

Stability Policing¹ (SP) in supporting fragile countries' resilience

by Marco Codispoti

It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change. C. Darwin 1809

Abstract

During or in the aftermath of modern conflicts and security crises, just because they target all aspects of states and societies, it has become increasingly important to support the country's resilience² through the defence of its population's rights and freedom, the economy and the effective functioning of its democratic institutions. Indeed, "Conflicts are fought in new, innovative, and radically different ways. With the advent of modern hybrid warfare,

they are less and less about lethal or kinetic force³". Consequently, attacks by violent non-state actors, can durably compromise the development of the State resilience. For the above reasons, during the last decades, the latter took particular importance within the Alliance becoming "the first line of defence" in the light of the new threats towards countries whose capabilities may be overwhelmed by a hybrid attack, natural disasters, pandemic, grey-zone aggression, involving non-conventional means including cyber4. For the sake of population's resilience, each institution can play an important role: Law Enforcement⁵ (LE), being part of the state institutions, has the role to avoid the exposure of the civilian population to threats while maintaining the Rule of Law 6(RoL), if the security environment permits to do it. On the contrary, in fragile or unstable countries, when LE cannot or do not perform their tasks, SP assets can contribute to the re-establishment of a Safe And Secure Environment (SASE) and freedom of movement, the restoration of public order and security and, most importantly, of the basic services and state infrastructure. While the above tasks are deemed enabling factors for the resilience of a population, trust and social cohesion seem neglected.

What is Resilience?

Resilience, in common parlance, has at least a double meaning. If referred to toughness, resilience is the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties while when referred to elasticity it is the ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape. In ecology, resilience means "the capacity of an ecosystem to respond to a disturbance by resisting damage and recovering quickly". Social sciences have produced a growing body of literature on the social dimensions of



resilience showing, for example, that a society's resilience rests on the capability of its citizens: healthy, empowered people are more

able to cope with all manner of crises, from crop failures to hurricanes⁷. Although resilience's meaning may slightly differ depending on the context, the takeaways from the natural world can teach how to strengthen societies' pre-

paredness and capacity to respond to crises such as modern conflicts or pandemics; therefore, based on the context, different definitions of resilience exist. One of these comes from the UN Office for Disaster Reduction, that defines resilience as "The ability of a system,

community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and


"DURING OR IN THE AFTERMATH OF MODERN CON- a crisis, whi-FLICTS AND SECURITY CRISES, JUST BECAUSE THEY le ensuring, at TARGET ALL ASPECTS OF STATES AND SOCIETIES, IT the same time, the continuity of HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO SUP-control by cen-PORT THE COUNTRY'S RESILIENCE[1] THROUGH THE tral bodies. This DEFENCE OF ITS POPULATION'S RIGHTS AND FRE-characteristic EDOM, THE ECONOMY AND THE EFFECTIVE FUN-CTIONING OF ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS"

> efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions3". If considered under a sociological perspective, resilience has a more complex meaning. Indeed, a community, in order to survive the occurrence

of an emergency, both of natural and man-made origin, must in advance organize itself to cope with and resolve, reduce and mitiga-

> te the effects of also takes the name of "resilience"; in this case it is defined

as the ability of a society, exposed to dangers, to resist, absorb, meet, adapt, transform and recover in a fast and efficient way, including the conservation and restoration of its essential structures and functions. In addition, regardless to the security environment, the resilience of the populace can vary according to its country's level of fragility because of its weak institutions, political fragmentation, ethnic divisions, as well as low level of trust between population and government.



Under NATO perspective, resilience is a national responsibility and a core element of collective defence8, anchored into the art. 3 of the 1949 Washington Treaty9. While during the Cold War, in case of crisis or wartime, NATO could easily take control of critical infrastructures¹⁰ controlled by a member State, today "the delivery of forces and military capabilities that NATO needs in order to uphold collective defence or to project forces beyond its territory relies on civilian resources11", which can be vulnerable in particular to hybrid attacks. To this regard, the concept of "civil pre-





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paredness"12 refers to the ability to withstand the functions vital to society or, in other words, the action of governments and agencies to enable a nation to survive either enemy attacks or a pandemic and to contribute to the common effort, to achieve resilience. It also means that the civilian sector in Allied Nations would be ready to provide support to a NATO military operation. The development of resilience through civil preparedness notably constitutes a central aspect of "total defence", intended as a security approach involving the "all of society", under the democratic the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat or a pandemic all the way up to the most demanding scenarios¹⁴". Yet NATO continuously updated them over time in light of new challenges, such as the 5G communications standard and, most recently, the response to the coronavirus pandemic. Notably, in 2021, the North Atlantic Council endorsed the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC), which paved the way on how to develop the Alliance's Military Instrument of Power (MIoP) and what it must look like to maintain warfighting advantage for the

crucial to enhance the resilience of the population also during the CO-VID-19 pandemic like, for example:

- Crowd and riot control: LE dealt with riots in prisons (like in Italy and United States, for example) and there is no reason to believe this could be different in areas where SP assets might be deployed (the same applies also for the support to judicial and correction institutions);
- Restoration of public security and public order: in case of social unrest as consequence of food shortages or sickness in theatre of operations or as a consequence of the application of COVID-19



control of political authorities, and through an institutional collaboration between these authorities, the armed forces, civil administrations, law enforcement, the private sector and the public. To this regard, at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO adopted seven baseline requirements¹³ in strategic sectors to serve as yardsticks for national self-assessments. They constitute "the backbone of NATO's approach towards Resilience through civil preparedness", applicable "to

next twenty years. Among the five warfare imperatives proposed, the Alliance included the Layered Resilience, intended as the ability to withstand immediate shocks to supply lines of communications, as well as attacks in the cognitive domain over long periods¹⁵.

Can Stability Policing support resilience in a fragile country?

During the last years, a series of tasks, falling under the heading of the SP remit¹⁶, have proved to be

restrictions, all over the world; - Counter-organized crime¹⁷: with particular attention to shark loans/usury and computer crimes;

- Traffic control: by supporting local authorities in enforcing lockdowns or other emergency like natural or manmade disaster;

- Counter Terrorism: by providing specialized and dedicated investigative units and tools with specific police skills, expertise and civil-oriented mind-set to contrast terrorist organizations by judicial means





(criminal investigations, arrests...). Among other important SP tasks, fighting corruption, as part of Building Integrity efforts, plays also a pivotal role in building the civil preparedness and the resilience of local police forces, whose accountability is fundamental to achieve efficient and sustainable results in the recovery period. For the same reason, the Cultural Property Protection effort plays an extraordinary role in preserving the community's identity and resilience, keeping social, ethnic and religious identity more cohesive and stronger. The same goes for Protection of Civilian, since the security of critical civilian infrastructures and the continuity of essential services fall under the SP heading tasks. Besides the above tasks, SP assets proved to be able to support population by a large number of additional, non-strictly police related activities, as for example delivering medicines, incomes, assistance, pro-

tect citizens as it is still in place in NATO operations in the Balkans.


Lessons from Kosovo

NATO doctrine recognized the prominent role played by LE actors in the context of military contribution to peace support¹⁸ and military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction¹⁹, praising the concept of Multinational Specialized Units (MSU)20, especially in support of a fragile or unstable country, after the collapse of institutions and LE, neither able nor willing to contrast threats and deal with the security crisis. In this situation local LE can provide the capability to establish RoL only if the security environment permits to do it. In Bosnia and Kosovo crises, with security conditions compromised, restoring the RoL and grant the protection of Human Rights, which are enabler factors to the resilience of the population and to reach the SASE, was possible only by the

deployment of MSU²¹ Regiment, which contributed to ensure SASE in the operational area, through proximity/community police methodology, characterized by information gathering, public order and public security management, and by listening and supporting local population needs in the framework of countering crime. The latter example clearly showed that SP assets, when engaged in a fragile or unstable context, could play a crucial role in developing the resilience of the population by providing critical sites security, the rapport building with population and authorities, the protection of people (especially vulnerable groups) and properties, the traffic control and community based policing. In fact, SP lies on the principle of working in partnership with the local, regional, and national communities and authorities. Improving community organization - defined as 'the density of interpersonal



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ties and the prevalence of shared expectation for collective action'22 - is an obstacle to organized-crime groups and the terrorist groups to control territory and reduce the benefits of coercive violence while increasing protection from any tentative of citizen's exploitation. In this vein, Community-based Policing becomes a tremendous opportunity for SP assets to represent the link between local populace and the NATO mission, by the accomplishment of everyday patrolling and promoting interaction with civilians. Population-focused policing aims at ensuring the security needs of all groups in a particular community through its partnership and interagency approach. In this way, the police can facilitate the access to justice, regardless of people's social or economic status. Addressing local needs, while combating crimes, improves overall security and allows the conditions for development to take place. SP efforts must be synchronised at all levels of intervention (local, regional, and national) and must be coordinated with all Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) efforts in order to avoid jeopardising the efforts of all the actors involved²³. This concept was stressed by Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto²⁴, in the context of the adoption of the first UN stand-alone resolution on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) "If the military and the Police were not seen as inclusive enough in the eyes of local people, that mistrust could easily lead to a relapse of conflict"25.

SP and Community Policing perspective²⁶.

One of the major outcomes of the NATO SP concept development workshops²⁷ was the necessity of being aware of cultural sensitivities

and local population's values²⁸, stressing that the core of a successful SP mission depends on the ability of establishing a deep communication with civilians through a community-based policing approach. "SP specialists are pivotal for achieving the goals of the mission. To enhance their effectiveness, they must have very good relationships and communication with local population, creating to the best extend possible a positive, trustworthy environment"29. Under NATO SP CoE's perspective, Community Policing refers to "the systematic use of partnership and the implementation of collaborative effort between the deployed SP assets, the local Police, when existing, and the community, to effectively and efficiently identify, prevent and solve problems of crime, the fear of crime and social disorder, in order to contribute to establish a SASE. It includes proximity policing instruments".30 While the main purpose of Community Policing aims to reduce low-level crime, the broken windows' theory³¹ (an un-repaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing) proposes that this can reduce serious crimes as well. It is a philosophy of policing, which encourages the public to become partners with the police in controlling and preventing crime. It does this by demonstrating to the public that police are prepared to respond to their security concerns, value their advice, and will act in a fair, honest, and impartial manner. While immediate effect of policing on crime may be limited, community-oriented policing, complemented with intelligence-led policing³², may help the host nation police forces in long-term crime reduction, thus enhancing the re-

silience of the population and of institutions to other threats. Increased sharing of intelligence beyond the limits of the law enforcement may also enable local authorities, aid agencies and health and education assistance programmes to have a greater potential to impact on a wider range of crime causal factors. As correctly argued in the Community Policing framework concept "Community Policing is not a mere instrument that the SP assets can actually take advantage of, while a fundamental component of the SP strategy to achieve the mission. It is also the most challenging part of an SP mission, as it requires a comprehensive approach, which means not only interacting but also working, relating and collaborating with civilians. private sector, civil Host Nation Institutions and communities as well as civil International Organizations and non-Governmental Organizations. Community Policing puts the military and the civil societies in close partnership to reach together the common good of a SASE. This requires mutual understanding and respect. The specific role of SP assets in this regard varies accordingly with the stage of the S&R process and with the mission assigned to the SP assets themselves"33.

Trust in building resilience

Trust and social cohesion are overlooked factors in building resilience. In the essay "Collaboration for Resilience" Bruce Evan Goldstein's³⁴ analysis showed that resilience depends on the community's ability to reconnect the bonds and connections. When trust falls between the elements of a system, in the middle of a critical event, lack of confidence hampers cooperative strategies and collective



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solutions, especially if these require a high degree of coordination between many actors. Collaboration in building resilience might be as well an important factor whether referred to Allied Countries or in case of unstable environments. In both cases, the civilian population can be the target and/or the main victim of the majority of risks and vulnerable to armed conflict, hybrid warfare, large-scale violence or other instability, including the inability to deal with transnational threats or other significant similar challenges. At the same time, the civilian population, if properly prepared, can transform in the first line of defence against any threats, as revealed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Indeed, the effectiveness of the coronavirus response depended primarily on citizens' acceptance and respect of the measures set out by authorities. Thus, both within stable and unstable/ fragile countries it is crucial for local LE, and/or SP assets when engaged, to place citizens at the heart of resilience-building efforts. To this regard, LE are able to provide a feeling of security through proximity to the local population only if the security environment permits to do it, in order to constantly reaffirm and strengthen ties between citizens and their democratic values and institutions. "Building, re-building, and fortifying trust remains critical to creating durable resilience in the face of hybrid threats that acutely imperil the security at the state and societal levels. Trust-building within and across communities ought to be the linchpin of efforts to neutralise hybrid warfare and threats"35.

Conclusions

Recent experiences showed that

the pure use of military force was less effective than non-military means to achieve political and strategic goals. This is due to the unpredictable number of subjects and disparate asymmetrical actions, characterized by a combination of military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces³⁶, through which these threats can arise, while, in principle, facing these menaces requires the involvement of the whole LE existing in a fragile country to mitigate the effects of an attack, while ensuring, at the same time, the continuity of control by central bodies. At the same time, trust between the population and LE has also demonstrated to be a key factor for a country to be resilient. As matter of fact, like in a synchronized natural mechanism, there is an interdependence among different factors such as civil preparedness, community policing, physical proximity and resilience of the population, which are inter connected and complementary. Ultimately, the integration among the above elements of such mechanism works in synergy to spread social cohesion and mutual trust between population and institutions. Under these circumstances, LE's main task remains to ensure the continuity of control by central bodies not only by enforcing traditional policing but also by enhancing awareness on population needs, reducing community disorder, helping to mitigate residents' fears about crime, solving problems, and caring for victims. Recognition of mutual interdependence becomes a factor of credibility between the population and between the population and the institutions and turns into social confidence by increasing community resilience. For the same reasons, building resilience matters also whenever SP supports S&R activities and/or the host nation local Police's Capacity building efforts. By reinforcing or temporarily replacing LEAs, SP brings about a more police-like mind-set, aimed at reaching the end-state also through non-combat-oriented approaches instead of focusing solely on the conventional military defeat of the adversary.

note

1 Defined as "Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace Indigenous Police Forces in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of public order and security, Rule of Law (RoL), and Protection of Human Rights". (NATO Allied Joint Publication AIP 3-22)

2 "the ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks and stresses, such as natural disaster or an armed attack, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors and resources" https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/02/27/resilience-the-first-line-of-defence/

3 Arsalan Bilal (2021), Hybrid Warfare-New Threats, Complexity, and "Trust" as the Antidote. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/ pag. 1 4 To this regard, cyber resilience is defined as "the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from and adapt to adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources regardless of the source" National Institute of Standards and Technology Computer Security Resource Centre – U.S. Department of Commerce

5 For the purpose of this article, we adopt the Army Techniques Publication ATP No. 3-39.10 Police Operations Headquarters, Department of the Army 2015 definition of Law enforcement: "the activities by personnel authorised by legal authority to compel compliance with and investigate violation of, laws, directives, and punitive regulations"

6 With "rule of law", we clearly refer to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and



which are consistent with international human right norms and standards (UN Report 2004) 7 Laurie Mazur. (2014) "To build resilience through development. Learn from population, health, and environment programs". Laurie Mazur, 2014. To Build Resilience Through Development, Learn From Population, Health, and Environment Programs (newsecuritybeat. org)

8 As per article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Collective Defence is the cornerstone of NATO. This means that an attack against one of its members is considered as an attack against all Allies

9 Art. 3 of the Washington Treaty affirms that "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"

10 Railways, ports, airports

11 Shea J.(2018) Joint Air & Space Power Conference 2018-The Fog of Day Zero – Joint Air & Space in the Vanguard Jamie Shea https://www.japcc.org/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/

12 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics 49158.htm

13 Which are: 1. An assured continuity of government and critical government services: communicate them and enforce them in a crisis. 2. Resilient energy supplies: back-up plans and power grids, internally and across borders 3. The ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people to de-conflict these movements from NATO's military deployments. 4. Resilient food and water resources: ensuring these supplies are safe from disruption or sabotage. 5. The ability to deal with mass casualties: ensuring that civilian health systems can cope and those sufficient medical supplies are stocked and secure. 6. Resilient civil communications systems: ensuring that telecommunications and cyber networks function even under crisis conditions. 7. The functioning of transport systems: ensuring that NATO forces can move across Alliance territory rapidly and that civilian service can rely on transportation networks, even in a crisis

14 Shea J. (2016). "Resilience: a core element of collective defence". NATO review magazine 15 John W. Tammen (20121) NATO's Warfighting Capstone Concept: anticipating the changing character of war- https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/07/09/natos-warfighting-capstone-concept-anticipating-the-changing-character-of-war/index.html

16 NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.22, Annex A

17 Organised criminal operations range from illegal protection and extortion rackets to the trafficking and/or smuggling of illicit drugs, humans, firearms and wildlife, cybercrime, oil theft, money laundering, counterfeiting and maritime piracy (Costa, 2010; UNODC, 2010) 18 NATO Allied Joint Publication - AJP 3.4.1 19 NATO Allied Joint Publication - AJP 3.4.5

20 Regimental-sized military units mainly composed of police forces with military status with civilian policing background. The Carabinieri from Italy have provided MSU's organisational framework since the inception of this unit; notwithstanding, Military Police and traditional military assets can support in discharging some tasks through their personnel, provided they have relevant equipment and training

21 MSU established in February 1998 during NATO countries Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting, where it was decided that NATO Police Forces with Military Status would be used for such multinational asset and the unit was inserted as integral part of NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia Herzegovina and NATO KFOR in Kosovo. From 2001, MSU became operational on 6 August 1998 with the aim of creating, keeping and promoting legality in post-conflict transition areas and was also deployed in Albania and Iraq

22 NATO SP COE contribution to ACT - RFS 20#042 / NATO COVID-19 LL Campaign. Microsoft Word - 2_ Impact of organise crime and terrorism to the governance.docx (nato.int)

23 NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP - 3.22 24 Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations in 2014

25 Available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11369

26 There is no NATO agreed term of CP. The Oxford English Dictionary defines CP as "System of assignment of police officers to specific geographical areas, so that they familiarize themselves with the local population" while the OSCE refers indifferently to Community-based policing and Community oriented policing as "an organizational philosophy and strategy that allows the police and the community to work together to solve crime, unrest and insecurity problems, in order to improve the quality of life for each member of the community" (OSCE. 2008)

27 NATO SP Concept development workshops were held on October 2016 and June 2017 with the aim to establish a baseline of current knowledge by understanding and/or identifying the complexities and variables involved in building a viable SP capability. Stability Policing: A Tool to Project Stability, NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 2000 Stingo, V., Dziedzic, M. J., & Barbu, B., 2017 pag.27 28 Stability Policing: A Tool to Project Stability, NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 2000 Stingo, V., Dziedzic, M. J., & Barbu, B., 2017

29 Ibid

30 "SP Framework Concept for Community Policing in NATO S&R OPS" edited by NATO SP COE (Ed.1 22 March 2016)

31 George L. Kelling, James Q. Wilson (1982), "Broken Windows: The police and neighbourhood safety", pp. 29–38

32 "Intelligence-led policing" (ILP) defined as "The use of processed information, i.e., data analysis and crime intelligence, as the fundamental basis for an objective, decision-making framework to facilitate crime and problem prevention, reduction, disruption and dismant-

ling through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies targeting serious crimes and/or prolific offenders. Intelligence informs and influences the police by helping them more effectively decide on priorities, the allocation of resources and strategies to reduce crime United Nations Police". Specialised Training Materials 2021. 004 UNPOL STM Lesson 6 Intelligence-led Policing.pdf

33 https://www.nspcoe.org/documents/%20 Stability%20Policing%20Framework%20Concept%20for%20Community%20Policing%20 in%20NATO%20Stabilization%20and%20Reconstruction%20operations

34 E. Bruce Goldstein is Associate Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Pittsburgh and currently teaches courses about the mind for the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at Carnegie-Mellon University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Arizona 35 Arsalan Bilal (2021), NATO Review. Hybrid Warfare- New Threats, complexity, and Trust as the Antidote. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/11/30/hybrid-warfare-new-threats-complexity-and-trust-as-the-antidote/

36 NATO - Topic: NATO's response to hybrid threats

PICTURES: 1 Image by NATO 2 Image by NATO 3 Image by NATO 4 Image by NATO



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Capt. - Italian Carabinieri NATO SP CoE Lessons Learned Analysis, Evaluation & Experimentation Section Staff Officer



