped the car and got out, but there was no way to move forward. After a while, we realized that the crowd had gathered to pay tribute to the soldiers who lost their lives in the Abbey Gate explosion. Amidst a sorrowful atmosphere, a memorial ceremony was taking place, and we joined in to pay our full respect. Shortly after, flag-draped coffins passed in front of us, and we saluted them with great esteem and sorrow as soldiers. The end of the 20-year mission, which was successful in some ways and contained errors in others, should not have come this way.

Pic. 6. A couple of hours before our flight, commemorative ceremony for the fallen 13 US soldiers at Abbey Gate explosion, Hamid Karzai International Airport, Kabul, Afghanistan (2021) © Emre Oğur

On August 27 in the afternoon, we boarded the plane that would take us to Türkiye through Pakistan. We stayed overnight in Pakistan and

flew to Türkiye early morning on August 28. The last three days of my 6-month planned but 127-day stay in Afghanistan, which culminated in our evacuation, were unforgettable!

5. Conclusions

Assessing the non-combatant evacuation operations carried out in the NATO Resolute Support Mission in the last fifteen days only within its own context would be a great deficiency. Taking a holistic approach to the situation, the main factor that has led to the humanitarian tragedies and chaotic scenes in the evacuation operations is the ongoing instability, corruption, lack of powerful police force, inadequacies in many areas, and the cumulative effects of all these in Afghanistan.
During my early days with the Advisory Teams, I learned that the Afghan National Police, responsible for public order and security, were integrating into the Afghan National Army to combat the Taliban insurgency. The briefings we received indicated how many police officers were being integrated into the army on a daily basis. This was the first time I had witnessed the personnel needed to strengthen the army being sourced from the police force, which is the main factor in ensuring internal security and maintaining public order. In such situations, it is desirable to consolidate and increase the number of soldiers, but it is best to source them from adult men within a certain age range in the population. However, in our case young adult men constituted the largest group gathered at the gates during the evacuation operations, indicating that the segment of the population most likely to fight and struggle in the country sought to escape and save themselves as quickly as possible.

During those days, a question kept coming to my mind about local people: "If you were so afraid that you were willing to climb onto the wheels and wings of planes to escape, then why didn't you resist the Taliban until now?". The Taliban was able to reach Kabul in a very short period without encountering any resistance from either the army or the people.

In relation to the non-combatant evacuation operations at Kabul Hamid Karzai International Airport, from my own point of view, I have tried to summarize the most important points that I would like to propose as "I wish it had been like this" with the followings:

- It was predicted from intelligence sources that the chaos that would occur with the entry of the Taliban into Kabul would necessitate the

completion of the withdrawal and evacuation operations before the Taliban's entry into Kabul. Given that the withdrawal process was decided upon as a result of agreements made with the Taliban, it is considered possible to have contact with the Taliban. In this regard, to know local people's possible reaction tendency in terms of Taliban's entrance of the city, it would be better to have a robust law enforcement intelligence mechanism.

- During the process of reducing forces, the units that should have been the last to leave the stage were those that had been involved in security tasks. Early withdrawal of these units has led to the need for numerous rotations within the base. The difficulties and weaknesses resulting from this situation were clearly seen in the last days when the local people flooded into the airport.

As a crucial factor that led to the collapse of the government, corruption in Afghan state institutions was well known by everyone. Corruption spread like a cancerous cell throughout all aspects of the government in a very short period of time, including the police force. This made it difficult for the police to effectively carry out their duties. In such circumstances, "reinforcement" or "replacement" of the indigenous police force could be an efficient solution which refers to "Stability Policing" activities. Stability policing activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a safe and secure environment (SASE), restoring public order and security, and establishing the conditions for meeting longer term needs with respect to governance and development. This can include both the re-establishment of law and order and reinforcing the rule of law.[4]

NATO's presence in Afghanistan for around 20 years has had an impact on many aspects of life in the region, such as girls going to school and women being more visible in society and the workforce. However, its focus has mostly been on building a modern army. It is a known fact that the establishment of an effective, powerful, and competent law enforcement organization has been relatively low priority.

For a local law enforcement organization to have credibility in the eyes of the public and effectively perform its duty of maintaining law and order, it must be close to the people and never be associated with illegal or immoral activities such as corruption, bribery, and nepotism. It is unrealistic to

4 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing, AJP-3.22, July 2016.

expect a law enforcement organization that is almost inseparable from these criminal and moral corruptions to be responsible for internal security in a country.

Suitable for the described circumstances, the term "security gap" is defined as the inadequacy of local law enforcement forces to fulfil their primary duties, such as maintaining public order and upholding the rule of law. This term was first described in the United Nations Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, dated August 21, 2000, which is commonly known as "The Brahimi Report". The concept of the security gap forms the basis of Stability Policing activities. NATO AJP-3.22 Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing is the basis for conducting these activities under "reinforcement" or "replacement" in countries classified as "states at risk". Afghanistan, where all the processes in the "states at risk" classification (recovering state, failing state, failed state) have been witnessed during NATO's 20-year presence, was a suitable field for the implementation of Stability Policing activities. However, during the campaign in Afghanistan, the Alliance and the international community did not consider the role that Stability Policing could have played in filling the security gap between local institutions and the Afghan population.

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BIO:

In 2012, Captain Emre Oğur graduated from the Turkish Military Academy with the rank of second lieutenant in the Gendarmerie. Between 2012 and 2018, he served as a platoon, and company commander in counter-terrorism units along Türkiye's borders with Syria and Iraq. In 2018, he was assigned to the Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Academy, located in Ankara. Between 2018 and 2020, he earned a master's degree in forensic sciences from the Criminalistics program at Ankara University by completing

a thesis titled "Evaluation of Forensic Mission Efficiency in CBRN Threat Environment: A Comparison Between Turkey and the USA". He is currently continuing his PhD studies in the same department. Between April and August of 2021, he was deployed in the NATO Resolute Support Mission at Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan and served in the Allies' non-combatant evacuation operations. At the time of writing this chapter, he has been posted as a Lessons Learned Validation & Dissemination Staff Officer at the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence located in Vicenza, Italy.

NOTES

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MISSIONS' CHART

1. 1946/1949 US Constabulary - Germany
2. 1995 NATO Mission - Kosovo
3. 1999/2003 UN Mission - Kosovo
4. 1999 UN Mission - East Timor
5. 2002 NATO Mission - Iraq
6. 2005 UN Mission - Sudan
7. 2006 NATO Mission - Iraq
8. 2008 UN Mission - Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia
9. 2008 NATO Mission - Kosovo
10. 2010/2011 NATO ISAF Mission - Afghanistan
11. 2017 Humanitarian Relieve Mission - St. Martin
12. 2018/2022 EU Mission - SAHEL
13. 2021 NATO Resolute Support Mission - Afghanistan


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I wish this book (the first in a trilogy) on Stability Policing had been available to me earlier in my career. I wish I had visited the Stability Policing Centre of Excellence while I was serving. Both changed my understanding of the policing/stability gap, and my mind on the benefit of Stability Policing as opposed to Security Force Assistance.

General Sir James Rupert Everard (ret), KCB, CBE

This book -the first of a unique and precious trilogy- is a collection of "cognitive experiences (...). These perceptions, these emotions, these experiences constitute the solid base that is the very reason of existence of Stability Policing doctrine -and as a consequence, of the existence of NATO SPCoE- across the years, the missions, the debates, the doubts, the confrontations, the failures, and the success.

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