



The global pandemic and the rule of law: a stress test for Law Enforcement and NATO Stability Policing?

by Marco Codispoti

"[...] the end of the law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For in all the states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be where there is no law: and is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists. (For who could be free when every other man's humour might domineer over him?). But a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be the subject

of the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own." ¹
JOHN LOCKE 1632-1704

Introduction.

With "rule of law" (RoL) we clearly refer to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independent-

lation and the economy, requires a profound reflection on the organisation and resilience of our societies. In this globalised world such emergencies can spread more quickly and recur much more frequently than in the past and provoke further pandemics, such as "hunger pandemic", "inequality pandemic" and a "pandemic of authoritarian rule"². The emergency constituted an unprecedented challenge with very

"THE CURRENT PANDEMIC, WITH ITS DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES ON THE POPULATION AND THE ECONOMY, REQUIRES A PROFOUND REFLECTION ON THE ORGANISATION AND RESILIENCE OF OUR SOCIETIES."

ly adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human right norms and standards¹. The current pandemic, with its dramatic consequences on the popu-

severe socio-economic consequences³ and further exacerbated state fragility, acting as a multiplier of force for pre-existing vulnerability factors, not to men-



tion threats to vulnerable groups, domestic violence, civil disturbances and riots, looting, cybercrime and – due to the deteriorating security environment – any form of trafficking and counterfeiting. The sum of these threats poses a number of challenges for the Law Enforcement (LE)⁴, in the entire world, based on the assumption that the concept of RoL is something to achieve for all states, without distinction from stable or fragile/unstable⁵ ones. Ultimately, Law Enforcement Agencies⁶ (LEAs), besides their daily routine tasks, are requested also to enforce sometime unpopular protective health restrictions, safeguard public institutions, and lastly, protect themselves from the risk of COVID contamination.

Rule of Law vs Rule by law.

Generally, to counter this trend affecting the already precarious health situation and the perception of insecurity, some countries have introduced broad and sometimes draconian measures, namely



emergency laws, curbing freedom of movement, speech and assembly⁷ in the name of public health, further heightening the risk of autocracy⁸, **risking descent from rule**

of law to rule by law⁹. Examples of backsliding include attacks on the independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court officials, as well as democratic society¹⁰.

*In these cases, where governments responded with an expanded role and the forceful presence of LEAs, challenges emerged, including perceptions of bias, disproportionate use of force, and other human rights issues*¹¹. Under these circumstances,

professional LEAs, trusted by and responsive to the needs of society are always critical to maintaining RoL, ensuring legal certainty and clarity in public communication, providing public safety, fostering an environment in which governance can flourish, and providing situational awareness and criminal intelligence¹². This could help to avoid aggravating social tensions, grievances and underlying causes of conflict – and preventing conflict is perhaps an imperative

now more than ever, as prospects for large-scale investment in conflict-management and post-conflict recovery fall victim to scarce resources¹³. In addition, restriction measures had negative impact on people's mental well-being, put pressure on their

relationships and caused stress, thus potentially contributing to an increase in domestic violence also called "Shadow Pandemic"¹⁴, as the movement-limiting measu-

res during the lockdown made it more difficult for victims to escape from aggression and receive assistance from healthcare service.



The pandemic, a stress test for Law Enforcement.

While fear leads government in taking restrictive measures to gain precious time for health systems to adapt to the new challenges, *societal values are under public scrutiny*, turning the pandemic in a *genuine stress test* for LE and its agencies around the globe¹⁵. In case a fragile/unstable country needs to cross over a crisis and re-build its institutions, RoL is an important facilitator in this process. As matter of fact, while in strong enforced RoL societies, the citizens can rely on effective, transparent, and accountable institutions¹⁶, whenever crisis hits weak or fragile/unstable states that are unwilling or incapable to control the situation, **the void that is left unattended allows crime to thrive and offers a bolthole for extremists to further destabilize** an already weak country¹⁷. Similarly, perceived inequalities in the administration of the law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for instability, with consequences also on military operations, which might support LE also in peacetime. One example of the latter is the case of "... *distribution of emergency aid, medical supplies,*



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*and economic stimuli provide ample opportunity for corruption and fraud. Without effective institutions that ensure transparency, accountability and oversight, much of it will not reach intended beneficiaries, deepening the social, medical and economic crisis and compromising and delaying recovery*¹⁸. It is then of paramount importance that, both in a weak and in a stable country, all actions taken by a government and its LE officers in attempting to restore stability are legal and perceived as legitimate. LE officers are more effectively able to carry out their duties and responsibilities if they are perceived as having legitimate authority by the citizenry that they serve¹⁹.

Among other challenges posed by the pandemic.

As the COVID-19 pandemic spread, LE had to take unprecedented steps to enforce restrictions and contain people's anger and violent reaction, which may con-

do not riot as a spontaneous reaction when they are frustrated, or they do not get what they want. Even when people are starving, this does not necessarily generate food riots. Rather, people need to feel that the way the crisis is being handled appears unjust and that they share a collective grievance with others in the same boat as themselves (their in-group). Second, they need to identify a clear source (or outgroup) who is responsible for their plight and who they can target²⁰. As experience showed, also **prison riots** started as consequence of the counter measures against the virus; new internal rules imposing to the inmate's restrictions by cancelling the visits (hyper isolation of prisoners); lack of protective masks in the prison system which lead to a few deaths among the inmates. Actually, according to the "breakdown" perspective, *riots occur when there is a breakdown of consensus between the prison administration*

bal governance, there is the degree to which organized crime may use the breach created by the political and social crises that the virus is bringing about to expand its impact, and build its legitimacy and reach with communities and governments alike. A number of organized criminal groups have traditionally attempted and succeeded in maintaining the monopoly of control of illegal activities at the local level, by imposing protection on all types of economic businesses and corrupting local political institutions. For some types of organized criminal groups that are traditionally linked to a specific geographical area, the control of the territory remains their main strength and source of power. It is through territorial control that they will try to take advantage of the coronavirus crisis to infiltrate the medical supply chain, penetrate the legal economy, gain access to national resources and, in general, influence post-COVID-19 policies for their own benefit. *To enforce this form of territorial control, these criminal groups often need to build the image of a sort of "state within the state", able to provide aid and support to the local community and, at the same time, discourage any form of criticism and dissent through intimidation and violence*²². The financial crisis and the potential bankruptcy of several enterprises, shops and economic activities, may represent further opportunities for organized crime to penetrate and infiltrate the legal economy. Moreover, organized crime has been able to exercise direct or indirect control over key economic activities in fragile sectors, including the food distribution chain and the food processing and manufacture. It is expected that crimi-



tribute to weaken institutions and government action, and to prevent organized crime to exploit the voids created by the crisis to expand its impact, build its legitimacy and spoil communities and governments alike. A large body of evidence shows that people

*and incarcerated people, which leads the administration to shift towards coercive methods of control, making prisoners feel that they have nothing to lose by rebelling*²¹. Among other hard challenges to the global community and to glo-



nal groups will try to profit at the maximum from these prospects, infiltrating sectors that have a high

ted during the current pandemic²⁴.

Stability Policing²⁵ plays a fundamental role in enforcing the RoL in fragile states.

According to the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, NATO will actively employ an appropriate combination of capabilities “to help manage deve-



potential of becoming strategic after the pandemic by responding to potential food or other commodities' shortages created by lockdowns and economic crisis in different parts of the world²³. As matter of fact, in the local governance space, there are three categories of actors operating interdependently: the state with its institutions, local authorities and LE; the civil society; and the local-strongmen that challenge legitimate authority, often in the form of organized crime. In places where state institutions are strong, the latter category is kept under control and distant from people's everyday lives, though never entirely absent, whilst in weak states, there are fewer barriers and greater opportunities for criminal strongmen, who see the pandemic more as an opportunity rather than as an ordeal. The same applies to terrorists, who have always used the aftermath of humanitarian emergencies to strengthen their ties in the communities and to leverage national governments for greater influence, as also demonstra-

*veloping crises before they escalate into conflicts, to stop on-going conflicts and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security*²⁶. The above-mentioned concept is also highlighted in the AJP 3.22, which states “Stability Policing operations can be performed across the full spectrum of operations, and could start when the environment is still unstable”. Indeed, in “unstable states”, the previous list of threats²⁷ will likely deteriorate the rule of law and spoil²⁸ the Peace Pro-

cess²⁹; consequently, the Judiciary and LE structures could progressively lose their effectiveness. To this regard, one of the conclusions assessed in the Spoiler threats Assessment - summary report”, issued by NATO SP COE, was indeed, “Stability Policing can play an important role in the early spoiler assessment and identification phase and in putting in place effective mitigating measures against them, especially if the spoilers belong to categories such as Criminalised Power structures”³⁰. The last sentence implies that the stability of these states depends, above all, on the commitment of their institutions to promote an acceptable standard of governance. The conditions may span from a failing to recovering state. In the “Failing States”, the condition is still viable but it is characterised by a reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation, a failing state may transition to a recovering or a failed state³¹. The latter could more easily appear if the cause of threats are left unaddressed and lead to civil war or other conflict while institutions are unable to effectively govern and protect the population. In contrast, it will turn into a reco-



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vering state when general situation of the country is moving toward normalcy but may have an imperfect level of viability. To this regard, a key consideration is whether the population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable normal and legitimate. In fact, as stated in NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing - AJP 3.22: *"The prospect of long-term stable governance only occurs when influence is exercised over a population and territory by*

methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the majority of the governed. The rule of law, based on three pillars (LE, judicial, and correctional) must be addressed concurrently, is fundamental to legitimate governance, and may be institutionalized in

varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural, and political characteristics of the particular society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by the externally imposed criteria.

The security gap³².



One of the conclusions of the "Brahimi Report"³³, which introduced the concept of the "security gap" and the requirement for a new peacekeeping structure, was that the lack of qualified and rapidly deployable police capacities resulted in a serious deficiency in several international peacekeeping and peace building missions. The policing gap illustrates the lack of indigenous police capability to provide a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), public secu-

"STABILITY POLICING PLAYS A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN ENFORCING THE RoL IN FRAGILE STATES. ACCORDING TO THE 2010 NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT, NATO WILL ACTIVELY EMPLOY AN APPROPRIATE COMBINATION OF CAPABILITIES TO HELP MANAGE DEVELOPING CRISES BEFORE THEY ESCALATE INTO CONFLICTS, TO STOP ON-GOING CONFLICTS AND TO HELP CONSOLIDATE STABILITY IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS WHERE THAT CONTRIBUTES TO EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY".

urity and the RoL. Stability Policing is intended to close the policing gap. Indeed, the purpose of RoL operations is to foster security and stability for the civilian population by restoring and enhancing the effective and fair administration and enforcement of justice. To reach

these targets there must be synchronization and synergy between efforts to restore, reform, and assist the court and legal system and efforts to restore, reform and assist the public safety system. A judicial system is powerless without an effective public safety system, while a public safety system is not legitimate without a fair and efficient judicial system. Here, SP assets conduct LE mis-

sions with the aim of establishing a SASE, come as support indeed, to better train and equip professional local LEAs as part of NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach³⁴, which means a combination of military and non-military actors, such as NGOs, IOs, and local agencies along indigenous and international police forces. That implies a respected legal framework is essential to gain the support of the local population as a key element for the success of

the mission. Indeed, *"Throughout the spectrum of conflict the initial goal of stability policing is to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for the local populace. Secondly, stability policing re-establishes law and order and strengthens the rule of law through rein-*

forcing local security institutions. In this view, lasting stability can be achieved, under the policing perspective, by preventing violence, protecting borders, personnel, key institutions, tackling organised crime, countering terrorism. Overall stability may only be achieved through a broad range of initiatives extending beyond policing activities³⁵. Is it not the same case in the midst of a harsh pandemic? Developing sustainable good and sincere relations with the local population within the area of responsibility is a strategic goal that the Stability Policing assets must achieve. This will help insulate adversaries like criminals, terrorists or insurgents from the sane population. This last concept relies on the Peelian principles, which define



COVID-19 and the Rule of Law

The effective emergency response that is in line with international standards

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policing by consent as base of the LE³⁶. Also in NATO operations, RoL activities aim to foster security and stability for the civilian population and require a comprehensive approach, involving not only the Alliance but the whole international community and the Host Nation. Indeed, the Allied armed forces are playing a vital role in supporting national civilian responses. *"This support includes logistics and planning, field hospitals, the transport of patients, disinfection of public areas, and at border crossings. Moreover, NATO Comprehensive response plan includes all NATO capabilities in which Stability Policing might play a relevant role in collaborating with the LEAs of the Allies and Partners when they are*

*affected by the pandemic outbreak. Through such a capability within the Alliance, the NATO members and partners might request the Alliance's support in terms of Stability Policing expertise for assisting in identifying ways that NATO might provide any support within their Nations, focusing mainly on a possible support to military and police forces involved in countering the pandemic challenges"*³⁷. Finally yet importantly, the primary responsibility for enforcing domestic criminal and public order law rests with police forces and Gendarmerie Type Forces (GTFs)³⁸ that are specifically organized, trained and equipped for these functions. This is why, in fragile/unstable states, the GTFs represent the su-

itable robust tool to ensure SASE and to strengthen the RoL by reinforcing local security institutions³⁹.

Conclusions.

As we said, the concept of RoL is something to achieve for all states, not just for fragile/unstable ones. It can play, at the same time, the fundamental role of enabler of peace, justice, and inclusion being able to provide a perimeter of legitimacy of the restrictive measures taken in response to the pandemic that hit every country in the world, ultimately bolstering their effectiveness through increased compliance. This implies that RoL also requires that law be understood as a cooperation of institutions. The same applies to NATO Stability Policing when deployed. Indeed, just like a cooperative enterprise, the legislator, the officials and citizens have each one a specific role: to dictate general and practicable rules, to interpret them and apply them in a suitable way, and take them as a guide for his or her own behaviour. In this regard, the effectiveness of government measures to contain the virus and Build Back Better depends, above all, upon the capacity of the LEAs, to provide transparent effective and accountable actions, in adherence with the rule of law. In fact, the latter nurtures trust in institutions and underpins a social contract among citizens, both indispensable to solving a public health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic in which a collective approach is the only way to contain and control the disease. Whenever deployed in unstable state, during emergency crises or in the normalcy, with the largest impact on the day-to-day lives of the population, LEAs fundamental role must remain to provide the feeling



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of security and justice by acting in favour to the populace, according to three principles: legality⁴⁰, accountability and transparency. With the same assumptions, Stability Policing plays an active role in fragile states whenever given an executive mandate bestowed by the UN Security Council Resolution through the Alliance. In the stormy sea created by huge emergencies, the RoL must remain the beacon that orients navigators and offers law based responses to the crisis.

Disclaimer: this paper is a product of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence and its content does not reflect NATO policies or positions, nor represent NATO in any way, but only the NSPCoE or author(s) depending on the circumstances.

PICTURES:
-NATO SP CoE

1. John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, C.B. McPherson ed. (Cambridge 1980) chapter 6, paragraph 57.
2. Polyandemic – Munich Security Report Special Edition on Development, Fragility and Conflict in the Era of Covid-19- Sophie Eisentraut Luca Mieke Laura Hartmann Juliane Kabus November 2020
3. "This devastating recession does not have an economic origin". It will dance largely to the tune of non-economic factors, and is truly global. The crisis has resulted from a policy to tackle a health emergency through containment measures. Hence characterisations such as "putting the global economy into an induced coma" or "into hibernation".... And it has induced contractions in output and employment that have been even steeper than those during the Great Depression. All this means that, in contrast to the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009, the present crisis has three key features. It is truly exogenous, not the result of the unravelling of previous financial imbalances—the typical recession trigger since the mid-1980s. It is

truly uncertain, in the specific sense that the wide range of possibilities depends on unpredictable non-economic factors. And it is truly global: despite how the 2007–2009 crisis is generally portrayed, many countries did not actually experience it, not least in Asia. Report on the comprehensive economic policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/press/press-releases/2020/04/09/report-on-the-comprehensive-economic-policy-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/>

4. For the purposes of this article, "law enforcement" was intended as "the activities by authorised entities to compel compliance with a law, excluding the Judiciary". Not a NATO agreed term
5. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) "a fragile region or state has weak capacities to carry out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or states are also more vulnerable to internal or external shocks such as economic crisis or natural disaster". Fragility refers to a wide array of situation: countries in crisis, countries at war, reconstruction context, humanitarian and natural crises, situations of extreme poverty. In NATO environment, the term "unstable state" is used, rather than "fragile state", to describe, "a state with weak capacity to carry out the basic state functions of governing a population and its territory and that lacks the ability or political will to develop mutual constructive and reinforcing relations with society" (Oxford Dictionary definition). Therefore for the purposes of this article both "fragile" and "unstable" terms are used with the same meaning
6. For the purposes of this article Law Enforcement Agencies are intended "any government agency responsible for the enforcement of the laws"
7. Rule of Law and COVID 19 Policy Brief- International Development Law Organization IDLO, pag.8
8. Anna Luhrmann and Bryan Rooney, 'Autocratization by Decree: States of Emergency and Democratic Decline', 2020, pages 1 and 11, available: https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/31/1d/311d5d45-8747-45a4-b46f-37aa-7ad8a7e8/wp_85.pdf. See also: Richard Youngs and Elene Panchulidze, 'Global Democracy & COVID-19: Upgrading International Support', 2020, available: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Global_democracy_covid-19_report_FINAL_WEB
9. In contrast, Rule by Law is a concept that sees the governing authority as

somehow being above the law, and has the power to create and execute law where they find it to be convenient, despite the effect it has on larger freedoms that people enjoy. To expand on this idea, rule by law is a method that governments and people in power use to shape the behaviour of people, and in terms of governing a country, mass groups of people. This usually has the end goal of psychologically or forcefully persuading people to agree with policy decisions they otherwise would not agree with.

10. See, for example, International IDEA, 'Global Monitor of COVID-19's Impact on Democracy and Human Rights', available: <https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/#/indices/world-map>
11. COVID and the Rule of Law: A dangerous Balancing Act <https://www.un.org/fr/node/80635>
12. Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing (AJP 3.22)
13. COVID and the Rule of Law: A dangerous Balancing Act <https://www.un.org/fr/node/80635>
14. UN Women, the United Nations entity dedicated to gender equality and the empowerment of women, launched the Shadow Pandemic public awareness campaign, focusing on the global increase in domestic violence amid the COVID-19 health crisis. The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, emerging data and reports from those on the front lines, have shown that all types of violence against women and girls, particularly domestic violence, has intensified. <https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-gender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19>
15. Rule Of Law In Tough Times – A Case Study On The Romanian Sanctioning Policy During The Covid-19 Pandemic – Laura TEFAN Cezara GRAM <https://rtsa.ro/tras/index.php/tras/article/view/649>
16. ...that can defend liberty and provide for public safety, including public health...
17. Polyandemic – Munich Security Report Special Edition on Development, Fragility and Conflict in the Era of Covid-19- Sophie Eisentraut Luca Mieke Laura Hartmann Juliane Kabus November 2020
18. COVID and the Rule of Law: A dangerous Balancing Act <https://www.un.org/fr/node/80635>
19. <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL261/better-policing-toolkit/all-strategies/legitimacy-policing/in-depth.html>
20. NATO SP COE – COVID 19 LL Data Collection plan <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/>



- Pages/HomePage.aspx
21. M. Colvins "The penitentiary in crisis: from Accommodation to Riot in New Mexico" Albany N.Y. State University of New York press
 22. Francesco MARELLI, How organized crime is expanding during the covid-19 crisis – United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice UNICRI
 23. This cynical opportunism in times of crisis is by no means unprecedented – mafia groups have long used the aftermath of humanitarian emergencies to strengthen their ties in communities and to leverage national governments for greater influence. The Yakuza gangs have been renowned first responders during earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan; the Jalisco cartel distributed aid to hurricane victims in western Mexico last year; meanwhile, al-Shabaab provides relief and distributes food assistance during Somalia's cyclical droughts <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/covid-19-strengthen-civil-society-in-a-time-of-unprecedented-change-and-undermine-criminal-governance/>
 24. Attacks conducted by terrorists and other violent non-state actors have certainly not ceased. In fact, in Mali, for instance, the first seven months of 2020 saw more fatalities than the whole previous year. In West Africa and the Sahel, groups like Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa province continued with "routine attacks" following a grim pre-pandemic trend. The current worsening situation in Afghanistan is self-explanatory
 25. Police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace Indigenous Police Forces in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of public order and security, rule of law, and protection of human rights (Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing, AJP 3.22 – NATO agreed)
 26. Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic concept for the defence and security of the members of the NATO, adopted by heads of state and government at the NATO summit in Lisbon, 19-20 Nov 2010
 27. See the previous chapter
 28. The Spoiling behaviour describes the act of spoilers who are "individuals that have the power to negatively impact the peace process both willingly and unwillingly. Spoiling behaviours include violent and non-violent methods". Working definition. NATO SP COE Assessment Of Spoiler Threats 2020 LL Branch - Summary Report <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/Pages/HomePage.aspx>
 29. For the purposes of the NATO SP COE Assessment Of Spoiler Threats 2020 LL Branch - Summary Report, the Peace Process is intended "the entire spectrum of activities ranging from the reduction of violence, to the peace agreement, and its related implementation"
 30. On 8-9 October 2019, NATO SP COE, supported by NATO's HQ SACT as Customer, successfully conducted a high-level conference involving the main IOs responsible for providing security (UN, NATO, EU and AU), in close collaboration with other national organizations such as the US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The Conference's purpose, entitled "Assessment of Spoiler Threats: A Shared Requirement", was aimed at bringing together UN, NATO, EU and AU practitioners in order to discuss the assessment processes (including tools) that can be used from the earliest phases of the planning process by these IOs to identify potential spoiler threats that can impact an operation. Its main conclusion was the recognition and mutual agreement of the requirement to develop a coordinated process for assessing spoiler threats affecting the end-states of any international mission
 31. Allied Joint Doctrine AJP 3.22
 32. The need for the NATO to be endowed with a military capability of civil police clearly emerged during the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1997, the Allied Command Europe identified the so called "security gap" in the field of public order and security. The "security gap" was the grey area between the SFOR military capabilities, on the one hand, and the UN IPTF mission, with no executive powers, as well as the capabilities of the local police forces, often either incapable of or unwilling to enforce the law, on the other hand. In this grey area nobody either could or wanted to take responsibility. The gap was bridged by a military unit capable to perform the typical tasks of the civil police: the NATO Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU), made up of gendarmerie-type forces (GTF – also called police force with a military status, PFMS), which are military forces with full civil police capabilities. Since then, this model has been implemented several times and the deployed MSUs have received the contribution of the MP and of infantry forces trained for the specific mission. Therefore, the concept itself of military forces performing police duties to cover the "security gap" has evolved in the current notion of Stability Policing
 33. Issued on 21 August 2000
 34. NATO has learned from its operational experience that military means, although essential, are not enough on their own to meet the many complex challenges to the Alliance's security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a comprehensive approach that effectively combines political, civilian, and military crisis management instruments
 35. Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing AJP 3.22
 36. "The police are the people, and the people are the police". According to Robert Peel's policing vision, "Policing by consent" indicates that the legitimacy of policing in the eyes of the public is based upon a general consensus of support that follows from transparency about their powers, their integrity in exercising those powers and their accountability for doing so
 37. NATO SP COE – COVID 19 LL Data Collection plan <https://nllp.jallc.nato.int/Pages/HomePage.aspx>
 38. An armed force established to enforce the law and that, on its national territory, permanently and primarily conducts its activities for the benefit of the civilian population (draft definition)
 39. In fact, "the rule of law, based on three pillars (law enforcement, judicial, and correctional) must be addressed concurrently. It is indeed fundamental to legitimate governance and may be institutionalised in various forms dependent upon the social, cultural, and political characteristics of the particular society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by externally imposed criteria (AJP 3.22)
 40. The quality or state of being legal. Oxford definition



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