



**STABILITY POLICING IN  
AFGHANISTAN: DID NATO MISS AN  
OPPORTUNITY? LESSONS FROM A  
20-YEAR CAMPAIGN  
2022 LL BRANCH – FINAL REPORT**



At the [NATO SP COE](#) in Vicenza, Italy,  
From July 2022 to September 2022.



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### DISCLAIMER

This report is the independent view of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) and of the report joint team. The decision to note or approve the report's content and its recommendations by NATO competent authorities will be promulgated in the Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation's cover letter, in its capacity as the report's customer.

The report is classified *Non Sensitive Information* - Releasable to the Public.

## FOREWORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I am particularly pleased to present this Final Report based on the outcomes of the outstanding event organised and hosted in Vicenza by the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence Lessons Learned Branch from 5 to 7 July 2022, in front of a group of distinguished participants including, among others, Lieutenant General Maurizio Detalmo MEZZAVILLA, Carabinieri Deputy Commander, and Ms. Irene FELLÌN, NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security.



Since 2001, little or no consideration was given to the role *Robust Police* assets may have played in Afghanistan, a Country where the Police was “*the most hated institution*” and police tasks had been delegated to ruthless tribal militias, armed and subsidized by the intervening countries, rather than applying the Stability Policing model which, since 1998, the International Community has so effectively adopted to respond to the security needs of the population in the Balkans, in Iraq and in East Timor.

In fact, Stability Policing assets could have complemented and/or replaced the Afghan police, monitoring and intervening on corrupt and afflictive behaviours, providing services to the populace, thus filling the “*security gap*”.

There was in fact the need for an asset which was interoperable with both the military and the civil society, capable to calibrate different levels of force and seeking to reduce the risk of “*collateral damage*” to the local population as much as possible and with the ability to hamper the Taliban's narrative at its core.

Failing to immediately ensure the rule of law and guarantee public order and security, hence to seize the so-called *critical golden hour*, has meant failing to provide a timely and effective response to the needs of the population and to help legitimise local governments.

The conference clearly evidenced that Stability Policing could have indeed played a crucial role in preventing chaos and focusing on the protection of civilians in the Afghan volatile and asymmetric scenario, thus contributing to legitimising the institutions and paving the way for a progressive transition and permitting the rule of law overriding the rule of guns.

The event was a golden opportunity for our Community of Interest to get together and discuss about Stability Policing, greatly absent in the Afghan conundrum from the perspective to “*learn from the past*” and suggest possible solutions applicable in future, similar scenarios, to contribute to fostering long-term peace, stability, and development.

I finally would like to thank everyone who contributed to the success of the Conference for their steadfast commitment, hoping that the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence area will continue to benefit from their invaluable support.

**Giuseppe De Magistris**  
**Colonel, Italian Carabinieri**  
**NATO SP COE DIRECTOR**

*“Building on the lessons learned over the past three decades, including through our operations in Afghanistan, we will continue to improve our readiness, our military and civilian capabilities and civil-military planning and coordination”<sup>1</sup>.*



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<sup>1</sup> NATO Strategic Concept, para 26.

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**At the NATO SP COE in Vicenza, Italy, from July 2022 to September 2022**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### I. BACKGROUND

For nearly 20 years, NATO has provided significant support to the Afghan National Security Forces, with the goal of creating a legitimate, accountable, and effective police force that could protect the population from criminals and uphold the country's rule of law.

Few missions have presented such a high number of challenges as that in war-torn Afghanistan. The large spectrum of security problems encountered during the international intervention (terrorism and insurgency relying on asymmetric tactics, organised crime groups, criminals, riots, etc.) would have suggested the deployment of a versatile police force such as *Stability Policing*, able to calibrate different levels of force to deal with these threats, as NATO did in the Balkans.

Instead, the so-called police "light footprint" approach was decided and was followed by a deterioration of the security conditions that required urgent development of an Afghan police force able to be professional, effective, and representative of the country's ethnic diversity.

From 5-7 July 2022, the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence organised in Vicenza (Italy) a 2-day workshop, followed by 1-day conference, aimed at bringing together experts from different fields to collect observations from the recently concluded NATO experience in Afghanistan, from a *Stability Police* perspective, in order to support a better use of this instrument in the management of future crises.

### II. LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP AND CONFERENCE ACHIEVEMENTS

The outcomes of the fruitful discussions carried out during the entire event are the following:

- *Stability Policing* has not been adequately taken into account in the planning phase of the mission, generating significant consequences in the execution phase, without ensuring a structured approach from the outset;
  - there has been no analysis and identification of a legal frame of reference that also takes account of the local realities and, consequently, no effective response was provided to the problems arising in terms of contiguity between criminal phenomena, insurrections and terrorism;
  - no effective reference model was established for the development of local police forces. In defining such a model, account must also be taken of the local situation in terms of culture, socio-economic dynamics and any pre-existing legal framework;
  - international military forces carried out support activities for local police forces through methods specific to the military instrument, highlighting the need for police mentoring to be conducted, with specific expertise in the field;
  - a lesser understanding of the local context did not allow the international military forces to create the mind-set of the local police forces with the correct approach in terms of "Community Policing", thus emphasising the deficiency in terms of a "comprehensive approach" by the International Community;
  - the frequent rotation of NATO staff in charge of mentoring activities had a critical impact on the success of the mission. This in future can be mitigated by interconnecting the

rotation of mentors;

- local police personnel assigned to command positions are not always adequate in terms of professionalism and integrity. Host Nation central authorities should consider this aspect when selecting police officers for such positions;
- gender perspective related issues have not been adequately taken into account when performing mentoring activities. Therefore, it would be more efficient to increase the number of female mentors in the future Alliance missions.

The achievements are completely in line with the findings reflected both in the JALLC reports *“Military Strategic Lessons Report from NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan”* and *“Train, Advise and Assist Lessons from Resolute Support Mission”*, as well as in the SIGAR lessons learned report *“Police in conflict: lessons from U.S. experience in Afghanistan”*.

### III. KEY TAKEAWAYS

✓ During the campaign in Afghanistan the role that Stability Policing could have played was not taken into account. This created a capacity vacuum, which led to the alienation of the local police from the population, whose basic security needs had been completely neglected.

✓ Because of the so-called *“light footprint approach”*, a robust police deployment was not considered as a means of disrupting Afghan powerful criminal and terrorist organizations. These were considered mostly as "just" an insurrectional problem to be curbed almost exclusively through the military instrument rather than the police one.

✓ Key elements of Stability Policing, such as the rule-of-law, the fight against corruption, the protection of women and ethnic minorities' rights as well as of the local historical and cultural heritage would have made a difference if included in the support provided to the local police forces.

✓ NATO needs a holistic approach to complex crisis management, where Stability Policing plays an important role in supporting the action of the military component, by filling the "public security gap".

✓ The role of Stability Policing within the Security Sector Reform was undervalued and, therefore, not appropriately implemented.

✓ The absence of a thorough understanding of Stability Policing within NATO is explained also by the lack of a dedicated platform/instrument for experts with Stability Policing background, who work inside NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure but often not in positions pertaining to Stability Policing. Such a platform would allow them to better integrate Stability Policing into NATO's work strands and promote its potential.

All these takeaways lead to the need for establishing a NATO Policing Capability, which may be underpinned by the hopefully soon-to-be approved NATO Stability Policing Concept.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The workshop was organised on 5 and 6 July 2022 and was followed on 7 July 2022 by the conference. The purpose of both events was to bring together experts from different fields to collect observations from the recently concluded NATO experience in Afghanistan, from a *Stability Police* perspective, in order to support a better use of this instrument in the management of future crises.

The workshop was structured in three syndicates (strategic, operational and tactical level), composed of 11 members each (moderator, co-moderator, minute taker and 8 participants).

The aim of the syndicates was to facilitate discussions among experts the SMEs and finding the most adequate answers to the following questions:

- How to effectively implement Stability Policing in NATO operations? (strategic level);
- How should the Police Capability Building be structured to reach the goals established in the mission mandate? (operational level);
- How could we take the experiences from the ground to make future Stability Policing tasks more effective? (tactical level).

### 1.2 METHODOLOGY

The chosen methodologies for the three syndicates have been the Brainstorming, the Affinity Diagrams, “5 W + H” and capturing outputs through the ODCR format.

Observations have been captured in the standard NATO structure, where:

- O stands for *Observation*: a factual description of a situation,
- D means *Discussion*: a presentation of why the situation exists; competing rationales for the situation; or the individual components of a situation,
- C comes from *Conclusion*: description of the overall findings, the causes of the situation and
- R refers to *Recommendation*: identification of Tasking Authorities, Action Bodies and their respective actions to rectify the problem or address a shortfall.

## 2. FINDINGS RELATING TO LESSONS LEARNED WORKSHOP

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to establish the right relationship between military and civilian elements when reforming the police forces in conflict and post-conflict regions. Principles of civilian and democratic Security Sector Reform (SSR) emphasise the need to separate the military and the police. Nevertheless, everyday reality in many places does not allow the realisation of this ideal type. The police must adopt a robust stance in order to close security gaps and proceed against well-organised armed criminals or insurgents. In the context of police-building and police reform in fragile states, this means that the police must be as civilian as possible and as military as necessary with regard to their equipment, approach, structure and duties. The rapid militarisation of the police can cause problems. It can lead to a rift between the police



and the public which prevents the development of a relationship of trust that is so important for police work<sup>2</sup>.

Starting in 2002, the international community agreed to divide the key tasks of reforming the security sector in Afghanistan among various stakeholders. Germany took the lead, based on its historical role as the “godfather” of the modern Afghan police force, with a program focused on the senior police ranks and improvements to police infrastructure in Kabul. As the lead U.S. agency for police assistance, State [Department] created an independent program in 2003 targeting the lower ranks of the newly created Afghan National Police. These civilian actors tried to demonstrate success by focusing on infrastructure projects, training, and equipping, and such efforts did yield some tangible outputs. But they had little impact on broader institutional problems, such as corruption and the lack of accountability. Just as importantly, the lack of a unified strategic vision for the police and justice sectors meant that additional international donor support did little to alter fundamentally compromised institutions. That lack of direction, combined with the neglect of institutional reform and post-training field advising, created a situation in which newly trained officers returned to an unreformed, corrupt environment—and often reverted to old predatory behaviours<sup>3</sup>.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) sets out to establish a security sector which provides security in a way that is effective, efficient, constitutional, and democratically legitimised. The most important fields of SSR are the reform of the military, police, justice authorities and intelligence services. Further activities on whose progress SSR depend are the control of small arms and light weapons, mine-clearing operations and initiatives to establish transitional justice. The pertinent SSR literature and international organisations advocate principles such as transparency, professionalism, efficiency, appropriateness (of means and re-sources), democratic legitimacy and local ownership. However, the implementation of these principles in post-conflict states often varies considerably (Scheye 2010). Apart from practical problems, this is frequently due to a lack of conceptual clarity. For example, it is often difficult to identify which of the many security stakeholders deserve priority. SSR stakeholders must therefore improvise. All important stakeholders must be involved in SSR processes. SSR stakeholders have recognised the danger of underestimating the political content of SSR (OECD 2007: 28), where ignorance of local contexts often prevents them from adopting a sensitive approach<sup>4</sup>.

From the end of 2007, the international stakeholders concentrated on the Focused District Development (FDD) Programme. The latter were organised in Police Mentor Teams (PMT) and Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT).

This involved an evaluation following which the entire Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) in a given district was withdrawn and subject to eight weeks of training at the Police Training Center (PTC). During this period, the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) took over the

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<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, Summary, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> SIGAR, Lessons learned report: “Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan”, June 01, 2022, p. 41.

<sup>4</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, p. 3-4.

duties of the AUP. Upon completion of training, the police returned to their district where they received post training support from international mentors and partners<sup>5</sup>.

The donors further accelerated police-building in the course of 2010. In autumn 2010, members of the Afghan National Police (ANP) were being trained at 38 locations in Afghanistan. Many police training centres were located at or in the vicinity of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) was now the main stakeholder in building the ANP and Afghan National Army (ANA). This mission united all international training components except those of the EU. The Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) continued to exist as part of the NTM-A. The Integrated Joint Command was responsible for building the ANP and the ANA at operational level<sup>6</sup>.

It is also important which external stakeholders dominate police-building. The strategic cultures of individual states and the professional identities and structures of their security forces strongly influence their strategies in multilateral operations<sup>7</sup>. The police are more likely to become militarised if external armed forces are the main driver of local police-building work<sup>8</sup>.

The interactive discussions aimed at collecting observations, lessons identified and best practices from the academic world, literature, diplomatic or military and civilian personnel deployed to Afghanistan under different aegis contribute to acquire useful information about the Stability Policing engagement in these missions, with a focus on the monitoring, mentoring, training and advising activities.

The workshop came up with practical findings and take aways on all three thematic syndicates. The first syndicate specifically focused on strategic level. In terms of strategic level, ideal-typically, the reform of the security sector in post-conflict states is linear. First of all, the military takes over police duties, particularly if the security situation is poor. The transition to civilian a police model then follows in the course of time. [...]. International donors failed to help to establish public order and rule of law in the decisive initial years and to coordinate their approaches. The lack of commitment to building a civilian police force served not least to [...]. On the Afghan side, the escalation of the armed conflict, poor government leadership, the absence of a tradition of civilian police work and the

*“In Afghanistan there was a lack of strategic view”*

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<sup>5</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, p. 23.

<sup>7</sup> This is due not least to the fact that both SSR norms and international law allow a great deal of leeway when defining police-military fields of competence and that donor states only surrender limited competencies to international organizations for the deployment of ‘their’ police and soldiers – Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, footnote p. 7.

<sup>8</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, footnote p. 7.

desolate state of the police encouraged the military bias of police reform<sup>9</sup>. “*In Afghanistan there was a lack of strategic view on how to deal with the stabilisation phase after the first initial intervention in the conflict and once the military goals had been achieved.*”<sup>10</sup> The collapse of the Afghan government and the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces in 2021 underscores the importance of establishing a trusted and effective police service in stabilising post-conflict and fragile states. Without a trusted police service to enforce the nation’s laws and protect its citizens, a country is at risk for instability and reverting back to conflict<sup>11</sup>.

The second syndicate conducted their discussion around operational level activity. The discussion led to the idea that International Community (IC) failed to build accountable and effective police forces although huge efforts in term of investments and security support. On the contrary, waste of funding, nepotism and corruption exacerbated the negative perception of civilian population toward both local police forces, resulted in the most hated and corrupted organisations in Afghanistan, and international actors involved in the stabilisation of the country. In addition, most of the local Police forces training and mentoring have been performed by NATO assets not granted with Police, or better, civilian Police mind-set. This fact created an unbalanced military oriented ANP which contributed to further alienate the local population. The operational level syndicate’s ESMEs answered the question on how the Police Capability Building should be structured to reach the goals established in the mission mandate. Despite the limited time available, a prolific discussion about training programs’ consistency, pre-deployment activities, building integrity/fighting corruption, the importance of cultural awareness, reached some valuable findings.

Lastly, the third syndicate concentrated on the tactical level. Starting in late 2007, NATO created police mentoring teams called Police Operational and Mentoring Liaison Teams (POMLT), to distinguish them from the U.S. military’s mentoring teams<sup>12</sup>. POMLTs consisted of 15 to 20 personnel and were modelled on the U.S. mentoring teams<sup>13</sup>.

*“NATO created police mentoring teams called Police Operational and Mentoring Liaison Teams (POMLT)”*

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<sup>9</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. “*Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police*”, p. 29.

<sup>10</sup> PROF. Ali Ahmed JALALI – former Afghan Minister of Interior. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL WS sessions – Vicenza, 05 – 07 July 2022.

<sup>11</sup> SIGAR, Lessons learned report: “Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan”, June 01, 2022, p. 223.

<sup>12</sup> ISAF, “Mentoring the Afghan National Police,” news release, November 8, 2008. SIGAR, Lessons learned report: “Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan”, June 01, 2022, p. 100;

<sup>13</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, “NATO’s Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs),” fact sheet, June 2010. SIGAR, Lessons learned report: “Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan”, June 01, 2022, p. 100;

POMLT personnel were drawn from military police or ground forces, or from gendarmerie units like the Spanish Guardia Civil, French Gendarmerie National, or Italian Carabinieri<sup>14</sup>.

As part of POMLT, member states contributed more than 400 gendarmerie officers to the Afghanistan mission<sup>15</sup>. However, apart from providing assistance in terms of training and equipment, the international partners also helped the ANP by improving infrastructure, particularly the construction of police stations<sup>16</sup>. Although the inclusion of NATO in the police assistance mission unified international military support, it did not improve coordination with civilian agencies. Civilian and military police assistance elements often worked at cross-purposes and failed to seek local buy-in. Issues with unity of effort affected the mission at the strategy, planning, and financial level; at the tactical level, teams often were unaware of efforts by other organisations, and some-times ended up undermining them. Formal bodies established to de-conflict international efforts were primarily focused on the strategic level. At the field level, there was no mechanism to organise the various efforts underway in some areas; advisors had to negotiate with their Afghan counterparts as best they could<sup>17</sup>.

The training courses put the main emphasis on military skills such as the handling of weapons, the establishment of roadblocks and the identification of improvised explosive devices (IED). Approximately seven of the eight weeks of police training were devoted to learning military skills. Only approximately one week remained for learning about such matters as Afghanistan's constitution, the conduct of criminal proceedings or human rights (Chilton et al. 2009: 60; Bayley/Perito 2010: 23). The civilian content of the basic police training was reduced further with effect from November 2008. Military-type training replaced lessons on community-oriented police work, domestic violence and women's rights (Cordesman 2010: 113)<sup>18</sup>.

## 2.2 FINDINGS RELATING TO SYNDICATE 1 – STRATEGIC

The workshop identified 5 findings and 5 key takeaways from the Subject Matter Experts (SME's) present in the strategic syndicate.

**1. Adaptive planning for post conflict to include policing. The International Community (IC) focused on achieving military results in Afghanistan in an initial phase, which sought to overtake and defeat the Taliban from a military perspective only; then there**

<sup>14</sup> ISAF Regional Command West, "Transfer of Authority of the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Qula I Naw," Defense Visual Information Distribution Service, October 5, 2011; Stephane Bras, "POMLT: Gendarmes en Afghanistan 2010," 2015, p. 15; Seth Robson, "NATO Revises Goal for Police Mentoring Teams," Stars and Stripes, November 19, 2010. SIGAR, Lessons learned report: "Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan", June 01, 2022, p. 100.

<sup>15</sup> European Gendarmerie Force 2020," p. 67. SIGAR, Lessons learned report: "Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan", June 01, 2022, p. 100.

<sup>16</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. "Militaryized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police", p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> SIGAR, Lessons learned report: "Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan", June 01, 2022, p. 102.

<sup>18</sup> Cornelius Friesendorf/Jörg Krempel – PRIF-Report No. 102. "Militaryized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police", p. 15-16.

was a lack of political will for nation-building or reconstruction after the Taliban were considered as defeated. In this sense, there was a false perception of the liberation war and a false assumption that the Taliban had been defeated, when stabilisation and fighting was still ongoing. This situation with simultaneousness of events did not permit a linear planning, hence it is highlighted that there is a need for an **adaptive planning for post conflict situations**. In regard to the planning phase, it is important to state that, **the policing experts were not involved in the planning process, as NATO is not structured nor resourced for international police assistance**. As a result, policing and criminal justice reform were not prioritised during the Security Sector Reform (SSR) planning. Other factors such as the short rotations which turned into loss of institutional memory, the lack of standardised advising/mentoring and no field advising in the early stages were some of the factors that hampered building a policing capacity in Afghanistan.

2. **Legitimate (internationally and locally) accepted legal framework, agreed and established in advance.** A Government should perform its legislative function in such a way that the regular citizen wants to be policed and accepts the authority of the police force. In order for this to occur, a legitimate legal framework must be obtained. The international community did not analyse the local applications of laws (sharia, customary common laws) balanced with a national legal framework and processes. The Justice System and its institutions were not developed in parallel with Policing / Security pillars, all of which had been absent in Afghanistan for a long period of time as a result of the militarization of the police and judiciary in post-soviet Afghanistan.

3. **Understanding local culture and social context over appropriate timeframes.** It was identified that tailored training on how to understand the local culture and the social context had been overlooked and was not provided in advance. In addition, the lack of languages knowledge, context of languages, adequate linguists, cultural advisors and the “awareness of sensibility” created a big gap during the mentoring/advising mission.

4. **A coherent response to the nexus between criminality and negative response including insurgency and terrorism.** “Drugs, thugs and official mugs” all created a vacuum of power in Afghanistan and the Taliban served as an umbrella for terrorists, thieves, and drug traffickers. These were sometimes tolerated by the top officials for security reasons such as force protection, and some countries had accepted deals made with illegal groups in order to protect themselves<sup>19</sup>. The lack of a traditional policing approach, the ineffectiveness of the Police in terms of definitions and responsibilities, handling funds in a non-transparent manner, the lack of accountability and the blurred line between criminality, insurgency and terrorism were a consequence of a underdeveloped

“*Drugs, thugs and official mugs*”. Prof. Ali Ahmed JALALI

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<sup>19</sup> PROF. Ali Ahmed JALALI – former Afghan Minister of Interior. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL WS sessions – Vicenza, 05 – 07 July 2022, from his article published in The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters (Spring 2006 issue, Article 9, pp. 6.

criminal justice system and a different legal framework.

5. **Communication strategy specific to the stability policing capability.** It was identified that there had been a lack of a clear strategy which should have been generated at the highest level, North Atlantic Council (NAC), Military Committee (MC) to highlight the stability policing capability and explain why they are contributing abroad. Key audiences were not clearly researched, identified, and understood in-country, regional, internationally and in NATO countries domestically. It was observed that tools for delivering any strategy were under resourced and not in place to ensure relevance to the audience, especially cultural requirements. Some strategy was delivered remotely by the organisation that was delivering the capability on the ground.

### 2.2.1 TAKE AWAYS

1. Early situation assessment in support of the planning process is important. Yearly situations update with reach-back/feedback mechanism should be ensured to facilitate adaptability for planning. It is paramount to include stabilisation transitions and policing in early planning, as well as establishing common directives for mentoring/advising. During SSR planning, priority to security sector governance should be given and a desired outcome for public order should be established. It is likewise important to create a Quality Assurance policy to ensure standards are met.

2. It is necessary to examine formal documents with NATO that could address updating an approach to legal frameworks, concepts, training and exercises, and doctrine. It is likewise necessary to feed the lessons learned into concept development and test with experimentation and validation.

3. Understanding and dealing with local culture and social practice leads to building trust with the community, which is essential in stability policing. Therefore, planning and resourcing (operational/institutional) for trained cultural anthropology specialists in order to gain an understanding of the cultural context in advance and ongoing is a must. It would be necessary to define a standardised employment policy of cultural specialists.

4. The SSR model requires a minimum level of security there is therefore the necessity for a different tailored organisation for army and for police to ensure well-functioning institutions; It is crucial that there is an implementation of good governance in these institutions to build their credibility. It is of paramount importance that there be presence of Stability Policing (SP) specialists in every step of planning and operational process, including the provision of comprehensive training.

5. There should be a communication strategy created at a senior level in coordination with the delivery organisation that highlights the stability policing capability and the need for it contributing abroad. To facilitate its implementation, Standardised Operating Procedures (SOP) should be created to allow flexibility for use in all possible domains. Likewise important is the identification of resources required in advance to create strategy in a timely manner. It is important to ensure that the strategy is operationalised and effects subsequently measured with appropriately agreed metrics.

### 2.3 FINDINGS RELATING TO SYNDICATE 2 – OPERATIONAL

The overall discussion covered the following four findings:

1. **Building of integrity and fighting corruption.** The Policing activities conducted by Afghan Local/Regional authorities did not encourage the building of integrity. The recruitment, the payment of police, the funding mechanisms and the disconnection from population were all factors that hindered the development of building integrity. Local power networks, belonging to the community/tribe, strongly controlled and influenced the recruitment mechanism. Moreover, the vetting of recruited members relied substantially on the local authorities often biased in vetting certain police members. Another key-point was the method of payment established within the Afghan Police Forces that provides the overall income into the hands of the local /regional police commander to be discretionary redistributed to the employees. Undoubtedly, the absence of strong mechanisms to track and control the payment of the police members and the use of other financial resources favoured Afghan traditional way of working and did not eliminate sources of corruption and personal dependency on the Afghan police chain of command. This resulted in hierarchical “*tax payment*” and the well-known “*ghost employment*” where the international community provided funds for Police members who were employed only on paper but not in reality. Moreover, the funding mechanism for the Afghan Police Capability Building process made it possible for Commanders to direct funds to companies associated with them, in violation of integrity standards for the International Community but with no damage from a local perspective and local understanding of integrity. Additionally, lack of understanding of local labour markets and a lack of appropriate interpreters to support this understanding, made more complicated the identification of any corruption activities. Therefore, indirectly, the International Community fed the corruption and lack of integrity among the Afghan Police Forces.

*“The Afghan police model designed by the international actors did not lead to effective implementation of the Rule of Law for the benefit of the majority of the Afghan population”*

2. **Effectiveness of the ANP model designed by the international actors for the implementation of the Rule of Law.** The Afghan police model designed by the international actors did not lead to the effective implementation of the Rule of Law. Actually, since the beginning of the intervention, the international community and US adopted a “*light footprint*” approach and did not plan any SP activity in Afghanistan. Within this context, international actors addressed the policing gap without a consistent approach and focused mainly on security tasks. Over the time, due to the need to fight insurgency and the lack of qualified and skilled police mind-set trainers, local police forces resulted over-militarised and did not accomplish police tasks such as criminal investigations, supporting justice, community policing and the implementation of the Rule of Law. International actors’ lack of sufficient cultural awareness resulted in designing the Afghan Police model without a clear and appropriate model of reference. Understanding the above aspects would have been critical

for interacting with local population and conducting police tasks in their benefit, with respect of their values. Moreover, different agendas of the sponsoring international actors in the region led them to adopt different approaches and behaviours towards the Afghan counterpart. Similarly, lack of proper communication and interaction with the local population led in many cases to a “cultural shock” that undermined the efforts to gain trust of members of Afghan Police Forces and of the local population.

**3. Massive military mind-set in developing ANP Capability Building.** International Military Forces conducted Afghan Police Forces Capacity Building with a military mind-set and without coordination, specific training, knowledge, and skills required for such activities. Consequently, ANP turned into a military force used to fight insurgents instead of filling the security gap while the population’s needs were totally neglected as International Military Forces were more concerned about counterinsurgency focusing their efforts towards the security dimension of the conflict. This aspect influenced the way Afghan Police Forces were trained, mentored, advised, and equipped resulting in police forces operating with military approach. Although some versatile Coalition forces (e.g. gendarmerie type forces) seemed more suitable to cope stability policing tasks, they were employed only at tactical level so that with no significant impact on the overall approach to policing in theatre. Additionally, the legal framework and the international mandate changed over time and the Afghan Police Capacity Building did not keep track with these changes. As a result, these forces continued to follow a military approach to policing resulting in ineffective delivery of the policing tasks. The military mind-set of the International Forces resulted also in the absence of a central authority for stability policing to ensure that policing activities were conducted at the right level and not only from military perspective.

**4. Lack of effective engagement of ANP towards the local population.** International actors did not facilitate effective engagement of Afghan Police Forces towards the local population. This was among the main causes that led the local population to support the Taliban. Besides corruption among police forces, there was also a lack of understanding of the nexus between criminals and insurgents and the deployment of police recruits far from their area of origin. Although, community-oriented policing would have been beneficial to keep local police forces connected with population, this tool was not included in the Comprehensive Understanding of Operational Environment. Consequently, there was not clear understanding about organised crime and insurgents’ connection to it, while international forces remained generally isolated or cut off from the local population due to the need for security and self-protection. An appropriate SP approach could have prevented this kind of problem.

### 2.3.1 TAKE AWAYS

**1. Within the context of Afghan Police Capability Building, the lack of tailored culturally-appropriate mechanisms and procedures that consider the integrity dimension, impacted the transformation of local/regional police.** International actors should develop appropriate mechanisms and procedures relating to police integrity prior to deployment, with a constant reviewing and updating throughout the operation.



2. **Effectiveness of the ANP model designed by the international actors for the implementation of the Rule of Law.** International actors' lack of cultural awareness led to imposing a police model neither suitable nor accepted by the population. Head of mission should consider culture, customs/habits, history of policing, justice system and social economic dynamics into the police model development, by involving trusted agents from the local communities and leveraging existing structures in the society.

3. **Excessive military mind-set in developing ANP Capability Building.** Afghan Police Forces poorly responded to police needs because trained, mentored, advised and equipped by international military forces with a pure military mind-set. Police expertise should be included in all phases of operation planning in order to consider the right police assets for the mission success.

4. **Lack of effective engagement of ANP towards the local population.** Societal differences within Afghanistan and the disregard of society systems and norms by the International Forces resulted in disproportional security focused policing and hindered community engagement. Community policing principles should be included as a part of Comprehensive Understanding of Operational Environment.

#### 2.4 FINDINGS RELATING TO SYNDICATE 3 – TACTICAL

The workshop identified 7 findings and 7 key takeaways from the Subject Matter Experts (SME's) present in the tactical syndicate.

1. **Tour of duty / rotation of international personnel in mentoring missions.** The frequent rotation of the mentors (every 6 months) created significant shortages and especially lack of trust, in their relationship with the mentored counterparts from the Afghan National Police (ANP). One of the main problems was that mentoring at high level, e.g. provincial police commander level, was based on personal connections, that often were lost due to a very short, or sometimes absent, hand-over take-over (HOTO).

2. **Enabling relations between the international mentor and the local police commander** was sometimes very difficult to begin with. Not all the commanding police officers appointed by the higher echelon of the Host Nation were suited professionally and morally for their position. Assigning a person that is not suited (including no technical expertise) for the position creates shortfalls in the regular police activities. Even if the mentors highlight the shortfalls in their periodical reports, these were not mandatory for the Host Nation authorities to implement. Having local police commanders not suited for their position directly resulted in lack of trust in Host Nation authorities and Coalition Forces from the local population.

3. **Lack of coordination between different actors when approaching the local police commanders.** There was an identified lack of understanding and coordination between NATO actors when approaching the local authorities. Many international actors did the same job, at the same time, e.g. training, operation, intelligence, logistics, with little coordination and, sometimes even with competing interests.

4. **Proper resources for the Host Nation Police.** Lack of essential resources led to less effectiveness and poor morale, facilitating corruption and creating difficulties in the recruitment and retention all these resuming to the lack of trust on the local/central

authorities favouring the traditional tribal/Taliban organisation. The lack of resources included insufficient equipment including weapons, ammunition, night vision goggles (NVG), biometric devices, winter clothes, medical kits, radios, GPS, and personal protection equipment. There was a lack of adequate food and water supplies bearing in mind the long periods of time in which they supposed to perform their duties, especially in the more remote and often solitary locations. This was compounded by the inadequate infrastructure for Police tasks and personnel accommodation, late delivery of the salaries which were often partially retained by the commanders.

5. **Literacy.** Low literacy rates in the Host Nations' populations was a major challenge confronting international police training efforts. Literacy training is often overlooked or is implemented after police elements have already been deployed. The failure to create a national literacy campaign undermined the effectiveness of police assistance programs. Illiterate police cannot perform basic law enforcement functions, such as writing reports, recording license plate numbers, and obtaining witness statements limiting also the amount and quality of evidence that can be used in prosecutions.

6. **Gender perspective.** It was very difficult to send international women mentors into the theatre of operations due to logistic and personnel issues and the dilemma of women mentoring men. Because of this the Host Nation did not have a clear understanding of the opportunity to have active female police officers.

7. **Pre-deployment training in facing local cultural challenges.** Lots of cultural and gender observations could increase the awareness on the pre-deployment training. Not always the cultural advisor was the most suited person to deliver this knowledge, due to lack of understanding of the Host Nation local cultural challenges.

#### 2.4.1 TAKE AWAYS

1. In order to ensure a proper HOTO for mentoring at individual level at least one month for high level mentors is necessary to establish a continuity of the mentoring teams through rotations at different moments inside the teams. Where applicable, it is necessary to use the pool of experts to facilitate the mentoring mission.

2. The Host Nation (HN) central authorities should take into account primarily, when appointing the local police commanders, the integrity, the skills and the professionalism of the candidates. Also, the periodical reports sent by the international mentors should be part of the selection process of the local police commanders, when made by the Host Nation central authorities.

3. The international mentor should be the focal point for communication and coordination between NATO and the HN counterparts enabling unity of effort and purpose and reducing, at the same time, loss of resources and the possibility of corruption. Use of the designated mentors and liaison officers in approaching the non-NATO actors should be mandatory and regulated in NATO SOP's.

4. NATO needs to invest adequately in the HN Police development in order to provide Rule of Law in a Safe and Secure Environment. Without adequate resources, the civilian agencies suffered from reduced freedom of movement and the lack of force protection capabilities required to operate in high-threat environments.

5. Low literacy rates in HN populations were a major challenge confronting foreign police training efforts. Police support offered by NATO should not include literacy programs but should partner with other international organisations to achieve this effect.

6. Nations should encourage and facilitate the engagement of women as international police mentors/ advisors.

7. Nations should collect and share within NATO all the cultural and gender observations during and after each deployment. Cultural advisors need to be appropriate to the specific environment, preferably belonging to the HN. Many police advisors received little or no training on the Afghan criminal justice system, penal codes, or policy and strategy guidelines for the Afghan police forces.

### 3. FINDINGS RELATING TO LESSONS LEARNED CONFERENCE

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite extensive documentation of Afghan policing shortfalls from different reports and independent analysts, substantive reform has come at a glacial pace. This lack of progress is partly a result of internal Afghan political dynamics in adopting a clientelist model to high-level appointments and fiercely resisting counter-corruption measures.

Likewise, the “[...] coalition deserves its share of the blame. The lack of forethought in building lasting Afghan security forces has left the overall training process in a constant state of catch-up, with the pivot to an advisory focus occurring as late as 2014. Instead, the first decade of international involvement overextended Afghan capacity by relying on large foot-print counter-insurgency efforts to expand the Afghan government’s influence with the aspiration of ejecting insurgents from all corners of the country”<sup>20</sup>.

*“[...] relying on large foot-print counter-insurgency efforts to expand the Afghan government’s influence [...]”*

#### 3.2 FINDINGS

During the conference day, a sequence of balanced presentations made it possible both to collect valuable observations on the international commitment to the construction of police forces in Afghanistan as well as the challenges and difficulties related to the implementation of this project.

The contributions in term of experience provided by Dr. Hosna Jalil and Prof. Ahmed Jalali, former authorities of the Afghan Government as well as Ambassador Stefano Pontecorvo, last NATO Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan and Mr. James

<sup>20</sup> Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub, October 20, 2020, *Afghanistan's Policing Failure and the Uncertain Way Forward* ([thestrategybridge.org](http://thestrategybridge.org));

Cunningham, US SIGAR project leader, converged with the academic viewpoints offered by Assoc. Prof. Cenker Korhan Demir, Prof. Moro and Prof. Ruffa.

The overall outcome identified a number of key points, which challenged the police capability building of the Afghan police forces in the last 20 years.

At the strategic level, Assoc. Prof. Cenker Korhan Demir believed that political decisions made during the Bonn agreement were mainly oriented to a military reform, not to the police reconstruction. Although Afghan security environment was characterised by high levels of violence, also by means other than war, such as corruption, organised crime, armed attacks and the actors as sub-national armed groups and warlords posed a significant threat to governing structure, before 2009, NATO did not spend any effort to establish an SP mission. On the other hand, he quoted that an effective security sector reform (SSR) required four preconditions, namely: the stable security environment, the political consensus, the human and institutional capacity and the durable resources, recognising SP as a mean able to cover the aforementioned issues. Nevertheless, persistent insecurity and a lack of understanding of local problems undermined political processes, the extension of government services and innumerable economic and development programs, that is to say that SP within the security sector reform was not appropriately implemented.

*“the gap was there, there were militias, there were criminals, there were terrorists, insurgents and that gap was suddenly occupied by all these or Taliban” Prof. Ali Ahmed JALALI*

Prof. Jalali, as former Afghan Minister of the Interior, quoted that the international community and US intervention in Afghanistan was accidental and marked by a light footprint approach. Consequently, at strategic level, neither plans for police forces' capability building were established nor international police forces were deployed in Afghanistan during his mandate (2003-2005). He concluded that “the gap was there, there were militias, there were criminals, there were terrorists, insurgents and that gap was suddenly occupied by all these or by the Taliban”. Another key point highlighted by Prof. Jalali was that since the

beginning of the intervention in Afghanistan, the international community mistakenly believed to deal with a post conflict situation while, said Jalali, “it was a conflict situation... it meant that whatever resources we had deployed in hope of stabilising the country, with the means we had, they did not work”. This principle has been better clarified by Prof. Jalali's quotation “you have to deal with the situation you face, not with the situation you wish”.

Former Afghan Deputy Ministry of Interior, Dr. Hosna Jalil, speaking about her experience in that position, raised few important issues starting from the fact that war on terror undermined efforts to counter crime and protect citizens in Afghanistan. Dr. Jalil recognised that Law Enforcement forces in Afghanistan were trained to fight on the battlefield and to conduct counter terrorism and counter insurgency operations, which had higher consideration and priority than the establishment of Rule of Law. On the contrary, as Dr. Jalil reported, the Ministry of Interiors data analysed in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2018 revealed that the number of criminal activities and death toll as consequence of criminal

activities was higher of 150-200% than the death toll from terrorist attacks. It means that more lives were lost due to the criminal activities than terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the police capability to protect or take security measures for demonstrations or to investigate criminal activities was limited because counter crime units were undermanned. Accordingly, Dr. Jalil concluded that the gap constitutes a lack of a clear vision and consensus in both the Afghan side and international community on the expected role of the police. Police forces had different units with different training, different equipment not just because their functions differed, but just because there were not available to them. This was in contrast to the ANA who got, normally, the best training and equipment. Moreover, Dr. Jalil admitted that SP was largely neglected, while, to have more fighters on the ground, the police forces turned into an over militarised force. In the end, only 10% of police forces were properly trained and equipped to counter crime, thus creating a disproportion in terms of police response in filling the security gap.

Another key point raised by Dr. Jalil was the high rate of unreported criminal cases committed in Afghanistan which, basically, depended on the limited developed police forces capabilities, including literacy. Ultimately, the role of police force was mainly addressed to counter terrorism and counter insurgency, as the police force was conceived to support ANA's military operations on the ground. For the same reasons, casualties among police forces were higher than in the ANA, because ANP deployed its personnel in small checkpoints compared to the Army, which was serving in fortified bases while the police forces were the real front line to the Taliban.

In his speech on the effectiveness and efficiency of international police assistance, SIGAR's Representative, Mr. James Cunningham, admitted that international community and US had a problem and recognised the need to change the strategy. He pointed out that no country organisation or agency has both the required capacity and the capability to develop a foreign police force during stabilisation operations. *"For capability we intend the ability to achieve a specific objective, while capacity means the quantity of a resource that can be deployed to reach it<sup>21</sup>"*. While an effective police is required to stabilise a country, as without it, criminal activities and lawlessness will flourish and the international community should not miss the golden hour in the first 6 to 12 weeks following the signing of a peace agreement or announcement of a ceasefire, as it is the most critical period to establishing the peace. Nevertheless, no military command plans for police assistance operations as part of its mission existed. Mr. Cunningham also stressed that, due to the uniqueness of each country's police and the lack of a standardised model of international police assistance, there is a need to develop a common operational picture among all local and international police assistance stakeholders. Police assistance strategies need to be coordinated with key elements of the criminal justice system to include legislators, courts, prisons and international donors.

Ambassador Pontecorvo pointed out that SP, being a robust police institution – "Stability Policing cannot be but robust" - would have made the difference in Afghanistan,

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<sup>21</sup> Mr. James Cunningham – Project Lead, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Washington, USA. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL Conference – Vicenza, 07 July 2022.

because it would certainly have had the control of territory, especially in those tribal areas far from Kabul's authority. In this regard, Ambassador Pontecorvo reported that the lack of prestige of the Afghan police was determined, firstly, because police forces were considered a backup force of the army, consequently, the importance of having police forces in crisis areas had been underestimated. Another point raised by the Ambassador was the fact that international community and US intervened in Afghanistan with only a partial view, namely, the war on terror rather the willingness to re-build the society.

From an academic viewpoint, Prof. Moro analysed the importance of inter-organisational learning as a major way to incorporate doctrines and practices into military organisations. Although his intervention was oriented towards the Italian military experience in crisis areas, his speech clearly underlined the need of share experiences collected, learning from diverse military operations from the past.

Prof. Ruffa presented an interesting perspective on how the Alliance/contributing countries worked together in the context of international military operations, recalling that multilateralism on the ground matters for SP missions, which are also as a space of innovation and a great opportunity for socialisation of ideas. In addition, Prof. Ruffa stressed the importance of consistency in which war/the operation is narrated and the need of a coherent narrative as well as the interactions with non-military actors, civilian organisations, particularly humanitarian actors.

Ms Irene Fellin's presentation concluded the Conference by recalling the lessons learned from Kosovo and Afghanistan on the importance of a gender perspective and the deployment of gender advisors in the field. Having female engagement teams creates a possibility to reconnect with the population in a way that it is not possible where only men are deployed. Ms. Fellin stressed that while NATO is no longer present in Afghanistan as an institution, NATO allies remain engaged, noting the Alliance and voluntary and non-governmental organisations' humanitarian effort in support to the evacuation of Kabul's airport in August 2021. Recalling the 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Ms. Fellin emphasised the centrality of human security aspect, including the protection of civilians and civilian harm mitigation, which have been included, as well as gender perspectives, in the agenda of the new NATO Strategic Concept, marking a progress in the future Alliance's approach to crisis prevention and management. In this regard, Ms. Fellin reported the Warsaw Summit in 2016, when NATO adopted the policy for the protection of civilians with the aim of setting out a coherent consistent and integrated approach towards protecting civilians in NATO-led operations. To be effective, concluded Ms. Fellin, "our policy on PoC explicitly emphasises also the importance of stability policing in relation to training the local police forces which can be critical to protect the civilian population during or after a conflict".

### 3.3 TAKE AWAYS

Every country is unique. As the International Community (IC) is about to go into a country like Afghanistan or other countries, they should know that every country is unique in how they do policing, from culture to history to midterm criminality<sup>22</sup>.

An effective police is required to stabilise a country. An effective police force will be able to provide the rule of law and law enforcement to stabilise a country. It is critically important in post-conflict fragile states that the IC has the ability to provide this type of police assistance to develop an effective police force.

Everybody has a different approach and a different model. There is no NATO standard for international police assistance, there is no NATO standard for how a police force should be organised. Everything is unique, so now the IC not only has to encounter the HN culture and history, but also needs to understand that all of us are coming with our own history and our culture.

Doing nothing is destabilising, as it was noticed in Afghanistan, not getting into that “golden hour” period, will allow people that are competing for power and for influence to use the police forces for political gains. Not intervening from day one, will create the conditions mentioned above to infiltrate into that society and law and order and by the time the police advisors are there their chances to reform that police force is significantly harder<sup>23</sup>.

Police assistance and strategies must be coordinated with other criminal justice components and that is a big issue that it was encountered in Afghanistan. The police assistance component developing capability capacities within the police was often gone and was not coordinated with the justice reform.

The IC must include the ability to do embedded long-term partnership with the nations. That is a big problem within NATO environment. Advisors were deployed for 6 months without engaging them again or engage them with a different approach. How can this long-term embedded advising be done? How does the IC ensure that the right people with the right capabilities are partnering with those forces on a long-term basis? The best models to develop capacity, capability in security sector are those that have long term embedded international advisors and support. Short deployments or periodic deployments are just not as successful.

The IC should send on the ground police mentors that have the technical capabilities, professional experience and tailored training to not only deliver appropriate police assistance, but also to be able to teach in the specific environment of the HN.

The IC needs to ensure that its training reforms outlast the international police assistance mission by building a “social contract” between international advisors, the government and police forces.

This is the process that needs to be in force in order to develop a reliable and effective police force and from here the objectives and the outcomes that it should be monitoring to

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<sup>22</sup> Mr. James Cunningham – Project Lead, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Washington, USA. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL Conference – Vicenza, 07 July 2022.

<sup>23</sup> Mr. James Cunningham – Project Lead, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Washington, USA. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL Conference – Vicenza, 07 July 2022.

be effective in the future for creating systems that outlast the IC engagement<sup>24</sup>.

#### 4. WAY AHEAD

The international community failed to apply these same lessons to Afghanistan before the collapse of the Afghan government and security forces. The opportunity to apply the lessons from Afghanistan to future police assistance and reconstruction missions should not be wasted.

How the international community can prevent next intervention, that it is planned, from not having same issue of going back into civil war because they cannot ensure the rule of law or an effective criminal justice system? What are the lessons that were learned? What are some of the things that the international community can take away from Afghanistan? First, develop a common operation picture with all local and international stakeholders. Understand what is the international community's objective, what the international community's intents to do in that country, what the international community wants to achieve, how the international community is approaching this problem, where externally the international community will have the same issues with the host nation, and what are they seeking in common operations?

Many countries might have a different approach but as long as they have the same objectives, the same goals and they recognise how they are performing, they will have success. To have that, they need to have their framework that clearly identifies activities and responsibilities. Who is going to be responsible for what to make sure they are not duplicating work, and not countering the way in which they are approaching their work in the police assistance environment<sup>25</sup>.

The international community should consider establishing a combined hub where they can participate by providing technical support, capacity building, case development advising, and sharing of intelligence and investigative leads. A central hub will not only synergise donor efforts and minimise working at cross purposes, but it will enable more effective oversight of donor funds and programming<sup>26</sup>.

Of the many shortcomings of [...] strategy in Afghanistan, the trials and tribulations of Afghan police development represent a crucial, but often overlooked, piece of the narrative.

When contextualised alongside monumental challenges and rare glimmers of hope, the legacy of Afghan policing also imparts lessons relevant, not just for the future of Afghanistan, but for state-building and stabilisation efforts the world over<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> Mr. James Cunningham – Project Lead, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Washington, USA. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL Conference – Vicenza, 07 July 2022.

<sup>25</sup> Mr. James Cunningham – Project Lead, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Washington, USA. Paraphrasing during the NSPCOE LL Conference – Vicenza, 07 July 2022.

<sup>26</sup> SIGAR, Lessons learned report: "Police in conflict: Lessons from the U.S experience in Afghanistan", June 01, 2022, p. 192;

<sup>27</sup> Karl Nicolas Lindenlaub, October 20, 2020, *Afghanistan's Policing Failure and the Uncertain Way Forward* ([thestrategybridge.org](http://thestrategybridge.org));



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## ACRONYMS LIST

Acronym	Meaning
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AUP	Afghan Uniformed Police
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan
ESME	External Subject Matter Experts
FDD	Focused District Development
IC	International Community
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
LL	Lessons Learned
HOTO	Hand-over Take-over
HN	Host Nation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission Afghanistan
NVG	Night Vision Goggles
PMT	Police Mentor Team
POMLT	Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
PTC	Police Training Centre
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOP	Standardised Operating Procedure
SPCOE	Stability Policing Centre of Excellence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
US	United States
WS	Workshop





**NATO SP COE LL Workshop and Conference**  
***“Stability Policing in Afghanistan: did NATO miss an opportunity?  
Lessons from a 20-year campaign”***



***Vicenza (Italy), 5 -7 July 2022***