NATO Stability Policing
Centre of Excellence

Stability Policing Framework Concept for the suppression of the counterfeiting of
currency and forgery of identification documents in NATO Stability and
Reconstruction operations

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B. AJP – 3.4.5 “Allied Joint Doctrine for the military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction” (ratification draft).


G. Concept of the NATO Stability Policing Centre of Excellence (NATO SP COE) approved on 15 May 2015 by the Steering Committee.
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1-1. The NATO Strategic Concept at Reference A. commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post – conflict situations since instability or conflicts beyond NATO borders can directly threaten its security. A comprehensive approach, including political, civil and military instruments, is necessary for an effective crisis management and, when a conflict ends, for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. In this regards, illegal activities are accounted as a factor of instability and a consequent possible threat, therefore, the Concept stresses the importance for the Alliance to “develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance”. Furthermore, the Strategic Concept highlights that the Alliance constitutes a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

1-2. The Allied Joint Publication 1 (D) (AJP -1 (D)) and the AJP – 3 series address the importance for the deployed Joint Force Commander (JFC) to tackle, inter alia, also the threats posed by illegal activities and to meet the need to provide the local populace with an effective and accountable police service. The latter is achieved through either replacing the indigenous police forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) or reinforcing their capabilities up to an acceptable standard of efficiency.

1-3. The AJP – 3.4.5 at Reference B. introduces the concept of Stability Policing (SP) as a set of police related activities intended to strengthen or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights in the wider framework of the stabilization and reconstruction process. The AJP – 3.22 at Reference C., while envisaging the definition in the following paragraph 1-7., sets out the specific doctrine for the implementations of SP.

1-4. The Convention at Reference D. lays down rules to effectively prevent, prosecute and punish the offence of counterfeiting currency. In particular, it aims at ensuring that severe criminal penalties and other sanctions can be imposed for offences of counterfeiting currency. All contracting parties to the Convention have to apply the principle of non-discrimination to currencies other than their domestic currency. The EU Directive at Reference E. supplements the provisions and facilitates the application of the above mentioned Convention by the Member States, by providing, inter alia, for the same offences to be punishable.

1-5. The forgery of identification documents is traditionally a crime subject to penal sanctions in all States, often of a high level. That is due to the serious nature and the impact of the crime on the public trust in the genuine character of documents issued by an official authority and on the public security since it conceals the effective identity of the holder. The abuse of a legally issued identification document by a person other than the legal bearer is also punishable in all States.
AIM

1-6. The aim of the document is to provide a framework concept for suppressing the counterfeiting of currency and ancillary offences as well as the forgery of identification documents, as below defined, under the international and Host Nation\(^1\) (HN) legal framework, within the concept of Stability Policing envisaged in NATO doctrine.

SCOPE

1-7. This concept establishes general principles mainly in support of both the planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction activities implemented by NATO (see Ref. B.). It helps identifying the capabilities of the Joint Force (JF), focusing on the specific police capabilities and professional skills that embedded Stability Policing assets should be endowed with, in both the envisioned scenarios of either replacing indigenous police forces or reinforcing them. In particular, it will address the key areas in suppressing the counterfeiting of currency and ancillary offences, the forgery of identification documents, as well as the required support for indigenous forces to combat counterfeiting and forgery.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

1-8. The following definitions are NATO agreed terminology (Reference F.):

- a. Area of operations / Zone d'opérations (AOO): An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities.

- b. Authentic document / Document authentique: A document bearing a signature or seal attesting that it is genuine and official. If it is an enemy document, it may have been prepared for purposes of deception and the accuracy of such document, even though authenticated, must be confirmed by other information, such as conditions of capture.

- c. Authentication / Authentification: Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official.

- d. Counterterrorism / Contreterrorisme (CT): All offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. Note: Such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the defence of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by military forces or civilian organizations.

- e. Host Nation / Pays hôte (HN): A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.

- f. Identification/ Identification: The process of attaining an accurate characterization of a detected entity by any act or means so that high

\(^{1}\) See following para 1-8 for terminology
confidence, real-time decisions, including weapons engagement, can be made.

g. Sector / Secteur: An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.

h. Terrorism / Terrorisme: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

1-9. The following definitions, while envisaged in the NATO doctrine, are not NATO agreed terminology:

a. Stability Policing: a set of police related activities intended to reinforce or temporarily replace indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights (AJP 3.22 – Ratification Draft).

b. Stabilization and Reconstruction: Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, and end social, economic, and political turmoil. Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and re-establishing governmental or societal institutions which were damaged during the crisis (AJP 3.4.5 – Ratification Draft).

1-10. For the purpose of this document the term (the following definitions at letters a., b. and c., are aligned with the legal contents of Reference D., E.):

a. “Currency” is defined as the “notes and coins, the circulation of which is legally authorised”.

b. “Counterfeiting” is defined as “any fraudulent making or altering of currency, whatever means are employed”.

c. “Ancillary offences” means:
  – the fraudulent uttering of counterfeit currency;
  – the import, export, transport, receiving or obtaining of counterfeit currency with a view to uttering the same and with knowledge that it is counterfeit;
  – the fraudulent making, receiving, obtaining or possession of instruments, articles, computer programs and data, and any other means peculiarly adapted for the counterfeiting or altering of currency or security features, such as holograms, watermarks or other components of currency which serve to protect against counterfeiting.

d. “Identification document” is defined as “any certificate issued by an official authority which may be used to verify the personal identity of the bearer”.

e. “Forgery” is defined as “any fraudulent making or altering of identification document, whatever means are employed”.

1-3
CHAPTER 2 – STABILITY POLICING AS A COMPONENT OF THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS

OVERALL MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

2-1. Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) is an overarching concept for stabilizing unstable states, which is addressed throughout the AJP – 3 series, notably in the AJP 3.4 series, with specific focus on the publication at mentioned Reference B. S&R activities may be components of operations conducted within the framework of Peace Support Operations (PSO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA), Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Major Combat Operations, and, in some cases, will overlap with their activities. Even though S&R is categorized as a crisis response, nevertheless, it may also be the result of Art.5 operations.

2-2. The NATO military contribution to S&R may be summarized in:
   a. establishing a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE), where the population has the freedom of movement and is enabled to pursue daily activities without fear of persistent or large-scale violence. The SASE is the general framework that allows all S&R activities to proceed;
   b. restoring public security, which includes the establishment of law and order, the rule of law and a basic legal infrastructure;
   c. contributing to the efforts of international civil agencies or local authorities to restore essential services and infrastructure;
   d. helping establish conditions for meeting longer-term governance requirements.

STABILITY POLICING CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

2-3. The JFC, if so mandated, will have the necessity to conduct police or police-related activities in all the areas of the military contribution to S&R. These activities, which require a police approach, a civil-oriented mindset and a specific set of capabilities, lie within the concept of Stability Policing. Although it may be necessary for conventional military forces to conduct police functions in the initial stage of S&R, in particular when it is the result of art.5 operations, the transition to SP assets consisting of police forces from within the NATO Force or from the Allied or partner Countries should occur as soon as possible.

2-4. SP assets are military assets with a unique capability of civil policing, therefore, they can substitute for the indigenous police forces (when either not existing or unable/unwilling to execute their duties) in performing the full spectrum of police and police-related activities for the advantage of the local population. Moreover, SP assets are able to reinforce the capabilities of failing indigenous police forces up to an acceptable standard of efficiency and effectiveness, through training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, partnering and reforming.
CHAPTER 3 – THE ROLE OF STABILITY POLICING IN SUPPRESSING COUNTERFEITING OF CURRENCY AND FORGERY OF IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS

GENERAL

3-1. Any currency\(^2\) is a pivotal factor in the HN everyday life of its citizens and in that of the deployed NATO forces.

   a. Counterfeit currency has a considerable ill-effect on the society. It harms citizens and entrepreneurs, who are not reimbursed for it even if received in good faith, and results in a lack of credibility for the HN fragile Government and for the deployed NATO forces because they are perceived as unable to protect the society and the economy from such a threat. The circulation of counterfeit currency could lead to consumers’ concerns regarding the sufficient protection of cash, to the fear of receiving counterfeit notes and coins, and to the use of a substitute currency or other means of payments. All this can pave the way for either hindering or even blocking the economical resumption of the HN and the Stabilization & Reconstruction process being implemented by NATO. It can also spread negative effects to the neighbouring Countries and even affect the NATO Member Countries. It is therefore of fundamental importance to ensure trust and confidence in the authenticity of currency.

   b. Counterfeiting of currency and ancillary offences are also a source of income to fund criminal or other destabilizing activity and are often part of a wider criminal network\(^3\), all this causing the weakening of public order and security conditions and the strengthening of criminality. Such a criminal network is likely to be transnational and may have connections even with the criminal environments in NATO Countries, taking advantage of the illegal mints located in the HN for counterfeiting their national currencies: in this regards, counterfeiting can also be categorized as a form of hybrid threat\(^4\).

3-2. Identification documents are displayed as proof of identity, nationality and status within the HN, or affiliation to the deployed NATO Forces and may grant the bearer freedom of movement throughout the Area of Operations (AOO – Ref. F.)\(^5\), the HN or across international borders, access to critical infrastructure or secure locations, including military installations. Fraudulent documents affect the

\(^2\) Including military currency. This NATO agreed term was deleted in 2014, anyway, it is still useful for the purpose of this document. Military currency / Monnaie de stationnement was defined as: currency prepared by a power and declared by its military commander to be legal tender for use by civilian and/or military personnel as prescribed in the areas occupied by its forces. It should be of distinctive design to distinguish it from the official currency of the countries concerned, but may be denominated in the monetary unit of either

\(^3\) Including, for instance, money laundering, smuggling of goods, black market, etc..

\(^4\) Hybrid threats are defined by IMSM-0292-2010 “Hybrid threats description and context” dated 31 May 2010 as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objective”.

\(^5\) See para 1-8 for terminology
proper identification\(^6\) (Ref. F.) of the bearer giving the impostor a screen behind which perpetrating unlawful or criminal activities\(^7\), including hostile acts against NATO Forces and terrorism\(^8\) (Ref. F.), and, of course, concealing a criminal who is already being sought by law enforcement agencies. Therefore the forgery of identification documents, either civil or military, seriously jeopardises public order and security of the HN as well as the security of the deployed NATO Forces and can be categorized as a hybrid threat. Identification documents usually being forged include at least the following: passports, national identity cards, military identity cards, driving licences, residence permits, visa, and official identity documents. The forgery comprises the following array of document abuse:

a. complete reproduction of an authentic document\(^9\) (Ref. F.) to resemble an officially issued document;

b. genuine document that has been unlawfully altered in some way, for example, by substituting a page, a photograph or image or by altering the personal details;

c. fantasy document with no legal basis and not officially issued by a legally recognised State authority or institution, or by an organisation recognised under international law, and, as such, with no legal validity (fantasy documents can occur in various forms and usually have the physical appearance of an official document);

d. use of a legally issued document by an impostor who simply resembles the legal bearer of it. In such cases, there is not a concrete forgery, nevertheless, the misuse of a document (which might have been stolen, lost or its misuse simply accepted by the legal bearer) needs to be assimilated to a forgery in terms of threat to security.

3-3. Counterfeiting and forgery pose an immediate threat to security, directly connect to a wide network of criminal activities, feed criminality, endanger the S&R process and may spread noxious effects to the NATO Countries. They are separate whereas connected criminal areas since they often leverage the same specialized criminal human and logistical resources (e.g. illegal printers or mints or, as a preparatory work, illegal production of instruments and components to counterfeit or forge, e.g. counterfeit official seals) and the same criminal channels to distribute counterfeit currency and forged identification documents. In addition, forged identification documents are often used to fraudulently inject counterfeit currency into the economic system by activities ranging from trafficking with small amounts of cash money to financial frauds. On these grounds, counterfeiting and forgery are associated subjects that need to be addressed together.

THE ROLE OF STABILITY POLICING

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\(^6\) See para 1-8 for terminology
\(^7\) Including, for instance, illegal working, immigration abuse, financial fraud, smuggling, etc..
\(^8\) See para 1-8 for terminology
\(^9\) See para 1-8 for terminology
3-4. The enforcement of law and order in NATO operations, including the suppression of counterfeiting and forgery, is a police activity that is encompassed in the concept of Stability Policing within the wider framework of S&R and lies with the SP assets embedded in the JF. Notably, the suppression of counterfeiting and forgery is connected with a number of SP tasks listed in the publication at Ref. C., in particular with border control, criminal investigations, protection of property, counter-terrorism\(^{10}\) (Ref. F.), counter-organized crime, counter-smuggling.

3-5. The specific role of SP assets in this regards varies in accordance with the stage of the S&R process and with the mission assigned to the SP assets themselves. While the suppression of counterfeiting is likely to assume a key role later in the S&R process, the suppression of forgery needs to be implemented since the very beginning of a NATO Operation, be it Art. 5 or non Art. 5 operation, as fake documents directly affect the security of the deployed JF. Nevertheless, both counterfeiting and forgery need to be addressed as a functional component of the overall campaign to combat criminality since the early planning stage.

3-6. **Replacement mission**

a. A replacement mission might be a Comprehensive Police Replacement Mission (CPRM) or Partial Replacement Mission (PRM), as envisaged at mentioned Reference C.. Despite the type of the mission, SP assets are most likely to have a territorial organization, with each unit exercising police authority and functions in its sector\(^{11}\) (Ref. F.). At the early stage of a replacement mission, notably during major combat operations or art.5 Operations, SP activities may be conducted by conventional military forces or by limited SP assets. The SP primary effort at this stage is to restore acceptable conditions of public order and security and to protect civilians from violence, therefore, there is no need for the JFC to focus on the suppression of counterfeiting and, consequently, for the JF and SP assets to have a dedicated specialized capability. In order to secure the JF, nevertheless, SP assets must always have the professional knowledge of the main features of the authentication\(^{12}\) (Ref. F.) of documents and be able to recognize forged identification documents. To this end, this peculiar professional skill should be widespread and part of the overall professional education of the individual members of the SP assets. Besides, conventional military forces should be able to understand when there is a reasonable doubt about the authenticity of an identification document and request assistance from the SP assets.

b. As soon as the S&R process grows more robust, the suppression of both counterfeiting and forgery needs to become an important component of the overall campaign to combat criminality and establish a SASE. On these grounds, an initial capability of suppressing counterfeiting is to be established within the SP assets and constantly improved. Important references in this regard will be, on the one hand, the economic growth and the possible

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\(^{10}\) See para 1-8 for terminology

\(^{11}\) See para 1-8 for terminology

\(^{12}\) See para 1-8 for terminology
increasing of the relevant criminality, on the other hand, the desired level of the Alliance’s involvement in the replacement or reinforcement of the HN Institutions through the S&R process. At once and along the latter line, the existing limited capability of recognizing forged identification documents must be gradually upgraded to a full police capability able to support, in particular, border control, counter-terrorism and criminal investigation.

(1) Suppression of counterfeiting of currency: the implementation of this capability may require the establishment of a dedicated central unit that is to become the hub for expertise in the specific field as well as an intelligence and evidence fusion centre, collating and analysing all the data anyway collected throughout the AOO. Taking into consideration that illegal mints operating in the HN may counterfeit also other Countries’ currencies, including those of the NATO Member Countries, it is important that intelligence and investigation connections are made with the law enforcement agencies of the possible target Countries and with the relevant International Organizations (e.g. Interpol, Europol, etc.). To suppress counterfeiting it is crucial that, besides the suppression of cash counterfeit currency, a campaign be launched to spot illegal mints, distribution hubs of counterfeit currency and possible transnational channels of smuggling as well as to control the specialist materials required to counterfeit.

(2) Suppression of forgery of document: the implementation of this capability may also require the establishment of a central unit, strictly connected with border control and counter-terrorist activities. A campaign, identical to that one launched against counterfeiting, should be launched to target illegal print houses and distribution hubs and channels as well as the control of the specialist materials required for forgery.

(3) To more efficiently combat counterfeiting and forgery, the best organizational choice would be the integration of both the central units into one integrated central unit responsible for both subjects.

c. The applicable law will be stated in the mandate, nevertheless, the Convention at Ref. D. establishes minimum rules for combating the counterfeiting of currency.

3-7. **Reinforcement mission**

a. A reinforcement mission is likely to be even more complex than a replacement mission since it involves a conspicuous number of interactions with key Institutions of the HN, which is presumably retaining at least partial legitimate sovereignty, or with international Institutions, such as the UN or the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), that may be operating in the HN. Moreover, in case of monitoring, mentoring, advising, reforming and partnering, the deployment of SP assets might be limited to a cluster of specialized individual Officers detached to the HN Institutions without the immediate support of the JF, which makes the assigned task more demanding. With regards to the latter case, the key factors of a reinforcement
mission are the personal skills and the professional qualifications of the deployed Officers. The end state in terms of suppression of counterfeiting and forgery should be the establishment of a dedicated integrated central unit or central units, as above described, complimented by a network of HN Officers able to deal with the specific matters, either exclusively or as part of their general duties. A dedicated network responsible for both subjects and subordinate to an integrated central unit, if actionable according to the general organization of the indigenous police force, would be the best option.

b. Training of the indigenous police. This specific activity focusses on collective professional education and training (E&T) and it is likely to be conducted by a dedicated SP training asset in training centres, on a cyclic basis. Generic issues in terms of counterfeiting and forgery, referring to both the international legal framework, for counterfeiting, and the domestic legislation, for both the subjects, will be incorporated in the training curricula, as part of the common education and training delivered to the indigenous police. The ambition of the training objectives will vary in accordance with the rank and the role of the trainees. Besides, some indigenous police Officers should receive advanced collective E&T, in order to establish the integrated central unit/central units and to form the network of qualified police personnel scattered throughout the HN able to prevent and investigate counterfeiting and forgery. The same Officers, when assigned to their posts, might be monitored, mentored, partnered with or advised by specialized SP Officers, as outlined below, and become the core of a self – sustainable and autonomous indigenous training capability in these specialized areas.

c. Monitoring/mentoring/advising/partnering with and reforming the HN Institutions. While the previous activity is a collective one, this group of reinforcement activities aims at strengthening the professional and personal capacities of the individual HN high-ranking Officers. This group of activities is the most demanding and, in the specific area of suppression of counterfeiting and forgery, might address not only the indigenous police but also other HN Institutions, either administrative or judicial, that have a specific legal competence.

(1) Counterfeiting and forgery are subject matters that must be part of the overall specialization of all individual Officers detached to the HN police/Institutions since it is important that these matters are not neglected but properly addressed, since the inception of the reinforcement operation, at all levels of the HN Institutions. The Officers detached to HN units/agencies that, exclusively or within their overall competence, deal with the matters of counterfeiting and forgery must have appropriate knowledge of the specific HN legislation, so as to be able to monitor/ mentor/advise/partner with/reform. The Officers strengthening the capabilities of the HN at strategic levels must also be able to support a transformation process and to promote a new legal regulation of the matters, if needed. Together with the suppression of the counterfeiting of currency, the suppression of all other fraudulent means
of payment such as fake cheques and false/cloned credit, debit and other electronic cards should also be taken into considerations as an important issue to be addressed when reinforcing the HN and promoting transformation and innovation. Eventually, the transnational nature of counterfeiting and forgery as well as the probability that the HN criminality may be targeting part of a wider international network is always to be considered when implementing a reinforcement mission. In this regards, the reinforcement action has always to address intelligence sharing with the law enforcement agencies of the potential target Countries.

(2) The development of the SP action in the specific areas of counterfeiting and forgery, along the lines of a replacement mission, will start addressing the issue of spotting illegal production and distribution centres and possible transnational channels of smuggling as well as the control of the specialist materials required to counterfeit or to forge. This require close relationship with the HN Institutions which might be weakened by lack of integrity, improper interference or more simply by a different cultural background, insufficient education or poor legislation. In addition, this activity may require partnering with International Organizations that may be operating in the HN in the same field or in connected functional areas.

(3) Counterfeiting is likely to be the matter requiring more focus on innovating or making the provisions of the HN legislation more effective. The Convention at Reference D. and the EU Directive at Reference E. draw the lines for an effective and modern legislation. If the HN is a Party to the Convention, the domestic law should already envision all its principles, notably the pivotal principle of non-discriminatory protection of the currencies, and provisions in terms of criminal offences. The EU Directive could then offer support for supplementing the domestic law. Should the HN not be a Party to the Convention, the latter should anyway form the ground for the development of a specific domestic law.

3-8. Within the framework of the overall planning of the SP operation, counterfeiting and forgery need to be taken into consideration, along the lines above described, between the tasks assigned to the SP assets deployed either to replace the indigenous police or to reinforce them. These tasks require, furthermore, to be addressed in the pre – mission training as general tasks of the SP assets. All SP personnel must receive a general training in the subject matter while monitors/mentors and advisers need to receive in depth education, comprehensive of the general lines of the HN legislation concerning the subject matter.
CHAPTER 4 – CONCLUSIONS

4-1. The suppression of counterfeiting and forgery can play an important role in the S&R process of an unstable area since it contributes to create the conditions for a socially fair and durable economic growth and for a more secure environment. Combating the counterfeiting of currency and associated ancillary offences as well as the forgery of identification documents and all their connected criminal aspects is police responsibility that needs to be coherently addressed since the inception of a NATO S&R operation, within the conceptual framework of Stability Policing.

4-2. The present framework concept, released under the Concept at Reference G., is intended to constitute the ground for doctrinal development, education and training, planning of operations within the framework of the transformation of the capabilities of the military instrument. The concept describes innovative and specialized niche capabilities aimed at coping with the challenges of future military operations. These capabilities match the constantly evolving sensitivity of the public within the Euro – Atlantic space. This evolution results in an increasing twofold request for the Alliance’s military instrument: on the one hand, to bring justice and to impose the rule of law in the areas of NATO operations, on the other hand, to protect the common goods of security and wealth from criminal threats or harms that, emerging outside the boundaries of Alliance, can spread to the Allied Countries. This framework concept lies under the overarching concepts of Smart Defence, Connected Force Initiative and Framework for Future Alliance Operations and it is harmonized with their guiding principles.

4-3. The NATO SP COE is a hub of Subject Matter Experts in the area of Stability Policing. The Centre provides a focal point and a hub of expertise for this specialty and acts as a prime mover to increase the contribution to the Stabilization and Reconstruction efforts of the Alliance in unstable scenarios, providing the NATO with a unique tool to fill the capability gap in this area. The SP COE is committed to help the Alliance and the Sponsoring Nations to enhance and transform their capabilities, procedures and functions in order to meet potential and future security challenges.